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Abstract 
Few empirical studies exist that compare regulation (R) and fishing crime (VL). The lack 
of information about R and VL effects stakeholder decision-making. Crime weakens 
conservation efforts and creates false baseline data. This furthers R and the cycle repeats. 
The purpose of this correlational study was to determine the statistical association 
between the number and type of annual commercial blue crab R and VL of the same. The 
Pearson’s R correlation was used to analyze the data because it demonstrated the strength 
of each relationship. This quantitative study was grounded in enforcement theory. The 
data was public record and consisted of the number of R and VL issued yearly from the 
General Assembly of a Mid Atlantic’s State Department of Natural Resources (MD-
DNR). The intent was to correlate multiple decades, but the earliest available VL data 
began in 2009. The analysis uncovered divergent patterns. The correlation coefficient of 
0.79644 confirmed laws from 2009 correlated positively with 2010 violations. Further 
analysis revealed a negative correlation for 2010 and 2011 that was indicated by a 
negative correlation coefficient of -0.3588 and -0.166. The mean average of VL was 
12.5%. As restrictions keep increasing, the economic impact on local communities is 
substantial. This research has the potential to effect positive changes in restrictive harvest 
practices, record keeping of VL by Natural Resources of this Mid Atlantic State, and 
harvest reporting practices by crabbers. Sharing the findings with industry stakeholders 
may stimulate dialogue among stakeholders that answers why one type of regulation was 
violated more than another, encourage compliance by industry users, and improve 
conservation efforts to proliferate blue crab. This research contributes to future 
investigation of often-neglected variables that compromise conservation of blue crab. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
Introduction 
Despite having a police force in place since the late 1800s, there continues to be 
noncompliance in the harvesting of fishery resources from the Chesapeake Bay. Although 
regulations and a police force are avenues to manage marine natural resources, it is 
unknown how the passage of commercial blue crab fisheries regulations effects the 
compliance behavior of commercial crabbers in Maryland’s Chesapeake Bay. Drawing on 
enforcement theory, which suggests optimal enforcement is zero crime and willing 
compliance, this quantitative, correlational study filled the gap in the research regarding 
the relationship between the number and type of commercial blue crab fisheries laws 
passed each year and the level of noncompliance by the number of commercial fishers 
crabbing in the State of Maryland. 
The core of crime and policing theory resulted from a 1960s study performed by a 
Stanford University psychologist whereby two vehicles were abandoned uptown and 
downtown, respectively. Criminologists, George L. Kelling and James Q. Wilson, were 
intrigued by this study and how the psychologist demonstrated that visible neglect of an 
item can influence time until vandalism. They suggested that cleaning-up the visible 
signs of neglect in a neighborhood would influence the overall behavior of citizens living 
in that community and would ultimately lower the crime rate. They coined the theory 
broken windows (Vedantam et al., 2016). Like that experiment, in this research, I 
reviewed crime over time. Although my research may not have shown why and where 
crime occurred, it provided knowledge that may contribute to identifying trends in policy 
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and enforcement. The results of this study can assist in making regulatory actions 
meaningful for all vested parties. Outcomes of compliance include a reduction in 
citations issued (less actual direct and indirect costs) and proliferation of Maryland’s 
seafood industry (increase in harvest potential). 
User groups throughout the world of commercial fisheries argue the harvesting of 
marine resources as a conditional right, not an allotted privilege (Lam & Pauly, 2010). As 
these perceived rights pertain to the use of marine resources, distinguishing right from 
wrong proved difficult, even in the face of overfishing. Numerous scholars have 
described overfishing in various areas in the world (Ali & Abdullah, 2010; Carrier, 2002; 
Guenther, López-Carr, & Lenihan, 2015; Hall, 2008; Maryland Department of Natural 
Resources (MD-DNR), 2011; McGrath, 2001; Nasser, 2013).  
It could be argued that rights lean towards other implications such as ethics, 
stewardship, and other business-related fiduciary responsibilities (Lam & Pauly, 2010; 
Lord, 2011), while privileges resonate something earned. However, there is no guarantee 
of ethical behavior and stewardship from the fishing community, which leads to 
legislative and agency laws and regulations to protect each fishery. In this research, I 
discussed violations of commercial blue crab (Callinectes sapidus) regulations in 
Maryland’s Chesapeake Bay. The purpose of my research is to share the findings with 
industry stakeholders to affect a positive social change between policy makers and 
commercial crabbers. 
In this chapter, I provided background of the problem and detailed the purpose of 
the study. I introduced the theoretical foundation and methods. Even though correlation 
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does not require testing hypotheses, I chose to present research questions and the 
hypotheses for explicative purposes. I defined the key terms and highlighted the 
assumptions and limitations. In Chapter 2, I reviewed the popular theories guiding 
fisheries management and introduced the theory of enforcement, which grounded this 
study. In Chapter 3, I elaborated upon the study’s design, data collection, and analysis 
procedures to establish the validity and reliability of the results, which I explained in 
Chapter 4. Finally, I provided conclusions and recommendations for future related 
research in Chapter 5. 
Background of the Study 
Those who flock to the Lower Eastern Shore of Maryland to enjoy the 
quintessential spicy “Old Bay” steamed blue crab and salty sea air instead meet with an 
unpredictable crab market because of unpredictable regulatory actions faced by the 
industry. There is a long contentious history in Maryland concerning regulating the 
harvests of the Chesapeake Bay. In general, management dates to Royal orders enacted in 
the 17th century by Charles the 1st of England guaranteeing Lord Baltimore “fishing of 
every kind” via The Maryland Charter of 1632 (Casey, 2002; Hall, Casey, & Wells, 
2004). Ongoing disagreement concerning regulations appropriate for the preservation of 
the blue crab and other marine delicacies characterizes this rich history (Carrier, 2002; 
McGrath, 2001). 
For my research, the word fishing means the act of removing commercially 
harvested living, marine natural resources from the Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries. 
The words waterman, watermen, and crabber designate the commercial people deriving a 
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living by fishing on the Chesapeake Bay. People held dip nets and scooped up blue crabs 
one at a time (Kennedy, Oesterling, & Van Engel, 2007) prior to the mid-1900s making 
regulations unnecessary, and oysters and fish were numerous as evidenced by harvest 
reports (MD-DNR, 2015). The first commercial crabbing regulations were enacted at the 
turn of the 20th century (MD-DNR, 2013) with the introduction of the crab pot into 
Maryland in 1939. Crab pot use tended to be reported widely as the gear that most 
threatened the blue crab population. In 2018, crab pot limits continued to range between 
50 to 900 pots per commercially licensed fishing person (MD-DNR, 2018) and caught 
62% of the total crab harvest in Maryland (Carrier, 2002; MD-DNR, 2015). Thus, the 
debate about regulating this gear in Maryland is extreme as it relates to arguable species 
quantity or maximum sustainable yield (MSY) and individual transferable quota (ITQ) in 
the Chesapeake Bay. 
Currently, numerous types of commercial blue crab regulations and difficult 
enforcement hurdles facing the Maryland Natural Resource Police (MD-NRP) continue 
to threaten the Chesapeake Bay resources, particularly blue crab. What consumers enjoy, 
and commercial fishers depend upon may not survive into the next decade without 
willing compliance to a limited number of succinctly worded enforceable regulations. 
Willing compliance by commercial crabbers could be the foundation to provide accurate 
baseline harvest data from which to create valid policy. While noncompliance continues, 
commercial marine resources remain at risk, threatening a $52 million blue crab harvest 
(Maryland State Archives [MSA], 2015) and a $600 million contribution to the state’s 
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economy (MSA, 2018), as well as a 300-year-old way-of-life carried on by commercial 
fishing communities throughout Maryland. 
Problem Statement 
In Maryland, commercial blue crab fishers continue to reject regulations enacted 
or proposed individually or in combination before, during, and after commercial fishing 
seasons (Chisolm, II, 1940; MD-DNR, 2015; Maryland Register, 2017), which results in 
noncompliance. The legislative practice of constant, cumulative implementation of 
commercial fishing regulations without empirical evidence lends itself to noncompliance 
by user groups. Rejecting regulations threatens baseline data, which furthers regulatory 
action that then effects stakeholder decision-making, and conservation plans fail. 
Whether unidentified or identified, undesirable outcomes of regulatory action effect the 
analysis and interpretation of harvest data.  
The blue crab is migratory, and the Bay traverses six states, which include 
Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, Pennsylvania,  New York, and West Virginia, as well as 
the District of Columbia (Chesapeake Bay Program [CBP], 2015). This makes 
management and the following enforcement difficult at best. Federal and state laws limit 
harvest pressure on the blue crab, but individual states are charged with managing this 
natural resource independently; although, some efforts have been made to act 
cooperatively. Despite Maryland’s regulations, noncompliance continues to occur, and 
“chronic overexploitation” (Lord, 2011, p. 60) is common in coastal states. In this 
research, I explored MD-NRP citations alongside blue crab regulations to identify 
patterns.  
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An unknown percentage of commercial blue crab fishers exceed their licensed 
commercial gear limits. The MD-DNR estimates regarding the illegal use of crab pots are 
inaccurate, and monitoring is near impossible. This leads commercial blue crab fishers to 
under-report harvest to avoid scrutiny. This type of noncompliance results from economic 
considerations (Arias, Cinner, Jones, & Pressey, 2015). Such skewing of blue crab 
harvests distress population data, and blue crab harvest reports are the catalyst for 
regulation, particularly when harvests appear low. In short, blue crab regulations are 
difficult to enforce that leads to noncompliance by user groups, creating discrepancies in 
harvest reports that further regulation. These factors contribute to a misrepresentation of 
the economic analysis of the blue crab industry and the population estimates in Maryland. 
As such, it becomes difficult to identify the many individual variables and their 
relationship with the resource, as they embed in one another. 
There is a limited check and balance system in place for monitoring commercial 
crab harvests from catch to retail market. The harvest process begins when the crabber 
purchases the commercial gear, sets the pot, empties the catch, and reports the number of 
blue crab harvested on an honor system. The market process for the commercial blue crab 
fisher includes direct retail (off the boat) or wholesale (to the dealer) dockside sales. 
Specifically, commercial blue crab fishers are to report daily harvests by the month on a 
chart template supplied by the MD-DNR. These data are compared to the dockside buyer 
reports to try to balance blue crab harvests in Maryland. Although MD-DNR (2012) 
requires 40% of a participant’s income to be derived from natural resources to be 
considered a commercial fisher, blue crab reports do not reflect specific Internal Revenue 
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Service (IRS) data. Reporting does not include comparisons between the number of gear 
licensed for use in a season and the supplies listed on IRS form Schedule C, Profit and 
Loss from Business, of any one commercial licensed blue crab fishing person. Instead, 
MD-DNR compares active license limits and their quotas to buyers’ reported dockside 
purchases to determine the accuracy of commercial crab reports (MD-DNR, 2017). 
Crab pots attract blue crabs continuously while submerged, which contradicts the 
MD-DNR’s regulation requiring commercial blue crab fishers take one day off per week 
(2015). Emptying crab pots daily avoids mortality, but crab pots left unattended or 
stranded on the bottom of the Bay leads to carnivorous activity and hypoxia (lack of 
oxygen) (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration [NOAA], 2015) as the crab 
pot fills with crabs and by-catch such as turtles, fish, eel, and other marine animals, 
which goes underreported. In addition, crab pots that are in use, but not reported on, may 
be termed black-market, as well as the harvest these pots produce. 
In 2008, the MD-DNR discovered that Maryland commercial blue crab fishers 
claimed 30% more blue crabs harvested than dockside buyers reported on purchases. 
MD-DNR conjectured that this behavior was commercial fishers’ response to upcoming 
regulatory action in the form of additional blue crab limits (MD-DNR, 2008). This 
indicates that regulation may have a negative corollary effect on compliance behavior, at 
the very least in the form of inaccurate harvest reports, suggesting an unexpected 
negative relationship between regulation and its intended outcome  conservation. 
If it is feasible for commercial blue crab fishers to set an inflated number of gear, 
then underreport for personal or business financial reasons, there is a negative influence 
8 
 
 
on blue crab conservation efforts. Economics further control this situation because only 
those who can afford the extra gear will benefit, while those who cannot will suffer with 
unequal harvest available to them. This type of noncompliance behavior is feasible 
because MD-NRP lacks enforcement ability of crab pots. As the Chesapeake Bay Stock 
Assessment Committee (CBSAC, 2012) noted, “based on continued evidence of inflated 
harvest reports, Maryland’s estimated the 2011 commercial harvest from fishery-
independent data sources” (p. 4). Commercial blue crab fishers are the direct data source. 
Relying on outside stakeholders for data removes an important key ingredient for 
successful conservation of the blue crab. 
In 2019, fisheries management regulates the resource, the worker, and the gear. 
MD-NRP are limited in number (MD-DNR, 2015) but are responsible for 4,480 square 
miles (Chesapeake Bay Foundation [CBF], 2015) and upwards of 5,000 commercial 
fishing licenses in the Chesapeake Bay management area. Regulations are a form of 
limits used to manage fisheries; I focused on the commercial fisheries management of 
Maryland’s Chesapeake Bay blue crab, and “fisheries management depends upon the 
possibility of prediction” (Apollonio, 2010, p. 184; see also Liermann, Sharma, & 
Parken, 2010). Limits are what make prediction possible. I explored the history of 
commercial blue crab fisheries regulations in Maryland alongside the citations and 
warnings written for commercial noncompliance. I found trends that can be explored for 
future policy making and policing practices. A correlational study of regulatory action 
and enforcement data aids not only in identifying trends of regulatory actions and 
enforcement data, but also, in identifying possible embedded responses. This makes 
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future predictions reliable and valid and develops a base for future qualitative studies 
(Osbourne, 2010). 
Variables 
Existing articles of law in the Maryland Registry as well as rejected and repealed 
laws provided the independent variables. The dependent variable consisted of the 
available number of commercial blue crab enforcement data reported for each year that 
included the harvest of hard, peeler, and female crabs as defined by the MD-DNR. 
Additionally, I used enforcement data that MD-NRP reported for the “0” factor, times 
when no laws were passed, for comparison. To show patterns relating to enforcement 
data, I generated a model that presented blue crab enforcement data in chronological 
order simultaneous with the passing of blue crab regulations, whether the regulation 
became enacted or repealed. I examined any patterns that emerged. 
Literature Gap 
Fisheries population estimates, a multitude of management strategies, projected 
outcomes, economic projections, and conservation necessities to advance ecological 
success usurped the literature. Countries practice pet theories with little empirical 
evidence to support their reasoning. Even with the best of intention, strategists in the 
MD-DNR who plan for blue crab management fail to control the use of crab pots, which 
continue as the largest contributor to blue crab catch effort (MD-DNR, 2015; NOAA, 
2015). 
News articles and government reports have quoted decision makers’ references to 
the success of specific regulatory actions, but few have published empirical results 
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related directly to such actions. No models exist that allow for comparing outcomes such 
as citations and warnings, judiciary outcomes, population fluctuations, population 
estimates, active crab pot licenses, or harvest reports to gear operated. I found little cross-
reference between MD-NRP and MD-DNR blue crab related records (MD-NRP, 2015). 
Further, I did not find a means to compare gear (assets) to crab harvest and income 
reported. The cumulative literature and media dating to the early 19th century 
demonstrated that contention over the crabbing industry has evolved into a tangled web 
of one’s translation of events. 
In this research, I sought to fill the literature gap by 
• Identifying patterns concerning regulatory activity and enforcement of the 
harvest of blue crabs in Maryland’s Chesapeake Bay; 
• Contributing to an increased understanding about the importance of 
enforceable regulations; 
• Increasing decision makers’ understanding about the significance of accurate 
Maryland blue crab baseline data (Kerlinger, 1986; Lord, 2011) that comes 
directly from the frontline; and 
• Discussing the impact that harvest discrepancies continue to have on 
Maryland’s commercial blue crab fishery. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose for this quantitative, correlational study was to determine whether 
there was a statistically meaningful relationship between commercial blue crab 
enforcement and regulatory action and types of regulation on years with none, one, or 
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multiple regulatory actions. I considered regulation spanning 2009-2017, while 
comparing enforcement spanning 2010-2017. The comprehensive purpose is to share the 
findings with industry stakeholders to affect a positive social change between policy 
makers and commercial fishers. I identified crime trends in this research, and those 
interested in more detail must delve further to ascertain and confirm what drives these 
trends. The results of this study can assist in making regulatory actions meaningful for all 
vested parties. 
I appraised commercial blue crab fisheries related regulatory activity alongside 
enforcement data. The results of this correlational study aided in making regulatory 
considerations pertinent to blue crab management strategies (see Osbourne, 2010). This 
research contributes to future investigation of often-neglected variables that may halt a 
regulation’s ability to meet its intended purpose. Specifically, I addressed Maryland’s 
commercial blue crab fisheries regulatory action within its boundaries of the Chesapeake 
Bay. I focused on non-positive law titles that represent all commercial blue crab related 
regulations dating 2009-2017.  
My research is distinct from previous research in that I created a model designed 
specifically for blue crab enforcement data in relationship to blue crab regulatory action. 
Identifying patterns may support assumptions concerning discrepancies in blue crab 
harvest reports. Neither science nor Maryland reports discussed the state or federal 
monetary losses (costs) related to the above-mentioned variables, but they discussed the 
conservation implications of this type of noncompliance. It is plausible that commercial 
blue crab fishers’ compliance behavior produced unexpected outcomes because of the 
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number or type of regulatory actions enacted annually, thereby suggesting the existence 
of an unintended relationship between regulatory action and compliance behavior. 
This led to the following research question: What is the relationship between the 
number and type of annual commercial blue crab regulations enacted as measured by 
individual count and type and noncompliance by commercial blue crab fishers as 
measured by the number of tickets written annually? I expanded on compliance and 
enforcement theory by applying a historical view to the relationship between regulatory 
action and compliance behavior for Maryland’s blue crab. 
Nature of the Study 
I chose a quantitative study because it precluded the human perception and 
experience and focused on existing data. The primary concern in quantitative research is 
how the truth relates to external reality. In this study, I systematically compared 
secondary data, profiling a specific group and specific commercial regulations related to 
blue crab. By doing so, it made it possible to generalize about regulation and responses 
by stakeholders to such. This research provides a volume estimate of enforcement data 
relative to commercial crabbing in Maryland’s Chesapeake Bay. The sample spanned 
nearly a decade, and I employed blue crab regulatory actions that provided for reliable 
statistical analysis. A model using enforcement and regulation presented how a group 
might respond to expected or what might be considered overregulation and the 
unexpected consequences that may result. 
The legislative practice of constant, cumulative implementation of commercial 
fishing regulations without empirical evidence lends itself to noncompliance by user 
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groups. Rejecting regulations threatens baseline data, which furthers regulatory action 
that then effects stakeholder decision-making. This data, expressed in numbers, provided 
a base for statistical testing using descriptive statistics. Further, I employed inferential 
statistics. I attempted to identify trends on a specific demographic. In the interest of the 
best use of secondary data, a quantitative study best represented the variables that 
uncovered phenomena relating to regulatory action and compliance behavior of 
commercial blue crab fishers. 
I have a professional and personal interest in the topic of Maryland blue crab and 
its sustainability as an economic and affordable grocery and income resource for 
Maryland citizens. Several decades of intimate community-connection have created a 
sense of loyalty to the cultural practices of the fishing community. I viewed the most 
important task as providing clear and accurate data in a model that compared regulatory 
compliance behavior to regulatory activity. As an educator and facilitator of stakeholder 
pro-activity, wanted to encourage cooperation between the vast and diversified 
stakeholders to solve a problem. Currently, a cross-reference database between 
enforcement data and current regulations does not exist. I determined that statistical 
methodology best suited this research. Thus, I chose to engage in a quantitative study. 
The independent variable represented the presence, type, and number of 
commercial blue crab regulatory actions brought to Maryland’s General Assembly. In this 
study, blue crab regulations included all related regulations, acts, laws, public notices, 
management practices, and or proposals. This included sunset and repealed laws. The 
selection process included those regulations that have a direct enforcement relationship to 
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blue crab as defined by the MD-DNR. The independent variables were analyzed and 
presented in historical format.  
The dependent variable under investigation included blue crab commercial 
enforcement data. The enforcement data comprised citations reported or recorded by 
MD-NRP between 2010 and 2017. Missing data were considered in the hypothetical 
model developed. I analyzed the above-mentioned variables over time and drew 
conclusions regarding regulation changes that created time to event slots for discussion. 
Data analysis provided knowledge that represented both negative and positive 
correlations that represented noncompliance by commercial blue crab fishers. 
Noncompliance contributes to overregulation that leads to enforcement barriers that 
negatively effects conservation efforts and economic opportunities. 
Research Design 
Enforcement data and regulatory activity provided the variables for the 
correlation. I made comparisons year-to-year that provided a timeline to present patterns 
that developed in compliance behavior. I retrieved data from annotated codes of 
Maryland via the Maryland Department of Legislative Services, active and proposed 
regulations via the MD-DNR, and enforcement data via the MD-NRP to investigate 
correlations between the years 2009 and 2017. By employing a priori analyses, I avoided 
Type I and Type II errors (see Booth & Quinn, 2015; Gerrodette & Brandon, 2014). I 
reduced correlations reported to reduce Type I error rates. I presented tables and a graphic 
representation of the development of relationships between the variables because these 
are pertinent to stimulating further investigation. 
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To demonstrate positive, negative, or no correlations among the variables, I used 
correlational design. Through descriptive methods, I provided basic information about the 
variables I discuss in the research. I made no causal inferences from this quantitative 
study. Based on my review of commercial fisheries regulations, I determined that nested 
data should be a consideration because laws are subdivided into title, subtitle, chapter, 
regulation, section, subsection, paragraph, and subparagraph. Nested data provided 
greater detail for testing. This leads to protection against error of inference or over or 
under estimating effects (see Libertia & Mian, 2008; Scheuerell et al., 2015). I had to 
delete many data because a multitude of cell data were not filled out preventing collection 
of the nested data. 
For tests, I employed nominal scales because count data includes number of 
enforcement incidents; ordinal scales because correlation sought medians; interval scales 
because the differences between values had merit; and ratio scales because both the 
differences and ratios of values held meaning. The scales determined the strength of the 
research correlations.  
The work by way of correlational designs in fisheries and time series studies in 
Ali and Abdullah (2010), Dichmont, Pascoe, Lompas, Punt, and Deng (2010), Guenther 
et al. (2015), Hankin, Hackett, and Dewees (2005), Mazany, Charles, and Cross (2005), 
and Wilen (1985) provided examples of how to collect, test, and present the data 
empirically. Secondary data provided the intended variable correlation (MD-DNR, 2015; 
MD-NRP, 2015; Maryland Register, 2017; Pauly & Zeller, 2003). I examined 
independent variables (commercial blue crab regulations) and dependent variables 
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(commercial blue crab enforcement data) month-to-month and year-to-year to determine 
if associations existed. I studied the years with and without regulatory activity. This 
research represented blue crab in Maryland, and the results may not be applicable to other 
fisheries; however, some coastal fishing fleets that use similar commercial fishing gear to 
Maryland may benefit from the general knowledge this research uncovered. 
Main Research Question: Hypotheses and Subsidiary Questions 
The primary research question: What is the relationship between annual 
commercial blue crab related regulations enacted as measured by individual count and 
type and noncompliance by commercial fishers as measured by the number of tickets 
written annually? Regulations and enforcement data provided the variables for the 
intended correlation. The data set encompassed years that included regulatory actions as 
well as reported enforcement data for years with zero regulatory activity. This research 
question led me to develop the following hypotheses that are stated for holistic review 
purposes in null and alternative form:  
H01: The number of commercial regulatory actions enacted does increase the 
number of blue crab citations and warnings reported annually. 
H11: The number of commercial regulation action enacted does not increase the 
number of blue crab citations and warnings reported annually. 
H02: The type of commercial regulatory actions enacted does increase the number 
of blue crab citations and warnings reported annually. 
H12: The type of commercial regulation action enacted does not increase the 
number of blue crab citations and warnings reported annually. 
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Equally important questions are: How many times has fishing illegal gear 
occurred during the study years? Based on enforcement data related to illegal gear, what 
is the skew on harvest data because of commercial blue crab fishers exceeding the crab 
pot limit? Do years with no regulatory activity have less enforcement (crime) compared 
to years with regulatory activity? What percentage is noncompliance behavior of total 
licenses reporting activity? 
To comprehend the evolution of the blue crab industry and its effects on 
Marylanders and U.S. citizens in general, I reviewed literature starting with the earliest 
record of the trade. As with all economic ventures that flourish, fisheries needed 
regulating for a host of reasons including but not limited to economic, conservation, and 
ecological impact. Thus, what became the number one export for Maryland – blue crab – 
also became a public policy issue and has remained such since its discovery by 
Maryland’s earliest Native American tribes. 
Theoretical Base 
Influences 
The evolution of blue crab as an important Maryland commodity represented the 
base concept for this research. On point, since King Charles I (1632) bestowed the 
Province of Maryland upon Lord Baltimore (Virginia Marine Resource Commission 
[VMRC], 2010), the debate reigned on about fishery rights and what that means to 
different stakeholders. Further, findings by the Supreme Court Justices (540 U.S., 2003) 
illuminated the broader implications surrounding fisheries debates and riparian rights. My 
initial  research concerning blue crab led to ecosystems theory. This theory attempts to 
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view a variable without fully understanding key interactions from other variables 
including different species in its habitat (Emery, Green, Gardner, & Tisdell, 2012). 
Alternatively, several themes emerged as dominant in the literature, presented here, most 
to least reported: conservation, environmental, informational, common-property and 
rights-based, economics, and enforcement. Standing alone, none of these theories 
represented the research problem concisely. 
Specifically, common-property and rights-based theories represent the current 
management standard in fisheries. Although both theories address open access or the 
division of fisheries, equal access to the harvest does not represent the real world 
accurately. These theorists believe that participation in the decision process on the use of 
a fishery acts as an incentive for fishing persons to “take the appropriate management 
actions” (Deacon, 2012, p. 261). These theories of management resulted in a percent of 
the overall allowable harvest per fishing person in hopes of developing an efficient, 
sustainable fishery (Stewart & Callagher, 2011) often referred to as MSY. The premise is 
that these theories support a sustainable fishery; however, skewed baseline data has the 
potential to impact MSY drastically, making it a poor model for fisheries management, 
particularly blue crab, which is unpredictable and misreported. As such, the division of 
opportunity to harvest is not equal among the frontline stakeholders, creating economic 
and harvest conflict that may lead to noncompliance behavior. Economic theories aim to 
create an equilibrium between effort and catch and analyze this in terms of present value 
(Diekert, Eikeset, & Stenseth, 2010; Nasser, 2013). Compliance and enforcement have 
received little attention in the literature but are  intricate ingredients in sustaining and 
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proliferating fishery resources (Ali & Abdullah, 2010). As such, the trends that became 
apparent between compliance behaviors relative to regulatory action are significant to 
future decision-making concerning blue crab management. 
Theories 
Fisheries managers reported enforcement of regulation commonly as the greatest 
expense in fisheries management (Kuperan & Sutinen, 1998). Enforcing the law of 
fisheries often leads to litigation between commercial fishers and the government agency 
creating the policy. Nie (2008) purported a “co-evolution” (p. 140) occurring between 
regulation and litigation. O’Connor Shelley and Crow (2009) argued that resource police 
receive little attention in the literature because the types of crimes that characterize their 
work may be considered “folksy”  and do not fall under the “construct of crime”  as 
studied in leading research (p. 11). Ali and Abdullah (2010) contended previous 
compliance studies followed either positive or normative theories. They suggested that 
fishing people make a conscious choice to break the law and accidental oversight of a 
violation is a rare event (see also Kuperan & Sutinen, 1998). 
Economic theory as it relates to fisheries has been considered by Ali and Abdullah 
(2010), Bressan and Shen (2008), Lord (2011), and Upadhyaya, Larson, and Mixon 
(2002). Because regulation controls the industry, it dominates economic sustainability. 
Ali and Abdullah (2010) pointed out that economists should be concerned with fisheries 
management. In their research conducted on Malaysian fisheries, the researchers showed 
a significant contribution from fisheries that equates to a 1.6% gross domestic product 
(GDP) employing 82,000 fishers. The GDP and employed fishing people represented the 
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sum of both small and large-scale commercial operators. Maryland’s blue crab industry 
contributes to a $33 trillion global value of ecosystem services (Roberson, 2003). 
In recent literature, rights-based fisheries centered in common property theory 
dominated the literature (Blankenship, 2010; Deacon, 2012; Lam & Pauly, 2010; Stewart 
& Callagher, 2011; Turris, 2010). Griffin and Woodward (2011) suggested biologists lean 
towards regulating effort or inputs and harvest potential or outputs, while economists are 
concerned with maximizing present value (PV). Turris (2010) argued that principal-agent 
issues have a significant impact on behaviors, as owner-operators would view fishing as a 
long-term stake as opposed to a leaseholder of licenses or fishing quotas. Lam and Pauly 
(2010) asserted that the issue of publicly owned resources leads to the perceived right to 
fish with an ethical dilemma of gaining financial rewards from such. Common property 
theory has led to management systems such as ITQ, MSY, and even cooperatives 
(Deacon, 2012; Stewart & Callagher, 2011). I further discuss the evolution of dominant 
theories in fisheries research and management in Chapter 2. 
I methodically examined the literature that revealed limited studies in compliance 
and enforcement theory. Literature grounded in the common property/rights-based and 
economic theory premises appeared as most prominent. The present main research 
question, subsidiary questions, and hypotheses benefited best from compliance grounded 
in enforcement theory. A study conducted by Guenther et al. (2015) analyzed commercial 
lobster fishers whose traps are stationary like blue crab pots. Like lobster fishers, 
commercial blue crab fishers are known to be territorial when using space in the 
Chesapeake Bay. The authors reviewed secondary data before and after a major 
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management change that created moratoriums on specific fishing locations. The study 
represented a time to event design similar to this blue crab regulatory and enforcement 
data study. 
Even though compliance and enforcement theory literature in fisheries appeared 
limited, it is essential to conservation and management; therefore, I discuss the apparent 
trends in noncompliance in the blue crab fishery. I assumed the secondary data as factual. 
The data included citations written for any law relative to commercial blue crab in 
Maryland’s Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries. Since the underlying standard for 
fisheries management is common property and rights-based theories, I discussed it 
thoroughly; however, economics drive the industry, so the costs associated with the 
possibility of skewed data is essential to the overall impact on the state by noncompliant 
commercial blue crab fishers. 
As I reviewed the vast literature, documentation suggested a specific theory to 
incorporate conservation and economics into a method that can be empirically 
documented has yet to come to fruition concerning ecosystem theories, in this case, the 
blue crab of the Chesapeake Bay (Fisher et al., 2009). Dichmont et al. (2010) stated that 
the newest paradigm attempts to manage the user group of natural resources rather than 
the resource itself. I used quantitative design to generate patterns between regulation and 
enforcement data in a state that manages both the resource and the user group. The results 
may contribute to future management strategies for blue crab. 
The plausibility existed that regulation had a negative corollary effect (Guenther 
et al., 2015) on commercial fishers’ compliance, which could skew harvest reports, 
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thereby suggesting the existence of an unintended relationship. Although Guenther et al. 
(2015) reviewed before and after data in fishing effort concerning regulatory changes on 
spatial demographics. Their research provided reference for my study. Most important, 
enforcement related to cumulative commercial blue crab regulatory actions was difficult 
to decipher. These noncompliance issues skew harvest data, which leads to additional 
regulatory action. Regulation inhibits economic opportunity. The documented history of 
blue crab management demonstrated sporadic decision making with little direct empirical 
evidence. This created enforcement management issues and leaves room for multiple 
judicial interpretations. I reviewed several theories for this study that included 
compliance and enforcement theory and common property and rights-based theories 
because each plays a vital role in the commercial fishing industry. Many of the 
researchers grounded their studies in economic theory, and they made up the majority of 
literature available. 
Operational Definitions 
The independent variables, indicated by R1, 2, 3 … are Maryland laws and statutes 
and are housed in the Maryland Registry. Congress categorized and named the articles 
Natural Resources. Each independent variable represented was titled: Title 4. Fish and 
Fisheries. Subtitles and sections define the independent variables into subject matter. To 
limit the independent variables into a workable data set, I grouped the articles into 6 
categories from existing Maryland Statutes: 
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• Regulation 1 (R1) Tidal Fish License, License for Catching Crabs for 
Commercial, Penalties, Natural Resources – Authorization to Catch Crabs – 
Revocation; 
• Regulation 2 (R2) Removing Fish, Nets, or Gear of Another Prohibited;  
• Regulation 3 (R3) Rules and Regulations Generally, Use of Crab Pots in 
Chesapeake Bay, Limitation on Number of Crab Pots, Crabbing – Crab Pots – 
Requirements; 
• Regulation 4 (R4) Rules and Regulations Generally, Closed Season for Hard 
Crabs; 
• Regulation 5 (R5) Limitations and Prohibitions on Catching and Possessing 
Certain Kinds and Sizes of Crabs Purposes; and 
• Regulation 6 (R6) Rules and Regulations Pertaining to Female Crabs 
Enforcement data that related to commercial blue crab regulations as reported by 
MD-NRP represented the dependent variables. Furthermore, I reported the “0” factor, 
those times during which there were no regulations enacted, but enforcement occurred, as 
zero regulation in this correlational study. 
Key Terms 
Legal Terms 
For the purpose of this research, the following source supported definitions 
relative to laws are interchangeable and referred to as a regulation(s) or law(s)throughout 
my research.  
Actions: Emergency legislation brought to the Administrative Executive 
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Legislative Review (AELR) Committee by the MD-DNR. Their authority includes 
making emergency decisions on fishing activities, including but not limited to 
moratoriums, early season closings, shorter day endings, and harvest limitations. 
However, the Governor has the authority to override an AELR decision (Maryland 
General Assembly, 2016). 
Annotated code: A compilation of laws that reference other relevant regulations or 
statutes and summarize cases that discuss or interpret the code section (Harvard Law 
School, 2018). 
Code of Maryland (CoM): These are statutes referenced from the annual editions 
of the Laws of Maryland by year and chapter. These are further subdivided by article, 
title, subtitle, section, subsection, paragraph, subparagraph, and so on (University of 
Maryland, 2018). 
Code of Maryland Regulations (COMAR): These are cited from the Maryland 
Registry by volume, number, and page. Individual regulations are further subdivided by 
title, subtitle, chapter, subchapter, section, subsection, and so on (University of Maryland, 
2018). 
Maryland Agency Rules and Regulations (MARR): These represent regulations 
created between 1972 and 1975 prior to the adoption of COMAR. MARR is cited by 
number and or date of a regulation’s adoption (Office of the Secretary of State, 1992). 
Positive law and non-positive law: A positive law (legislative act) title represents 
one law, conforms to Code, and is named and enacted by Congress. Congress specifically 
organizes the text, and it appears exactly as proposed by Congress. Even though both 
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types of titles may be temporarily modified with emergency regulations, Congressional 
laws always supersede departmental regulations (uscode.house.gov, 2015). A non-
positive law (agency regulation) title represents a regulation and is assigned by the 
agency in charge, such as the MD-DNR. When necessary, the agency creates a new title. 
Each regulation has been specifically arranged in the text. “The organization, structure, 
and designations necessarily differ from those of the incorporated statutes (legislative 
acts), and there are certain technical, although non-substantive, changes made to the text 
for purposes of inclusion in the Code” (uscode.house.gov, 2015). 
Regulation: Rules that “administrative agencies adopt, amend and repeal. 
…under the authority granted to them by statutes. Unless the Legislature has created an 
exemption, agencies must follow the procedures in the Administrative Procedure Act 
when adopting, amending, or repealing regulations” (Maryland Secretary of State, 2015). 
Statutes/Laws: Legislative enactments developed in Congress (Maryland 
Secretary of State, 2013). 
Uncodified regulations: These are regulations created prior to the adoption of 
MARR. They are cited by number and or date of a regulation’s adoption (Maryland 
Department of Legislative Services, 2007). 
Crab Definitions 
 For the purpose of defining the blue crab, the following details will be specific to 
the research discussion. 
Blue crab: Callinectes sapidus is found in the Western Atlantic within its tidal 
tributaries and estuaries (Chesapeake Bay Program, 2015). Predominantly, it is a bottom 
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feeder. Legal harvest size varies from state to state. The blue crab evolves through six 
cycles: hard, peeler (white, pink, rank sign), buster, soft, buckrum, green (male), or sook 
(mature female). Visual identification of the male is defined by the “Washington 
Monument” apron on its bottom, while the mature female sports the “Capital” building 
on her bottom (J. Rachor-Hornsby, personal communication, 2018). 
 Hard crab: It is not a female, soft, peeler, buster, buckrum, or green crab as 
defined by the MD-DNR. It is a male crab whose shell is hard, and it is harvested by 
regulated size; at specific times; on specific days; with specific apparatus. It is referred to 
as a #1 Crab, a #2 Crab, or a Jimmy Crab (J. Rachor-Hornsby, personal communication, 
2018). 
Peeler crab: Authenticated by the distinct sign in the shape of a half-moon on the 
last paddle of the rear swimming fins. Three phases in this sign include a white sign, a 
pink sign, and the blood red sign (rank) that signifies it will shed its outer shell within 
several hours. The female can be identified visually by the rainbow-colored triangular 
apron on her bottom (J. Rachor-Hornsby, personal communication, 2018). 
Soft crab: Authenticated by its soft, spongy structure and inability to use its 
pinchers. It lacks physical control and floats with the tide until it gains some strength. 
This crab shed its outer shell within the previous two to four hours (J. Rachor-Hornsby, 
personal communication, 2018). 
Sook crab: Authenticated by a hard shell and rounded apron on the bottom side. A 
mature female close to the end of its life cycle that may or may not shed its shell, or it 
may have been fertilized during its soft-shell duration. Once fertilized, it will grow a 
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spongy, egg bottom, which is protected by the apron (J. Rachor-Hornsby, personal 
communication, 2018) and develops through distinct cycles (Virginia Places, 2018). 
Fisheries Terms 
For the purpose of this research, the following source supported definitions will 
be applicable to this study. 
Crab pot: A cube-shaped or rectangular device with openings toward the inside 
for the entrance of crabs (COMAR 08.02.03.01.A.(4)). The structure and its 
compartments are made from wire mesh in a cube shape, and it has not changed much 
since its introduction in 1939. An iron square is attached to the bottom perimeter to help 
it maintain its structural integrity. Wire mesh separates it into two levels: an upper 
chamber and a lower chamber. The bottom chamber has two to four concave funnels that 
allow a crab to enter but unable to escape because of the crab’s pointy shell and legs. 
Often, the crabs crawl up to the top chamber through another funnel in the center of the 
pot where they stay until dumped from the pot by a commercial blue crab fishing person. 
The top of the pot at the upper chamber opens to release the crabs. The commercial blue 
crab fisher holds the pot upside down, and the crabs naturally release their grip falling 
into a waist high box where specific stages of their life sort them. Although design is 
consistent, crab pots used to harvest hard crabs utilize a heavier gauge wire and iron to 
weight the pot to the bottom. 
The crab pot is a stationary device and is placed in rows of about 50 pots with 
each pot placed 20 feet apart. A floating device (buoy) is attached to a rope to identify 
which pots belong to whom and their location; then, the rope is attached to one corner of 
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the bottom iron square. Commercial blue crab fishers hook the buoy with a hand-held 
boat hook, pull it on board the vessel, and turn the pot over, which allows the crabs to 
drop, bait the pot in a special chamber on the bottom, dump the pot, close the pot, and 
then throw it back over board. As the boat travels from buoy to buoy, the boat mate culls 
the harvest into specific baskets or aerated, water-filled boxes. This process from 
daybreak to closing time is referred to as “fishing pots” (J. Rachor-Hornsby, personal 
communication, 2018).  
License type: The MD-DNR allocates licenses by gear used and quota of crab 
pots allowed per person per boat. Tidal Fishing License (TFL) up to 900 crab pots; Crab 
Harvester (CB6) up to 600 crab pots; Crab Harvester (CB3) up to 300 crab pots; and 
Limited Crab Catcher (LCC) up to 50 crab pots (COMAR 08.02.01.05.A.). 
Maximum sustainable yield (MSY): The largest long-term average catch that can 
be taken from a population under prevailing ecological, environmental conditions and 
fishery technological characteristics (e.g., gear selectivity), and the distribution of catch 
among fleets (NOAA, 2011).  
Overharvesting: A loosely used term to discuss the nature of fishing persons 
removing more than the species can sustain or one’s license allows and that can cause a 
fishery to collapse (PNAS, 2018). 
Overreporting: The falsification of crab reports by inflating actual harvests (MD-
DNR, 2008). 
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 Overregulation: A loosely used term used to discuss the cumulative regulating of 
the Maryland blue crab and Maryland commercial fishing person (J. Rachor-Hornsby, 
personal correspondence, 2018). 
Stock abundance: Numerical data used to represent the blue crab population for 
any given year or season (NOAA, 2009). 
Underreporting: The falsification of crab reports by deflating actual harvests 
(MD-DNR, 2008). 
Winter dredge survey: The only bay-wide fishery independent effort to estimate 
the number of blue crabs living in Maryland’s Chesapeake Bay (MD-DNR, 2013). 
Maryland Statutes 
The following is a list of the defined Maryland Statutes I examined in this 
research. Maryland’s Congress specifically named the article, title, subtitle, and section. 
§4-701 Natural Resources: Title 4 Fish and Fisheries, Subtitle 7 Licensing,  
Regulation, and Supervision of Fishing and Fisheries in Tidal Waters, Section 701 Tidal 
Fish License. 
 §4-703 Natural Resources: Title 4 Fish and Fisheries, Subtitle 7 Licensing, 
Regulation, and Supervision of Fishing and Fisheries in Tidal Waters, Section 703 
Issuance of new tidal fish licenses after September 1, 1988. 
§4-803 Natural Resources: Title 4 Fish and Fisheries, Subtitle 8 Crabs, Section 
803 Rules and Regulations Generally; Public Hearings Before Rules and Regulations 
Become Effective. 
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§4-804 Natural Resources: Title 4 Fish and Fisheries, Subtitle 8 Crabs, Section 
804 License for Catching Crabs for Commercial or Noncommercial Purposes. 
§4-809 Natural Resources: Title 4 Fish and Fisheries, Subtitle 8 Crab, Section 
809 Limitations and Prohibitions on Catching and Possessing Certain Kinds and Sizes of 
Crabs. 
§4-810 Natural Resources: Title 4 Fish and Fisheries, Subtitle 8 Crabs, Section 
810 Rules and Regulations Pertaining to Female Crabs. 
§4-812 Natural Resources: Title 4 Fish and Fisheries, Subtitle 8 Crabs, Section 
812 Use of Crab Pots in Chesapeake Bay Waters in Dorchester and Somerset Counties. 
§4-813 Natural Resources: Title 4 Fish and Fisheries, Subtitle 8 Crabs, Section 
813 Harvesting Crab with Crab Pots in Somerset County. 
§4-814 Natural Resources: Title 4 Fish and Fisheries, Subtitle 8 Crabs, Section 
814 Limitation on Number of Crab Pots. 
§4-1201 Natural Resources: Title 4 Fish and Fisheries, Subtitle 12 Penalties and 
Fines, Searches, Seizures and Forfeitures, Section 1201 Penalties. 
§4-1205 Natural Resources: Title 4 Fish and Fisheries, Subtitle 12 Penalties and 
Fines, Searches, Seizures and Forfeitures, Section 1205 Seizure and Disposition of Fish 
Unlawfully Caught, Sold, Offered for Sale, Transported, or Possessed. 
§4-1206 Natural Resources: Title 4 Fish and Fisheries, Subtitle 12 Penalties and 
Fines, Searches, Seizures and Forfeitures, Section 1206 Seizure, Forfeiture, and 
Disposition of Devices, Equipment, or Property. 
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Assumptions 
Based upon MD-DNR complaints (2008), it must be assumed that commercial 
blue crab fishers can over-report harvest, and commercial blue crab fishers have the 
means to exceed their crab pot limits. MD-NRP cannot enforce crab pot limits effectively. 
Secondary data provided by MD-DNR represented the independent and dependent 
variables for this research. Because this agency collected, compiled, and disseminated 
this information, it must be assumed to be evaluated and based upon fact. 
Certainty in fisheries does not exist. Several assumptions about this research must 
be considered. First, skewed harvest data acts as a catalyst to further regulation. 
Inconsistent blue crab data and a migratory species makes MSY a poor control for 
population stock abundance since MSY is dependent upon consistency. Blue crab 
populations and fluctuations are inconsistent. The effect of overharvesting, 
overregulation, and black market crab pots is unknown. Crab pots trap blue crab and by-
catch continuously while submerged. 
 For this research to have merit, I assumed that overreporting and exceeding crab 
pot limits occurred. Moreover, governmental secondary data provided the necessary 
depth and breadth for this time series model. Maryland provided reliable sources for a 
compilation of variables. I presented a bias free model of positive and negative trends 
found in regulatory action. The results of this will further positive outcomes in the fishery 
through open communication. I used  an existing time model because I had limited time 
available to complete my study. Using a quantitative study, I presented trends that may 
lead to future qualitative studies in this area of research. 
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Because Maryland uses individual crab harvest quotas for hard crab, 
understanding how MSY works is essential for understanding MD-DNR’s viewpoint on 
blue crab management. The MD-DNR is charged with sustaining the resource, not with 
guaranteeing a livelihood to commercial fishers. The MD-DNR regulates the resource for 
this purpose. Multiple variables influencing population data exist such as unhealthy 
habitat, climate changes, and unknown black market crab pots. Certainty is not an 
accurate representation of any fishery. It must be assumed that blue crab float or swim 
both in and out of the Bay dependent upon natural phenomena, effecting blue crab 
population to the minute. I tested the data to identify patterns and relationships. Future 
researchers can delve deeper to ascertain the meaning and influence of trends discovered. 
In any fishery, MSY is dependent upon consistency, and blue crab are not consistent, 
making MSY a poor measurement and management strategy for the blue crab population 
in the Bay. 
Scope 
I conducted this study  in Somerset County, Maryland. I determined if an 
unexpected relationship existed between blue crab enforcement data (2010 – 2017) and 
regulation (2009 – 2017) represented by secondary data. For this research, I included 
commercial blue crab related enforcement data and blue crab related regulation data. I 
used the commercial crabbing community as defined by MD-DNR active licenses as the 
basis for this research. This community reflected a culmination of commercial blue crab 
harvesters, whether they were Maryland residents or other, but they had to work in 
Maryland’s portion of the Chesapeake Bay or its tributaries. In the results section, I 
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discussed key differences between crabbing communities  and how that may have 
influenced the results of this research. 
The populations I investigated included the commercial blue crab fisher, 
commercial blue crab citations and enacted, rejected, and repealed commercial crabbing 
regulations, and the Maryland blue crab. I investigated multiple theories for grounding 
the research and analyzing the variables. I developed an empirical study to represent the 
correlational research question. I reviewed articles from all aspects of the marine 
sciences, social sciences, and economic theories to determine the appropriate variables to 
test. To gain a concise representation of the research, I had to dissect and group the 
variables to a manageable size. Thus, time, money, and availability of data became the 
final determination of variables to be used in this research. Many researchers attempted to 
identify causes for existing obvious problems in the industry such as overharvesting, 
disease, or conservation. I sought to identify possible unexpected outcomes to regulatory 
action. Secondary data and time analysis became the obvious choice in variable and 
design selection. This made compliance and enforcement theory most relative to this 
research.  
 This study cannot be generalized to other marine resources since the information 
reported about the subjects and populations under study was specific to Chesapeake Bay. 
However, this design may be applicable to similar gear used in fisheries. This model 
allowed for the analysis of any regulation and its corresponding enforcement data. 
However, cultural conditioning and specific state regulations from fishing community to 
fishing community would change the outcomes of any similar research. For this study, I 
34 
 
 
compiled public data on enforcement and legislative activity, and I viewed the 
commercial crabbing community as a single unit, simplifying ethical confidentiality. 
Delimitations 
I did not investigate the commercial blue crab community as a group or as 
individuals because I attempted to identify trends rather than causes of such. Generalized 
secondary data reflected the citations and warnings without the necessity of identifying 
the accused offender. Repeat offenders were not considered in the variable set. I did not 
consider the number of NRP as compared to the number of citations and warnings written 
in the research. I reviewed judicial outcomes for informational purposes, but the 
outcomes of warnings and citations were not included in the data set. I found limited 
empirical research that supported management decisions for the Maryland blue crab, 
particularly, research that considered multiple theories as a lens to view a single problem, 
and ecosystems theory dominated blue crab literature. 
Limitations 
Maryland’s DNR only concerns itself with the Maryland portion of the Bay. The 
situational conflict is that blue crabs participate in northerly and southerly migrations 
influencing the geographic data of blue crab and affecting multistate regulations. Limited 
historical enforcement data and activity and general blue crab data hindered my research. 
How, when, where, types, and to what degree data was collected by scientists and 
reported by commercial fishers since the 1940s varied throughout the 1900s and twenty-
first centuries and can be described as sporadic. I based this research solely on 
Maryland’s portion of the Chesapeake Bay. However, much of the literature considered 
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the entire Bay in its studies. The patterns discovered in this research from the selected 
variables can be addressed immediately and directly, but the results are not pertinent 
outside of Maryland’s boundaries. 
Maryland collected data throughout the history of commercial crabbing in 
Maryland can be described as inconsistent at best. Regulations are formed and repealed 
most legislative sessions. This creates problems for monitoring outcomes of regulation 
and additional enforcement costs. Noncompliance behavior data was limited. There 
existed no cross-referencing of data between the administrative, enforcement, and 
scientific agencies of the MD-DNR. Further, the Maryland Department of Agricultural 
and the United States Department of Agriculture have some regulatory influence 
concerning the Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries. License holders may not be active 
from season-to-season. Cultural practices may influence noncompliance behavior as 
opposed to regulatory action. 
My past professional experience had given me the opportunity to work as a 
commercial blue crab fisher within Maryland on the Chesapeake Bay where I performed 
the necessary duties of a boat mate, which included but was not limited to cutting bait, 
flipping pots, baiting pots, culling crabs, loading/unloading bushel baskets full of crabs, 
fueling, and assisting in maintaining and operating the rig. Further experience included 
the operation of a soft crab-shedding shanty. I worked laborious, 4-hour intervals during 
blue crab shedding, which continued around the clock, from June through late summer. I 
have a stake in supporting the sustainability of the Chesapeake Bay fishing community 
by testing current practices using secondary data. Because I worked as a commercial blue 
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crab fisher and was involved politically in the industry, I have several preconceived 
philosophies. To eliminate personal bias, I chose a quantitative study, which represented 
the compared data empirically. Representing data accurately best serves the commercial 
crabbing community as well as the resource – blue crab. I accomplished this using 
secondary government data. By employing a quantitative study, I presented the data free 
from emotion and any misinterpretation of human responses that can occur in qualitative 
studies.  
I identified trends between noncompliance and regulatory action, but I did not 
seek to discover why patterns emerged. Patterns that emerged can be analyzed using 
qualitative design to answer the question “why” these patterns emerged. Further, time and 
money constraints prevented me from investigating similar variables related to other 
fisheries in Maryland to make possible general predictions about the nature of 
compliance related to regulatory action. An enforcement database that is accessible for 
strategic planning is nonexistent. Voluntary harvest reporting occurred until the mid-
twenty-first century. Geographical conflict arose between the southern, central, and 
northern Bay fishers because blue crab life cycles differ in time and place that influence 
harvest type, effort, and season. The cost to acquire detailed data from MD-DNR limited 
my research, so a preexisting data base supplied by MD-NRP provided the enforcement 
variable set. 
Significance of the Study 
This study is crucial because as restrictions keep increasing, the economic impact 
on local communities is substantial, and compliance and monitoring issues escalate with 
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the problem. One importance of the study to past and current research is that it 
empirically connects commercial blue crab regulations to enforcement over time. 
Because patterns emerged between regulation and noncompliance, I suggest skewed 
baseline data exists that may then drive policy, which furthers regulation unnecessarily. 
This research may lead to changes and repeals in legislative policies relating to both blue 
crab regulation and enforcement policies. This research may lead to changes in MD-NRP 
budgets needed to perform enforcement. Legislative bills that have the potential to make 
enforcement of crab pot limits possible may be a result. In turn, enforcement of crab pot 
use will improve base line crab data, which will improve conservation of the blue crab 
and even the playing field for stakeholders through economic opportunities within 
Maryland’s commercial crabbing community. 
The scale of the fishery is of no consequence when deciphering the relationship 
between baseline data and regulation (Lord, 2011). In this study, I touched on important 
social issues relative to the perception of rights, the cultural significance of crabbing 
communities, and the direct and indirect costs of enforcement, including the inability to 
enforce. Compliance issues interfere with the ability to collect accurate baseline data 
from the frontline (Lord, 2011) - commercial fishers. Because regulation controls the 
industry, it dominates economic sustainability. 
I extended the body of knowledge by expanding upon the chronological order of 
events that include the development of the blue crab commercial fishing industry, the 
MD-DNR, its counterpart, the MD-NRP and how it relates to historical regulatory action. 
Reviewing the life span of these events and their relationship to each another was 
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significant for understanding the unpredictable relationship between stakeholders. The 
identification of correlations between regulations and enforcement and how it translates 
into harvest discrepancies is essential to public policy making. This empirical study 
discovered patterns between blue crab regulations and commercial fishers’ compliance 
behavior. 
Summary and Transition 
Chapter 1 provided background information relating to the commercial blue crab 
industry in Maryland. The research problem of regular implementation of commercial 
blue crab regulations and the impossible task of monitoring and enforcing blue crab 
regulations represented the essence of this research. A historic review of blue crab 
management and enforcement data  illuminated important, influential trends that exist but 
were unexpected. This data has the potential to impact legislative decision making and 
support or negate previously held beliefs about over-harvesting the Maryland blue crab. 
 The purpose of this quantitative, correlational study was to determine whether 
there was a statistically meaningful relationship between commercial blue crab 
enforcement and regulatory action on years with none, one, or multiple regulatory actions 
spanning 2009 – 2017, respectively. A comprehensive purpose for this quantitative, 
correlational design is to share the findings with industry stakeholders to affect a positive 
social change between policy makers and commercial fishers. I grounded the study in 
enforcement theory. I collected data from the MD-DNR, MD-NRP, and the Maryland 
Register regarding blue crab related enforcement and regulatory action. I analyzed data 
using time series and linear regression. 
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I provided a detailed explanation of the importance of reviewing the key theories 
considered for this research in Chapter 2. The concept of time analysis provided an 
environment from which to study the variables of enforcement data and regulation. The 
relevant literature consisted of rights-based and common property theories, economic 
theories, and compliance (enforcement) theories. Individually, these theories were routine 
in fisheries research, but in combination, innovative ideas were revealed for future 
research. In Chapter 3, I further discussed the choice of method and provided additional 
information about validity within the research. I analyzed secondary sources and 
measurement tools in detail.  
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Chapter 2: Review of the Literature 
Introduction 
In Maryland, commercial blue crab fishers continue to reject regulations enacted 
or proposed individually or in combination before, during, and after commercial fishing 
seasons (Chisolm, II, 1940; MD-DNR, 2015; Maryland Register, 2017), which results in 
noncompliance. The legislative practice of constant, cumulative implementation of 
commercial fishing regulations without empirical evidence lends itself to noncompliance 
by user groups. Rejecting regulations threatens baseline data, which furthers regulatory 
action that then affects stakeholder decision-making, and conservation plans fail. 
Whether unidentified or identified, undesirable outcomes of regulatory action affect the 
analysis and interpretation of harvest data. This baseline data furthers regulatory action, 
which effects industry stakeholders’ decision-making regarding marine resources, and the 
cycle continues. 
MD-NRP is limited in number (MD-DNR, 2013) but is responsible for 4,480 
square miles (CBF, 2015) of Chesapeake Bay management area. I appraised commercial 
blue crab fisheries related regulatory activity beside enforcement data as my primary 
objective for this research. Enforcement data included warnings and citations written to 
commercial blue crab fishers within the boundaries of Maryland’s portion of the 
Chesapeake Bay. I did not include the outcomes of warnings and citations. Specifically, I 
addressed Maryland’s historic regulatory action within its boundaries of the Chesapeake 
Bay and whether it had influenced compliance and enforcement data in unexpected ways. 
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Summary Content 
I conversed with active and retired MD-DNR administrators, MD-NRP, and 
commercial fishing people to identify reoccurring keywords to research for my study. I 
used television, radio news broadcasts, newspaper articles, online blogs, and chat rooms 
to identify keywords in fisheries research. I participated in the commercial fishing 
industry from 1992 to 2000 where I learned key vocabulary in its colloquial form and 
searched said words. From 1992 to 1998, as a fulltime, grassroots lobbyist and president 
of a newly formed watermen’s association for the reform of Maryland commercial fishing 
licenses, I learned administrative and legislative terms that became keywords in my 
search for materials. I used this collection of key words to search Google Scholar and 
electronic databases accessed via Walden Library for scholarly, peer-reviewed literature. 
The findings led to in-depth searches into American state and federal agency search 
engines and websites regarding the management of marine resources, while scholarly 
work provided international data. 
One contribution this study made to past and current research is that it empirically 
connects commercial blue crab regulations to enforcement over time. The social change 
implications of this research include affecting a positive social change between policy 
makers and commercial fishers by identifying unexpected relationships between 
regulations and noncompliance. Further, the historic value of this study is that it 
demonstrates how cultural gear practices as well as the interpretation of a fisher’s 
perceived rights can act as an enforcement barrier, which changed little for centuries. 
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Preview and Organization of Major Sections 
In this chapter I highlighted the strategies I employed to access appropriate 
literature. In the first section, I discussed the major theoretical themes found in the 
literature and their direct relationship to this study. I presented the review of the thematic 
literature in order of the study variables from most relevant to least relevant as they relate 
to the current study: compliance and enforcement in fisheries, common property and 
rights-based fishing, and economics and fisheries. However, as reoccurring themes in the 
literature review, each supported this study by presenting the persistent problem of 
enforcement. Thus, I discussed thoroughly the problems, as identified by the authors, 
within each theme. 
Following the thematic review, I have organized a section on methods relevant to 
this study by theme and presented materials in chronological publication order. The first 
theme presented is basis for all fisheries, which is conservation of the natural resource. I 
followed this with compliance and enforcement literature, common property and rights-
based literature, and economic theories relative to fisheries. Finally, following the current 
literature that supported the research design, I detailed my choice of the study’s 
quantitative, correlation time analysis that identified trends. 
Literature Search Strategy 
Searching for materials began with a “to do” list that I wrote while brainstorming 
ideas for this study. First, I completed an online search named “list of quantitative 
theories” using Google, Google Scholar, and the Walden University Library. Databases I 
accessed via the Walden Library included Academic Search Premier, Academic Search 
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Complete, EBSCOhost, Business Source Premier, and Galegroup. I performed this task to 
familiarize myself with as many quantitative theories as possible. For those theories 
unfamiliar to me, I performed a defining search. 
Further, I searched Amazon where I  purchased and then read a variety of books, 
including those I had on hand. This list of books included: 
• Fixed Effects Regression Models by Paul D. Allison, 
• Analyzing Quantitative Data by Norman Blaikie, 
• Asking the Right Questions: A Guide to Critical Thinking by M. Neil Browne 
and Stuart Keeley, 
• Statistical Power Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences, Second Edition by 
Jacob Cohen, 
• Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches, 
Third Edition by John W. Creswell, 
• Discovering Statistics Using SPSS, Third Edition by Andy Field, 
• Modelling and Quantitative Methods in Fisheries by Malcolm Haddon, 
• The Reviewer’s Guide to Quantitative Methods in the Social Sciences, Revise, 
Accept, Reject by Gregory R. Hancock and Ralph O. Mueller, 
• How to Measure Anything: Finding the Value of Intangibles in Business by 
Douglass W. Hubbard, 
• Secondary Analysis of Survey Data by K. Jill Kiecolt and Laura E. Nathan, 
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• Statistics for Social Data Analysis, Fourth Edition by David Knoke, George 
W. Bohrnstedt, and Alisa Potter Mee, 
• Interviews: An Introduction to Qualitative Research Interviewing by Steinar 
Kvale, 
• The Fisherman’s Problem: Ecology and Law in the California Fisheries (1850 
-1980) by Arthur F. McEvoy, 
• PASW Statistics 18 Guide to Data Analysis by Marija J. Norušis, 
• Social Science Research Design and Statistics: A Practitioner’s Guide to 
Research Methods and IBM SPSS Analysis by Alfred P. Rovai, Jason D. 
Baker, and Michael K. Ponton, and 
• Statistics II for Dummies by Deborah Rumsey. 
Initially, I organized the hard copy materials alphabetically by author’s name to 
prevent duplication of printing. I assessed over 1000 sources for inclusion in this review. 
Two hundred and ninety-nine scholarly and professional articles were catalogued in an 
Excel spreadsheet. I purchased and read 10 books to gain a stronger understanding of 
theory and data measurement. For future convenience, I developed headings such as year, 
author, title, design, theme, and results to sort and filter the multitude of documents 
collected and reviewed. After entering the information for each resource, I organized the 
hard copy materials by year from oldest to newest to review historic changes in academic 
thought. I sorted and organized the data by multiple headings depending on the 
information I sought. I created a separate Excel database to organize the materials 
representing the evolution of Maryland commercial blue crab fishing regulations. I 
45 
 
 
named headings like year, regulation type, license type, and description to allow sorting 
of the materials. 
Key Search Terms 
After I defined the collected theories, I cross-referenced these with the words: 
fisheries, fish, and commercial fishing utilizing the same websites. When a theory failed 
to present materials with the keywords, I eliminated it from the list of usable theories 
under consideration. The keyword list included words that came to mind at any time and 
in any place related to fisheries, crabs, harvest reports, and citations. I started with scraps 
of paper and notebook entries that included elements of conversation with active and 
retired MD-NRP, active and retired commercial fishing people, and MD-DNR staff. 
Further, I listed key words from television and radio news broadcasts, and I cut articles 
from newspapers. Additionally, I collected keywords from online blogs and chat rooms, 
as well as from Maryland Public Television broadcasts. I searched for keywords in three 
stages.  
Stage one keyword search. Quantitative theory, quantitative and economics and 
theory, quantitative and conservation and theory, quantitative and fisheries and theory, 
quantitative and economics and conservation, economics and conservation and fisheries. 
Stage two keyword search. Time series analysis design, correlational design, 
causal-comparative research, survey research, evaluation research, ex-post facto designs, 
logic model, longitudinal study, prospect theory, supply-side economics, differential 
association theory, causal determinism, action research, systematic evaluation, process 
theory, game theory, theory of compliance, deterrent model, common property theory, 
46 
 
 
normative theory, causal model, command and control approach, manifest and latent 
analysis, content analysis, creative destruction, dynamic inconsistency, principle-agent 
theory, fish, fishery, fisheries, crab(s), economics, conservation, policy, quantitative, 
Chesapeake, and bay. 
Stage three keyword search. blue crab, economics, fisheries, fish, fishery, 
regulation, regulatory, action, policy, discrepancies, crab pot, Chesapeake, bay, 
regulations, blue crab fishers, commercial, fishing, management, strategy, theory, 
theories, quantitative, harvest, reports, Maryland, brood, stock, harvest, overharvest, 
enforcement, compliance, hierarchy, model(s), legislation, theory, correlational, time-to-
event, license, ITQ, limits, conservation, law, reporting, illegal, sustainability, 
monitoring, compliance, data, watermen, waterman, annual, title, COMAR, article, 
outcome(s), industry, dockside, value, DNR, and NRP. 
I used this list of keywords related to the commercial fishing industry to perform 
the initial search. Next, I divided the list into specific categories related to the 
Chesapeake Bay, and then I segmented them further into the Maryland section of the 
Chesapeake Bay. The list shows how I continually segmented each group of words in an 
effort to narrow the research to the subject under study. 
Scope of the Literature Review 
While initially investigating the literature, I placed few limits other than keywords 
and combinations of such. The use of fish dates to the beginning of human survival. For 
this research, my focus on regulation concerning fisheries in Maryland created 
parameters by which to focus. Specifically, the research dates Chesapeake Bay material 
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to the late 15th century and concludes with the year 2017. 
The complexities involved in managing the blue crab require social change agents 
to speculate on broader implications such as noncompliance, enforcement, the right to 
fish and common property, the multifaceted economic variables, and discrepancies in 
harvest reporting. This requires gaining a working understanding of the diverse 
stakeholders, the crabbing culture as it has developed over time, and the gear called crab 
pots. Because crab pots are reported as the gear that catches the majority of blue crabs in 
Chesapeake Bay, knowledge gathered about its uses provided further understanding to the 
evolution of this industry. 
After I completed the initial searches, I limited database searches to “full text and 
peer reviewed,” and I searched again. I searched in the MD-DNR, MD-NRP, Maryland 
Legislative Services, Maryland Division of State Documents, and The United States 
Supreme Court to find relative historical information. I limited searches to publication 
from 2011 to 2015 in order to analyze current trends in fisheries research. This search 
echoed concerns for the need of quantitative empirical research.  
Limited Research 
Locating empirical studies for this subject in excess of economic theory and 
measuring variables related to a particular species such as stock numbers, mortality rates, 
growth rates, birth rates, sustainability, harvest pressures, and the like for a particular 
time in a particular place usurped most of the research. I found few quantitative studies 
that measured and analyzed specific outcomes related to specific regulations other than 
for ITQs or empirical studies related to discrepancies in fisheries harvest data. 
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Additionally, research regarding enforcement/compliance analyzed the “why and where” 
behind fisheries criminal activity as opposed to the “who, what, when, and how often” a 
trend occurred.  
Limited quantitative research available forced me to expand my limiters to 
include qualitative studies that offered further resources. This literature varied a great 
deal, and like the quantitative studies, researchers produced qualitative work from all 
over the world. Nonetheless, European and American resources produced the majority of 
all the work collected. A great deal of information concerning game and compliance 
theory appeared cross culturally in qualitative studies but did not necessarily address the 
current research. The question as to “why people break the law” attracted a great deal of 
interest from social scientists using qualitative design.  
Summary 
In summary, I narrowed the topic of study to common theories related to the 
commercial fishing industry. Once I completed this, I moved to the population of interest 
- the commercial blue crabbers. I cross-referenced this with the theories that became 
apparent during my second search. To conclude, I explored the research with the final 
limits: Maryland, Chesapeake Bay, full-text, and peer-reviewed because I intended on 
including only compliance, regulation, and specific gear harvest data for blue crab that 
may have influenced fisheries decision making processes in an unexpected manner in 
Maryland. 
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Theoretical Foundation 
An immense span of literature relative to fisheries exists, and my attempt at 
conciseness forced me to review several theories for consideration in this study. The 
problem is intertwined tightly within the selected theories, and these theories are 
interwoven further. Noncompliance and enforcement theory - to a degree – are neglected 
in the commercial blue crab literature, falling short to economic theories. I explored 
compliance alongside regulatory actions. Maryland treats its natural resources as 
common property; likewise, commercial blue crab fishers lean towards rights-based 
fishing. Therefore, these two theories were essential to review. Ultimately, the regulations 
that manage the industry control the economic sustainability of the practice of 
commercial crabbing in Maryland’s Chesapeake Bay; thus, economic theory became 
critical. I sought patterns using existing enforcement data, so I reviewed compliance 
grounded in enforcement theory. I measured enforcement data alongside regulatory 
activity to see if patterns appeared over time.  
Empirical fisheries literature on noncompliance and enforcement was scarce. In 
the beginning of this diverse fishery, in 1632, King Charles I made a Charter for Lord 
Baltimore to establish the Province of Maryland that led to Jefferson, Madison, 
Washington, and Randolph negotiating secure access for Virginians to have equal harvest 
potential in the Potomac River fisheries. Tensions over this continued until 1785 when 
the Maryland and Virginia Compact established state boundaries on the Potomac River 
because of deadly battles between Virginia and Maryland commercial fishers (VMRC, 
2010, para. 8). Another 100 years lapsed before Maryland enacted a commission to 
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manage fisheries decision-making in 1874 (Kennedy et al., 2007; MD-DNR, 2007), but 
in the meantime, Maryland created the first marine police force in 1868 (MD-DNR, 
2007). In contrast to active legislative and community interest, enforcement and 
noncompliance concern by academics did not seem to take route until the late 1990s. 
Since then, Ali and Abdullah (2010) and Kuperan and Sutinen (1998) reflected upon the 
limited empirical studies available and added to the limited body of evidence concerning 
blue water crime and compliance.  
Material on criminal activity can be dated to Beccaria (1764) in his paper, Essay 
on Crimes and Punishment; however, I did not read about theory leading to the capture of 
the criminal and his or her punishment. This came much later in Ehrlich’s The Market for 
Offenses and the Public Enforcement of Laws (1996). All through the centuries, crime has 
drawn a great deal of interest in research and academia, but the enforcement facet, that 
which is assigned to protect and impose, the police, seem to be taken for granted as a 
perfect determinant variable. Certainly, the perceived response of police by a particular 
group of criminals influences the actions of those same criminals. 
Nielsen and Mathiesen (2003) on compliance theory particularly influenced this 
study by discussing in the literature an often-ignored widespread problem, which is 
“management bodies [often respond to concerns with] restrictive control measures or 
ignore problems [altogether]” (p. 409). Second, the researcher conducted the study over 
time using secondary and primary data. My study, modeled for time analysis, highlights 
crucial changes in regulation that impacted blue crab harvests in Maryland’s Chesapeake 
Bay. Finally, Arias et al. (2015) used time analysis to analyze compliance before and after 
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the implementation of MPAs. Arias and I tested, in our perspective studies, for 
correlations between regulation and enforcement data. I decided enforcement/compliance 
theory using time analysis best suited my research. 
Major Propositions and Hypotheses 
The plausibility existed that regulation had a negative corollary effect on 
commercial blue crab fishers’ compliance, which influenced harvest reports, thereby 
suggesting the existence of an unintended relationship. Noncompliance and regulations 
that are difficult to enforce skew population and harvest data, which leads to additional 
regulatory action. Regulation inhibits economic opportunity. The history of blue crab 
management demonstrates sporadic decision-making with little empirical evidence to 
support those decisions. The hypotheses and null hypotheses are stated for the purpose of 
discussion but not called for in correlation design. 
H01: The number of commercial regulatory actions enacted does increase the 
number of blue crab citations and warnings reported annually. 
H11: The number of commercial regulation action enacted does not increase the 
number of blue crab citations and warnings reported annually. 
H02: The type of commercial regulatory actions enacted does increase the number 
of blue crab citations and warnings reported annually. 
H12: The type of commercial regulation action enacted does not increase the 
number of blue crab citations and warnings reported annually. 
 Based upon MD-DNR complaints, I assumed that commercial blue crab fishers 
can over-report harvest, and commercial blue crab fishers had the means to exceed their 
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gear limits. Inconsistency in blue crab harvest was common. In contrast, MSY depends 
upon consistency for application and is used by the MD-DNR to create blue crab harvest 
quotas and license caps. I considered several assumptions such as skewed harvest data 
acts as a catalyst to further regulation; MSY is a poor control for population stock 
abundance since blue crab populations fluctuate regularly. ITQs create inequality in a 
small-scale fishery, such as blue crab in Maryland’s Chesapeake Bay. The effect of 
overharvesting, overregulation, and black market crab pots related to illegal activity in 
the blue crab industry remains unidentified. One fact is certain, crab pots trap blue crab 
and by-catch continuously while submerged until oxidation eventually breaks down the 
metal. 
Theory Rationale 
The three theories guiding the literature review included compliance/enforcement 
theory, common property/rights-based, and economic theory. I implemented a strict 
selection process to narrow down the theory pool. By continually asking myself what I 
wanted to test assisted in keeping the objective in focus. I appraised commercial blue 
crab fisheries related regulatory activity beside enforcement data as my primary objective 
in this research. Does the regulatory process lead to an unexpected relationship between 
compliance behavior and this activity? As a rule, regulation had been grounded in 
common property and rights-based management strategies, and economic theory had not 
ventured further than costs associated with the practice of crabbing, renting the licenses, 
or illegal, risky activity. My study considered the ramifications of unexpected 
relationships, specifically for blue crab harvest that effects commercial blue crab 
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regulations using enforcement/compliance theory to lead and ground the study. I used a 
descriptive study to capture the essence and prevalence of particular compliance 
phenomena that may lead to further research to determine the underlying causes of such a 
phenomenon. 
Relative to the Study 
The existing gap in the literature concerned possible unexpected relationships 
between enforcement data and blue crab regulations. By me expounding upon the 
development of the MD-NRP, blue crab enforcement tactics and outcomes, blue crab 
interest, and regulatory action, a person might grasp the volatile relationship between 
stakeholders. As restrictions continue to increase, the economic impact on local 
communities is substantial, and compliance and monitoring issues escalate with the 
problem. In this study, I connected regulatory action to commercial crabbing 
noncompliance data. Patterns developed, and this may suggest the use of skewed baseline 
data as an issue, and this further drives policy. The MD-DNR is charged with protecting 
the natural resources of Maryland despite economic concerns held by the commercial 
blue crab fishers. Compliance and enforcement theory in fisheries were limited, but it is 
essential to management. Common property and rights-based theories remain and 
continue as the foundation in fisheries policy. Economics drive the industry, but in the 
current literature, researchers viewed it narrowly. 
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Conceptual Framework 
Key Phenomenon 
According to enforcement/compliance theory, people choose to break the law. The 
literature supported this with reasons as to why a person breaks the law. Specifically, in 
fisheries, moral development, income potential, and perceived legitimacy, as well as 
prisoner’s dilemma were often quoted as contributors to making the decision to break the 
law or not. Types of crimes characterized by this specialized group of individuals 
included illegal, unreported, and unregulated harvest of fish, as well as fishing in private 
and or protected areas (Ali & Abdullah, 2010; ; Arias et al., 2015; Daw & Gray, 2005; 
Dresdner, Chávez, & Barriga, 2015; Eliasen, Papdopoulou, Vassilopoulou, & Catchpole, 
2014; Hentati-Sundberg, Hjelm, & Österblom, 2014; Kuperan & Sutinen, 1998; Mazany 
et al., 2005; Nielsen & Mathiesen, 2003).  
The continued lack of empirical studies in fisheries enforcement was mysterious 
in light of the constant call for improved enforcement. Testing and proving the necessary 
role of enforcement in fisheries is obligatory. Authors had stressed the importance of the 
need for enforcement to encourage compliance in fisheries regulations, but credible data 
that supported specific regulatory action continued neglected in the field. This study 
discovered enforcement/compliance trends developed in response to regulatory activity. 
Thus, enforcement/compliance theory best represented the current problem and the 
results of this study in an often-neglected area in academia. 
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Key Theorists 
Guenther et al. (2015) analyzed fishing effort of commercial lobster fishers whose 
traps were stationary like blue crab pots. Their interest involved Marine Protected Areas 
(MPAs) possible spillover effects. The authors proposed it was common knowledge that 
MPAs increase “…species abundance, biomass, and productivity within their borders” (p. 
78). One assumption presented in this study suggested as an adaptive strategy to recover 
possible losses, fishers would “fish the line” to capture target species as they “spill-out” 
(p. 79) from the MPA. The authors viewed secondary harvest data prior to and after an 
MPA was established to determine how fishing efforts may have changed. 
Their study represented a time to event design. It provided a guideline for my 
study on blue crab compliance and the number and type of regulations enacted whereby 
enforcement data was identified in relationship to these regulatory actions. The authors 
asserted few studies had compared “methodological outputs or examined discontinuities 
in environments” (p. 80). Further, the authors contended that human behavior may be 
unwittingly effecting models whereby they may no longer fit the actual data. In 2008, the 
MD-DNR suggested commercial blue crab fishers over-reported harvest in response to 
upcoming regulatory action. The commercial crabbing industry in Maryland had little 
research that spanned beyond conservation and ecosystem services. My study suggested 
that if commercial blue crab fishers can set crab pots that exceed the limit, the probability 
of over or underreporting blue crab harvest was likely, and they were unwittingly, 
negatively effecting current MSY models. 
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Related Methods 
Enforcement Theories 
Termed “conservation,” the mid-1920s saw the first plea for enforcement. In 
January 1926, the Baltimore Sun, in bold, stated, “Big Depletion in Crab Supply Found 
by U.S.” urging the drawing of drastic laws to conserve the Chesapeake Bay blue crab. 
The paper continued to report that over the previous 15 years, the average blue crab 
harvest per trotline (baited rope stretching 1000’) had decreased by 70%. In contrast, the 
gear called scrape (metal frame with fishing net attached) and dip net (small net on a 
stick) had harvests that remained uniform and average throughout the season. Hoover 
made the following recommendations: 
• The taking of sponge crabs be outlawed. 
• The taking of buckram crabs be outlawed. 
• The peeler crab be defined by the new soft shell fully formed under the outer 
hard shell and easily detected by the backfin’s coloration. 
• A thirty percent reduction takes place in all forms of crab fishing. 
• Continuous collection of statistics and biological data occur to analyze the 
effect of any new regulations. 
• By approval of the Governor, state fishing commissions may change 
regulations. 
Limited literature provided empirical studies pertaining to compliance and 
enforcement issues in fisheries. On July 24, 1941, the height of the blue crab season, The 
Baltimore Sun heralds, “Judge Melvin Upholds Ban against Crab Pots.” An angry 
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commercial blue crab fisher “attacked the validity of the law” (para. 2). He asserted that a 
multitude of men had been employing the use of crab pots prior to this new law. Indeed, 
this law bounced between passed and over-turned for several years, but the crab pot won 
out and continues as the gear most used to harvest blue crab in Maryland in 2019. 
By November 1942, The Board of Natural Resources ordered a study completed 
by Charles C. Davis of the Chesapeake Biological Laboratory named, “A Study of the 
Crab Pot as a Fishing Gear.” He conducted a quantitative study that introduced the 
general principles of the industry and gear types employed in the blue crab industry. He 
compared the harvest of crab pots to the traditional trotline. He counted individual 
harvests that included total number of crabs, legal and illegal in three locations and 
displayed these in a table. The summary reported that the crab pot as good for 
conservation and efficient if employed in deep waters as opposed to marshy inlets and 
rivers where it could be destructive biologically. Further, he asserted that if crab pots are 
legalized in Maryland it should be with location restriction and a limited number of pots 
per license. 
This era in the United States did not call for research in this area. The industry 
was changing and growing so quickly that compliance behavior and enforcement abilities 
were given little thought. However, this author published this report through a 
government agency, at the request of the government, and presented an overall picture of 
the commercial crabbing industry. The title denoted the content, and the report presented 
all common gear and its use in the crabbing industry as well as recreational gear. He 
founded the content first-hand during interviews with all the watermen in crabbing 
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regions throughout the State. He reported the results professionally and written with 
common vocabulary. Industry stakeholders or academics would benefit from reading this 
report. At the age of its publication, the author remained objective and provided new 
literature not considered at the time. Much of the industry has remained unchanged. 
In the 1990s, limited literature continued to evade compliance and enforcement 
theories. K. Kuperan and Jon G. Sutinen (1998) published in The Law and Society 
Review, “Bluewater Crime: Deterrence, Legitimacy, and Compliance in Fisheries.” The 
authors tested the roles of deterrence and legitimacy in the compliance behavior of 
Malaysian fishers. They asserted that empirical evidence continued to evade the scholarly 
work related to this industry and these variables. Kuperan and Sutinen, used a qualitative 
study to collect their data. The survey included several facets including probability 
statements, potential for illegal gains, and why a fishing person complies or not 
considering instrumental and normative compliance theory. 
Financial gains drive instrumental while normative is driven by moral obligation. 
Process variables were considered from efficiency and effectiveness ratings and how 
these equate to the result of compliance to a regulation. Further, the authors utilized 
cognitive and social learning theory to understand the forces that influenced compliance 
behavior. The authors tested hypothesized relationships among variables. They extended 
the model of compliance to include moral decision-making. Their work uncovered stock 
abundance and income potential play a leading role in compliance choices. They 
discussed a need for fine tuning instrument use and proper assessing of subjective 
probability responses. Their research supported the deterrence model that asserts the 
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value of expected penalties compared against the benefits of illegal fishing determines the 
outcome of compliance behavior. Their model provided support for increased 
enforcement that would increase the probability of being caught in illegal activity. 
 Kuperan’s international exposure and research conducted in many countries has 
led him to teach courses in global economic theories, as well as courses in international 
business and management economics. He chairs for MBA and DBA students at the 
Othman Yeop Abdullah Graduate School of Business. Dr. Kuperan has been cited more 
than 1,300 times with a third of them occurring since 2011. Sutinen’s expertise lies in 
fisheries economics. The past 30 years has led him to conduct research in 
fisheries management, specifically the compliance and enforcement of regulation. His 
research has been adopted by a multitude of government agencies and shaped regulation 
in several countries, including the United States. He began to take an interest in 
recreational fisheries management, an area often neglected for the variables under study. 
The title specifically introduced the content of the article, which was written for 
the academic. The authors do an excellent job of creating background for the research 
hypothesis by introducing a variety of theories by which to view the problem. This 
research highlighted the occurrence of illegal activity and the extent of requested data 
that fishers were not willing to share. For instance, they would not discuss the associated 
costs of conducting illegal fishing. The dated article underscores the need for empirical 
evidence and research pertaining to enforcement and compliance. Because limited 
literature exists, the authors were limited in resources. This primary work acted as an 
update to existing materials and substantiated the need for further studies in fisheries 
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compliance behavior and enforcement ability. 
Fabienne Lord (2011), author of “Understanding Social Impacts by Using New 
Variables and a Causal Model Diagram in New England Fisheries,” addressed regulatory 
response through a qualitative causal model that focused on identifying a new list of 
variables indicative of social impact and social change processes. The Magnuson-Stevens 
Act provides for social impact analysis caused by regulation change. A Social Impact 
Assessment (SIA) identifies, predicts, and manages or mitigates for these possible 
impacts. This provision was equally true for environmental processes referred to as EIS, 
Environmental Impact Statements. The New England groundfishing industry continued to 
fail in spite of these changes and continual regulations. The regulations increased conflict 
with fishers. The Northeast Multispecies Fisheries Management Plan was adopted in 
1987 and changed 41 times, with 11 amendments, and 30 framework adjustments by the 
year 2000. The author contended that the list of indicators to be considered in SIAs and 
EISs does not adequately consider the indirect, cumulative, and interactive effects from 
multiple stressors in the industry; thus, it misrepresents the range of impacts experienced 
by fishers. 
Lord (2011) categorized the fishermen’s response to regulations into the 
following: reduced perceived quality of life, reduced job satisfaction, distrust in 
government, adopting risky behavior, reduced psychological and physical health, and 
reduced standard of living. He contended that processes lead to impacts, and the ability to 
identify these processes in advance can assist management in providing interventions in 
advance of a regulation. He asserted that a more thorough assessment tool can improve 
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baseline data through ‘lessons learned’ for a particular management actions’ impact on 
context-dependent causal pathways that lead to social response. This new knowledge 
could be transferred to new regulatory actions.  
This article was informative. The title reflected the content accurately. The 
author’s message supported the importance of understanding the mind-set of the 
commercial fishing community. Currently, Lord (2011) is a Consultant and Project 
Coordinator for Environment and Sustainability in Montreal, Canada. He graduated from 
the University of New Hampshire. This research has been cited eight times since its 
publication. This was a thorough read for the academic or scientist. Lord provided much 
background information to support his views. He employed qualitative methods to collect 
data, which I believed to be subjective. The work does update the available materials in 
that it discussed regulation and effects of such without an economic basis. The material 
reads on the emotional side, and it lends itself towards the possibility of bias work. 
Common Property and Rights-Based Theories 
Current research is grounded in common property and rights-based theories 
because that is the status quo for fisheries management. Although the terms as vernacular 
were not mentioned in the early research, the ideals date back several centuries. However, 
in 1954, H. Scott Gordon, a forerunner in economic and common property theories in 
fisheries, set a new bar by examining economics extensively alongside common property. 
He implied fisheries hold “no economic rent,” and a sea harvest equaled any other 
common-property natural resource harvested individually. He further argued that for all 
those who used the term ‘economics’ no one had extensively examined it. “Fisheries 
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management” surfaced, but Gordon suggested this focus on maximization of resource 
fails to consider other costs that go uncounted. He applied economic theory to 
“demonstrate that the ‘overfishing problem’ has its roots in the economic organization of 
the industry” (p. 128). 
 The title, The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery, 
clearly delineates the nature of the study. H. Scott Gordon, an economist who taught 
college in the United States and Canada, founded an economics department, chaired and 
multi-chaired several academic departments, at times, simultaneously. Most notably, he 
peer-reviewed for the Journal of Law and Economics. This particular work became a 
"citation classic" (2016, Indiana University, Archives, Bibliographic Note, para. 3). 
Although the article was dated, the material remains current to fisheries and this blue crab 
related study. The author addresses multiple groups that may be influenced by this 
application of economic theory. Although the author described technical content, it 
remained digestible for a general population. The work was based upon facts and 
available research materials. Many of the concerns put forth by the author continue into 
present day. Certainly, this primary source advanced and highlighted the complex 
relationships that exist in fisheries, even today. 
In 2012, economists continued to evaluate the influence common property had 
upon fishing effort. The article named Are Input Controls Required in Individual 
Transferable Quota Fisheries to Address Ecosystem Based Fisheries Management 
Objectives, pointed to common property as the issue behind the ‘open access / right-to-
fish’ competitiveness. Emery et al. research suggested allotting value to the right-to-fish 
63 
 
 
would “eliminate the competitive ‘race to fish’” (p. 123). Their research focused upon the 
use of ITQs, a system by which the fisher owns the right to a percentage of the overall 
harvest but holds no property rights to the actual resource. Traditional approaches 
manage the fishery through effort restrictions, the top-down approach. The failing 
fisheries led management towards a bottom-up approach or ITQs. Only 2.7% of the 
world’s fishing harvest utilizes this system. The advent of ecosystem-based management 
forced ITQ systems to consider more than economic rent, but also, environmental and 
biological factors. These authors reviewed 18 ITQ fisheries across six countries limiting 
the research to five fishing methods in an attempt to present the success or not of input 
controls in light of the onset of ecosystem-based fisheries management. The results 
demonstrated that ITQ systems are inherently inflexible requiring the continued use of 
management controls. This control undermines the value of perceived ownership in the 
harvest “security” and affects human behavior. The authors’ review encouraged future 
studies were warranted to promote the security of fishing people and the test of 
incorporating ecosystem-based management. 
 Two schools of thought at the University of Tasmania meshed for this research 
and publication: Institute for Marine and Antarctic Studies and School of Finance. The 
precision of referencing the literature within the article assisted in analyzing the content. 
The title and sub-headings made this difficult read easier to follow. This article was 
intended for a fisheries-related informed audience. It was advanced, but, well 
synthesized. The study covered a reasonable amount of data for its purpose. The authors 
reviewed prominent literature, but that which supported the authors’ view. Many works 
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were in line with the authors’ views, representing the gap in the literature. Assumptions 
that were made about fishermen’s’ behavior related to regulation and enforcement first 
must be proven to exist. The tone seemed an attempt at convincing the reader about ITQ 
appropriateness, rather than educating the reader on his or her choices as to his or her 
thoughts about ITQs and its relationship to the ecosystem at large. This paper would hold 
legislative influence in support of ITQ management. A rebuttal article could be written 
using some of the same literature found in the Reference section. Specifically, the 
Reference section adds to the wealth of this article. 
Economic Theories 
Limited empirical literature exists that grounded regulations, compliance 
behavior, and enforcement in economic theory. However, in 1905, the Department of 
Commerce and Labor, Bureau of Fisheries captured blue crab interest in a paper titled, 
“The Crab Industry of Maryland” by Winthrop A. Roberts, Agent. The data provided in 
this paper stemmed from a general study conducted on the Maryland fisheries in 1902. 
Simultaneously, Professor W. P. Hay (1904) of Howard University researched the natural 
history of the blue crab, and his notes were applied liberally to this paper. Roberts’ stated 
specifically in his report that the point of view would not be from science but that of blue 
crabs’ economic value. 
The author visited, physically, the entire Tidewater area in Maryland that 
produced the newest edible natural resource. With the advent of ice and gas, Maryland 
became the top producer in the Union. Mr. Roberts’ covered a multitude of happenings 
and apparatus and how each individually related to the economics of the industry. 
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Further, he discussed some theory on biological aspects, such as feeding stale meat to 
crabs in captivity, which led to high mortality. He discussed demand, supply, and market 
prices. He reviewed the “seasons” of the industry biologically, not as a rule of the 
industry, but as an industry practice. The report provided a table of blue crab harvest in 
1901, which was an asset as little empirical evidence was available from the 
establishment of commercial crabbing as an entrepreneurial practice. 
Although the report was dated, much of the data interestingly remains unchanged. 
The author held a government based relationship to the study, and it could be considered 
factual in its entirety. He presented the information in an easy to read format for any 
person who showed interest. This was a scholarly work for its time. The report provided 
background industry information, walked the reader through the gear, and discussed the 
practice of crabbing for two life stages: hard crab and soft crab. Each community 
produced harvests regionally within the Chesapeake Bay. This report provided another 
example of the importance of the industry to Maryland both economically and culturally. 
However, in 1985, James E. Wilen of the Department of Agricultural Economics 
of the University of California delved into fisheries and economics, only to discover that 
this paradigm did not yet exist. He contended this contrasted with microeconomic studies 
in most industries. Wilen suggested real-world views of the working environment 
captured problems that could be resolved with realistic theory and empirical research. He 
asserted that nothing further than the wastefulness of open access (common property 
theory) with formulas for “optimally managing” (p. 370) (MSY) fisheries had emerged. 
His study, Towards a Theory of the Regulated Fishery, highlighted that the 
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common-property model was no longer relevant because fisheries first are managed at 
species survival and second at economical returns. He called for a look between the 
“regulators and the regulatees” (p. 372). Wilen insisted that fishing behavior was “itself 
the outcome of gaming situations between the individual units at the microeconomic 
level” (p. 372). He presented the first approximation of a theory, which demonstrated 
“behavior is aggregated from a microeconomic-level theory of the individual unit’s 
behavior” (p. 386). 
 Dr. Wilen is a distinguished professor who has authored 126 publications and 
2,442 citations. Regardless of its 1987 publishing, the source continues to be legitimate to 
current fisheries issues. The author speaks to the need of developing behavior related 
fisheries theories. The title conveys the intent of the publication, which was to introduce 
such a theory. This article read with ease but was intended for a scientific or academic 
audience. Wilen covers the general facts concisely and merges the idea of the need for a 
relationship between those who regulate and those who are supposed to follow the 
commands. He contended that the disequilibrium decision making that was encountered 
in Prisoners’ Dilemma was in effect the same response of fishing people. He or she does 
not consider the long-term effects of his or her actions, only how it relates to what other 
people are perceived as “doing” in the here-and-now. This article supported literature as 
an important update to other sources and extensively covered the current topic. 
In 2013, Abdullah Nasser addressed concerns about overfishing in a paper called, 
“Overfishing: Economic Policies in Finite Resource Biological Pools.” The paper 
addressed the state of innovative technologies and the impact of the Industrial Revolution 
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on the fishing industry. The idea of resource-depletion was a new idea, but the 
improvements in gear created the capacity to fish beyond sustainability or to complete 
destruction if allowed. Although the 1949 International Convention for the Northwest 
Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF) addressed this through new command and control 
regulations, it did little to address the inability to monitor and enforce the regulations. In 
contrast, this same monument was dissolved in 1979, and fishing advocates faced less 
pressure. The author expressed some fisheries became bankrupt, several fish were pushed 
to near extinction, and revenues declined by some 50% for the commercial fisher. The 
author used a mathematical model to “establish payoffs in a time-dependent dynamic 
system.” Three stages were employed: Biological, Individual fishers, and Supply-demand 
economics. Several factors were considered in the model, which consisted of deficiencies 
related inter-species interactions, factors assumed constant were not, and prices at the 
market, which changed with the wind or because of natural global supply/demand chains. 
Again, the prisoner’s dilemma was exposed. The general conclusions of this paper can act 
towards policy recommendations. 
 The author can be found at Harvard’s Schulich School of Medicine and Dentistry 
Medicine. He has been cited a dozen times, with nine of those occurring since 2011. The 
publication is current and published in the Undergraduate Economic Review. The title 
demonstrates the content accurately; the author addresses the audience with concise and 
simple language. Most readers would understand this article, including the interpretation 
of the math formulas used in the model. The article read objective and impartial, but it 
does make some glaring assumptions that would impact the outcome of the model 
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significantly if completed in a time-series analysis. Regardless, this article not only 
updates gaps in the literature, it identifies the importance of the need for accurate base 
line data and the dangers of a lack of monitoring and enforcement of regulations. 
Approaching the Problem 
Enforcement Theories 
I discovered little on compliance and enforcement literature until publications 
dating the late 1990s. In the first quarter of the twentieth century, conservation ideals 
ruled fisheries. As reported by the Baltimore Sun, January 11, 1926, after the Fisheries 
Bureau, Maryland, and Virginia cooperated in collecting the data, Herbert Hoover urged a 
1/3 reduction in the harvest of blue crab. The cooperative, quantitative study surveyed 
harvests over multiple years to determine the condition of the fishery. The author’s 
immediate focus summarized the rise and fall of the population through documented 
harvests. The government hypothesized that 75% of the adult population faced removal 
each season. 
The idea of a “study” made this research leading edge. It was the first serious 
gauge of the blue crab population. The study was limited using unquantifiable data. The 
Chesapeake Bay blue crab was fast becoming a delectable resource by demand because 
of the industrial revolution: gasoline engines, refrigerated railway cars, and delivery 
service by ship. Historical gear faced new gear in the form of a crab pot in 1939. This 
was outlawed in Maryland in 1941, but Virginians 20 miles south employed some 40 
thousand pots for blue crab harvest (Davis, 1942). Maryland confiscated crab pots as 
enforcement, but ownership of the crab pot was not identifiable (The Sun, 1941). 
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In 1942, Charles C. Davis of the Board of Natural Resources completed a study of 
the crab pot. Mortality, injured, legal, illegal, and by-catch data was collected from crab 
pots placed at three separate locations. This data was compared to harvest from a 
traditional gear – trotline. This was an economic analysis as well as a mechanical, 
biological, and environmental review of the use of the crab pot. The analysis touted the 
crab pot as efficient in its harvest, as well as superior in conservation to its counter, the 
trotline, when used in deep water. It suggested the crab pot would be destructive in 
marshy areas and sounds. This research was leading edge for its time and made several 
excellent considerations for future research. The study was weak in that it was performed 
once. In addition, the data collected, unless commercial blue crab fishers’ verbal 
responses were guaranteed by honesty or anonymity lacked validity. 
By 1998, Kuperan and Sutinen highlighted crime in fisheries focusing on 
deterrence and legitimacy in behavior choices. This qualitative study occurred because 
the authors’ recognized the lack of empirical evidence in the fisheries literature 
concerning behavior of fishing people. They discussed the expense of enforcement, an 
often-ignored issue in the literature. The report relied on the answer to questionnaires 
provided to 318 Peninsular Malaysian fishers. Limited available data in the field hindered 
the study. Further, the data could not be quantified. There may have been motivation on 
the part of the fishers not to report honestly. Many questions remained unanswered by 
fishers, so the impact of no response had to be considered in the formulas. Regardless, the 
literature brought forth important considerations about the human aspect of the fishing 
industry. 
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In another decade, social impacts were reviewed in a causal model of New 
England fisheries (Lord, 2011). This author used qualitative research to review how new 
processes under the Magnuson-Steven Act were prohibited from reaching their goal, 
which was to consider social impacts of a regulation. Ground theory guided the research; 
it allowed the data to lead to hypotheses of relationships between variables without 
research bias. The author adapted a causal model, which allowed indirect and direct 
effects of any stressor to be analyzed. This was valid when the model was applied to “all” 
aspects of the research. This validity would be hard achieved in view of time constraints 
to publish research results. The research employed direct quotes from fishing people. The 
literature did not provide the steps applied to collecting data from the fishing community. 
The considerations in this research were important, but the study lacked procedural 
vernacular important to validity of the content and analysis. 
Common Property and Rights-Based Theories 
In reviewing the literature for common property and rights-based fishing, it 
seemed we as a people had not made much progress. Throughout time, particularly in 
international seas and bodies of water within the United States, the ideal of common 
property rights had existed as a survival belief first and as an ideal of equality among 
men, in this case – fishers of all sea life, second. In contrast to some phenomena 
uncovered by previous research, the United States, in particular, Maryland continued to 
employ status – quo, common property theory, while attempting to maintain sustainable 
quotas (MSY), an oxymoron. There were two forces at work. The ideal of common 
property and rights-based fishing immediately depicted an entrepreneur working towards 
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profit (Arnason, 2009). In contrast, one view attempted to create a sustainable fishery 
without cooperation and another view attempted to profit under limits.  
 The research on common property and rights-based fishing was leading edge in its 
roots. These authors provided an array of overviews. The authors presented documented 
background information; they offered solutions to the problem or ideas for further 
research. However, the theories had not made much progress even in the use of economic 
theories. This author used quantitative research grounded in economic models that sought 
value in the efficiency and work of the industry. The qualitative methods were limited, 
and they were geared toward cultural significances. Limited available data hindered the 
research content. As cited by H. Scott Gordon in the mid-50s, the literature lacked 
empirical economic research that supported common property/rights-based fishing. 
Furthermore, he contended fisheries management was not for protecting fish through 
management, but for the exploits of man; thus, how was this beneficial per se? The ideals 
of common property continued into the 1990s. MSY came into existence as science 
attempted to identify and maintain a specific harvest that would sustain a fishery 
biologically and economically. In 2012 (Emery et al.), scientists continued to ask 
questions about the practicality of quota systems in a common property resource. 
Economic Theories 
In 1905, Winthrop A. Roberts of the Bureau of Fisheries visited all blue crab 
regions in Maryland to investigate the industry. The author used descriptive reports and 
relied upon personal observations, extensive notes collected by Dr. Hay (1904), 
interviews with industry participants, and harvest reports from the 1901 season. Roberts 
72 
 
 
provided standard industry terminology for gear and descriptive terms for the life cycles 
of the blue crab in the report. He discussed the day-to-day practices of the industry and 
the market prices for specific life stages – hard crab or soft crab. Historical, cultural 
practices persist today in mindsets as beneficial to the submerged world of blue crab. This 
descriptive, qualitative report presented as a factual representation of the blue crab 
industry in Maryland. The sheer volume of information that had to be compiled and 
entered by hand for this research indicated a weakness in the research. Numerous 
transpositions could have occurred. Regulations did not exist for blue crab, so verbal 
responses were presented as fact from the perspective of the watermen community. 
Maryland reported its first economic gauge for the blue crab industry, documenting its 
economic importance for the state. 
In 1985, James E. Wilen questioned the lack of studies developing 
microeconomic theories meant to capture the decision-making environment fishers face. 
Wilen asserted the assumption that “fishermen are assumed to make decisions regarding 
potential fishing and capacity in light of how they anticipate fellow fishermen and 
regulators to act” (legitimacy in compliance) (p. 369). He asserted that fisheries require a 
shift to predictive modeling and away from normative modeling. Wilen suggested a 
regulator-regulatee model is essential to avoid disequilibrium decisions or Prisoner’s 
Dilemma. With potential-effort limited by constant regulation, fishers continue to 
compete for a share of the catch. The author presented several formulas by which to 
discuss fishing effort, resources, and economic impacts such as taxes and fees as a way to 
regulate the fishery. In the paper, the author discussed real world decision-making 
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(compliance behavior) and how that related to macroeconomics and microeconomics. 
This study represented the continuation of the interest in economic behavior in fisheries. 
The author introduced innovative ideas, but the ideas would need to be tested for 
practicality. Even when a theory may appear valid on paper, it may not fit real world 
applications. The paper oversimplified the problem. 
Abdullah Nasser (2013) addressed the equilibrium solution using mixed methods 
grounded in game theory. The model was intended to estimate the effects different 
variables had on the fishing market. It would assist in predicting fishers’ responses, thus, 
controlling overfishing. Their modeling demonstrated that fishers were caught in a 
Prisoner’s Dilemma-type problem. The quantitative model was created using several 
qualitatively described regulatory proposals. The author suggested several economic 
strategies to control overfishing: quotas, moratoriums, licenses, taxes, and price 
stabilization through price controls. The authors address concerns that have continued 
since the commercialization of crabbing. This work does not add to the literature, but 
rather, it rehashes concerns about common property, economic decision-making, 
compliance behavior, and overfishing. 
Variable Selection Rationale 
Throughout the literature, the variables selection appeared across time and theory, 
fisheries - economics. The focus was upon individual decision making as it related to risk 
and economics. This evolved into a comparison to prisoner dilemma theory. Compliance 
and enforcement although mentioned were not reviewed until the late twentieth century. 
The research failed to produce actual outcome data. Each article or report provided 
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historical data to introduce the variable set and continued with a specific interest in 
economics along-side common property and rights-based theories. The selection of 
compliance – enforcement data (v1) and the regulations (v2) from which it stemmed as it 
related to the gains made by a person’s right to fish remain familiar themes. This study 
maintained this familiar theme in variables, but it employed simultaneously the use of all 
the variables to produce empirical data that may reveal timed non-compliant phenomenon 
as opposed to day-to-day compliance issues. 
Thematic-Chronological Review of Related Studies 
Conservation Theory Review 
In 1927, Maryland took measures to define the “peeler crab” using clearer 
language. In addition, it increased the minimum harvest size for soft crabs to 3½ inches 
(Kennedy et al., 2007). However, Maryland did not take charge until 1928 when it started 
an annual collection of data on commercial harvests (Kennedy et al., 2007). The Sun 
reported in its headline on June 1, 1930 (Brooke) - “Household – A Crab Season of 
Plenitude and Cheapness.” The blue crab season peaked at 36,938,783 pounds (Kennedy 
et al., 2007) quadruple the 1925 harvest (Maryland State Planning (MDP), 1938).  
The ebb and flow of the fishery triggered continuous interest, and Maryland’s 
Chesapeake Biological Laboratory began a long-term study of the blue crab (Kennedy et 
al., 2007). However, in contrast to conservation and proliferation, in 1932 Virginia 
repealed its protective legislation banning the taking of the sponge crab (impregnated 
blue crab) during spawning season (The Sun, 1932). Maryland’s conservation 
commissioner proclaimed that the increase in crab harvests from 30 million pounds in 
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1926 to 63 million pounds in 1932 in Maryland and Virginia was a direct result of the 
previous outlawing of the harvest of sponge crabs (Griffin, 1932). No empirical evidence 
exists to support this claim. Again, commercial blue crab fishers were pitted against one 
another through unequal regulation in Virginia and Maryland’s Chesapeake Bay. 
 As posted by The Sun on January 19, 1932: 
The uninitiated wonder at times why so much interest surrounds the famous blue 
crab of the Chesapeake, why so much legislation has been passed regarding it, so 
many scientific studies made of the creature. Chief reason is the fact that the 
annual crab catch affects well nigh every fiber of the business structure in the 
tidewater counties of Maryland and Virginia (para. 2). 
In 1934, the National Recovery Association in Washington, D.C. announced that 
the Crab Packers’ Association group would administer the blue crab code for Maryland 
and Virginia. This group comprised of commercial blue crab fishers and industry 
participants from both Virginia and Maryland. Their responsibilities included improving 
marketing, other conditions, and pricing in the industry (The Sun, 1934). Eighty-seven 
percent of the entire blue crab production in the United States stemmed from Maryland, 
followed by Virginia (The Sun, 1934). In 1937 in response to an unstable blue crab 
harvest, Maryland’s General Assembly closed the blue crab season early in November, 
one month prior to the spawning season (Kennedy et al., 2007). It was suggested that the 
blue crab was on the verge of extinction (West, 1938). 
By 1938, the male dominated industry felt stricter measures were necessary, and 
this was the first year a Maryland senator, Tydings, attempted to involve the Federal 
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government in regulating the blue crab, specifically the spawning female blue crab. 
Although he was heavily criticized, he had introduced a similar bill just three years 
earlier (West, 1938). In December, Maryland’s Planning Commission published a report, 
“Five Years of State Planning” (MDP, 1938). The report detailed the seafood industry in 
Maryland. It discussed the breakdown between Virginia and Maryland. It asserted that 
instead of Virginia lifting the ban on sponge crabs, she should have attempted to adjust in 
the market to absorb the vast supply of blue crabs harvested that season. Both the report 
and Senator’s Tydings’ bill created activity that resulted in Virginia’s Fisheries 
Commissioner outlawing the taking of female crabs during the spawning season. Equally 
important, Maryland closed the female crab season during November and outlawed the 
use of sloughing boxes for hard crabs (4 out of 5 die), which are submerged or stationary 
dry-docked wooden boxes (colloquial term is crab float) where peeler crabs are held in 
Bay water until they shed into soft crabs (West, 1938). 
The past decade demonstrated, although experiencing some minor industry 
changes, the fight over blue crab harvest had not waned even a little since the late 15th 
century. However, the fight led to some proactive conservation efforts that continue to be 
debated in 2017. Specifically, data collection and regulation took root, commissions were 
developed to assist in creating an extended market for the delicacy, and inhumane 
practices were put to rest. Most important to the blue crab during these years was the use 
of traditional, non-threatening gear such as dip nets and trotlines. 
Conservation as a word is interpreted often in a multitude of ways that can 
contradict the interpretation of others’ views, especially when applied as a systematic 
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means to control the use of natural resources. The proof to implement these intentions is 
often lacking, and the defined meaning behind the act is often rejected in the fishers’ 
community vernacular, or it is missing altogether. The word “conservation” has been 
thrown around loosely for many decades, but its general premise is understood, and 
fishers hold strong religious and cultural beliefs that influence their thinking. Thereby, 
research that supports a conservation theory or attitude is regarded as guarding and 
proliferating the existing resource, and many industry participants are threatened by the 
attitude of “at the blue crab fishers’ expense” when many variables contribute to the 
destruction of the Bay’s habitat daily. 
Innovative thinking by Eldridge, Burrell, Jr., and Steele (1979) led their research 
towards reshaping the gear in order to originate a self-culling blue crab pot. This research 
addressed actual response of blue crab to gear, which effected enforcement of undersize 
crabs caught in legal pots and might lessen illegal catches in illegal pots, which 
influenced commercial blue crab fishers’ compliance. The article, Development of a Self-
Culling Blue Crab Pot discussed a conservation effort that would require an industry 
change but lessen the physical effort for the blue crab fisher; however, it never reached 
fruition until the late 1990s (DNR, 2015). The study estimated that the number of 
sublegal crabs made up 60 percent of the catch during May and June, and a great deal of 
time would have been spent culling (removing) these crabs from the legal ones, which 
often led to injury and sometimes death of the crab. The authors tested escape ports using 
rectangles and circles with different measurements. A chi-square confirmed that pots with 
three escape ports as opposed to two reduced the catch of sublegal crabs by 82%. Circles 
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were determined as best suited for escape without reducing legal catch, while rectangles 
allowed legal crabs to escape. The authors determined that the test was valid and 
produced the expected results of reduction in sublegal catch without reducing legal catch, 
which significantly reduced damages to the blue crab. This experiment was relative to 
over and underreporting commercial blue crab harvest in the twenty-first century. If more 
crab pots than Maryland’s legal limit were set, additional uncounted mortality, injury, and 
ghost pots were likely. The authors used chi-square to measure catch and release 
differences using different style escape routes for sublegal crabs; the current study can 
employ chi-square in order to measure differences in enforcement data, as well as the 
potential black-market blue crab harvest. This article adds to the literature that 
demonstrated the perpetual, cyclical nature of the limited available empirical research 
concerning blue crab and crab pots. 
Two decades later, Guillory and Prejean (1997) conducted similar experiments in 
their study of trap selectivity with various mesh sizes and shapes. The article, Blue Crab, 
Callinectes sapidus, Trap Selectivity Studies: Mesh Size, asserts that sublegal crabs 
continue to be retained by more than the 10 percent allowable tolerance in Louisiana. 
They tested three shapes with assorted sizes and collected crabs 2 weeks in March, April, 
and from June through July. Pots were set in shallow waters adjacent to emergent 
vegetation. Pots were baited with cut fish. They performed statistical tests using SAS. 
They tracked average catch rate by weight. Hex mesh pot rates by number and by catch 
were significantly higher than rectangle traps. Although the historical Hex mesh pots 
remained the most efficient in maximizing legal harvest while minimizing sublegal catch, 
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the sublegal catch still exceeds the 10 percent tolerance. Guillory and Prejean asserted 
that changes in structure would lead to trap saturation effects, decrease handling, and 
increase catches of legal-sized crabs when escape vents are provided for sublegal crabs. 
Abandoned pots (Ghost) on the bottom would allow escape of crabs and smaller by-
catch, as well as fishing efficiency would occur with less culling required. The authors 
demonstrated how self-culling pots could assist in conservation by minimizing mortality 
and creating economic efficiency by lessening time constraints. My research addressed 
non-compliance concerning undersized crab retention and other violations of regulations. 
Guillory (1998) revisited mesh and retention rates in his article, blue crab, 
Callinectes sapidus, Retention Rates in Different Trap Meshes. The author hand measured 
each crab using a dial caliper for carapace and body width. Next, he manually passed 
each crab through the 5-experimental square meshes and the hexagonal commercial mesh 
observing the capability of passage without aid. Because blue crab communities vary in 
season and salinity, male and female crabs were assumed equal to calculate the overall 
retention curve. The results indicated that the 44.4 mm square allowed maximum 
escapement of sublegal crabs to escape while retaining the highest rate of legal blue 
crabs. The author contended that this study offers evidence and justification for gear 
management strategies to reduce sublegal catch at the onset as opposed to the time of 
harvest. This article addresses noncompliance of crab pot use as a means to manage 
fishing effort through gear standards. Enforcement data concerning illegal harvest of 
crabs would make it possible to recognize the skew that exists in fisheries stock data. My 
study reviewed the influence of regulation on blue crab fishers’ noncompliance using 
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enforcement data. The current study included the time that Maryland required 
commercial blue crab fishers place escape rings in each commercial crab pot. 
J. F. Caddy (1999) discussed the role of paradigms on fisheries management in 
chronological theme in his article titled Fisheries Management in the Twenty-First 
Century: Will New Paradigms Apply? Caddy sought to predict future changes in 
methodologies by reviewing historical science and management. He asserted that current 
paradigms have a “marked geographical context, [a limited view of analysis], and are 
driven by technological changes” (p. 3). He discussed the academic context of fisheries, 
stock assessment tools, limits reference points, dominant paradigms, management cycles, 
and common property issues in this in-depth review. Caddy provided the Mediterranean 
demersal fishery as an example to exploitation using ITQs and elaborates upon 
ecosystems theory for multispecies management. He discussed the newest requirements 
that include economic and social impacts. The author contended that management would 
have to move towards technical advances. For instance, he suggested the use of telemetry 
and black-box systems, as well as global positioning technology to track fleets in open 
seas, while he believes inshore fisheries would be best suited to community management 
using catch limits and access rights. He expressed the importance of improved 
management infrastructure that leans towards innovative designs in experimentation for 
improved conservation.  
The advanced arguments of this author relate to noncompliance in fisheries. In 
particular, his suggestions for technological advances in enforcement would assist in 
identifying unreported crab pots via video recorders or other devices. His historical 
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review of paradigms demonstrated the changes in management cycles much like the 
overuse of regulation to address problems. In this way, this article provided my study 
trends in styles of regulation and the “why” behind a particular strategy. Further, the 
author discussed skews on harvest reports similar to that of blue crab in Maryland. This 
article addressed the need for improved infrastructure, which equated to enforcement 
agencies having the ability and the means to influence commercial blue crab fishers’ 
noncompliance, particularly for crab pot. 
Dr. Anthony Hart (2002) for the Australian Centre for Tropical Freshwater 
Research produced, Fisheries Monitoring Programs in the Southern Gulf of Carpentaria 
– a Review. The author reviewed existing monitoring programs from the government, 
participant stakeholders, and community groups. Five criteria for assessments included: 
scientific credibility, ability to protect environmental value, cost-effectiveness, level of 
duplication across regions, and helpfulness of reporting style. Four types of monitoring 
were reviewed: commercial fisheries, fisheries independent monitoring, recreational 
fisheries, and fish habitat. Commercial fisheries have included on-board observer 
programs. Observations were used to consider risk analysis and sustainability indicators 
along with catch and effort using daily logbooks provided by fishers. Independent 
monitoring is accomplished when observers hire out commercial vessels to collect 
samples for factors such as length, weight, sex, and maturity. Limited data on recreational 
harvest exists although 90% of tourists expressed fishing as a main reason for visiting. 
Hart contends that the 1990s resulted in the recognition of the importance of maintaining 
marine ecosystems that begin with fish habitat. The Queensland Fisheries Act of 1994 led 
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to creating Fish Habitat Areas (FHA also called MPA). In some areas, habitat 
characteristics and water quality were analyzed. 
The author discussed CHRIS (Coastal Habitat Resource Information System), 
which is an interactive mapping resource for coastal fisheries habitat, environmental 
datasets, and fisheries harvest data. It has the ability to integrate a multitude of agency 
data from coastal vegetation to topographic and bathymetric data. However, Hart stated 
after multiple attempts to utilize the program, it was “difficult to operate” (p. 16). 
Monitoring programs for the blue crab have been completed commercially and 
independently because of accusations of falsifying crab harvest reports. This occurrence 
skewed baseline data that acted as a catalyst to regulation. He suggested there are many 
gaps in the data such as “ghost” fishing and by-catch surveys. These issues mirrored the 
effect of ghost pots on blue crab and unreported losses of mortality and by-catch found in 
crab pots. This author addressed the impact of ghost pots, and commercial blue crab 
fishers’ noncompliance on number of pots allowed. He contended ghost pots cannot 
accurately be estimated creating a cause for concern. Thus, the damages and costs 
associated with a black-market crab pot that then gets lost at sea remains uncounted. 
Ju, Secor, and Harvey (2003) produced a Demographic Assessment of the blue 
crab (Callinectes sapidus) in Chesapeake Bay Using Extractable Lipofuscins as Age 
Markers. Common methods to determine population to regulate fishing dynamics include 
age-structured models. Hard parts cannot be analyzed because blue crab sheds its outer 
shell with growth. Length-frequency as a second approach was limited because of 
interannual and seasonability variables and protracted spawning season that led to 
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multimodal distribution of sizes per age class. Instead, the authors investigated 
lipofuscins that accumulates in the eyeball and can be measured for age as opposed to 
size-based measurements. It was a biochemical option that eliminated “overlap of sizes in 
age classes that can reduce accuracy in age determination” (para. 3). Sciences disputed 
natural longevity because empirical evidence does not exist. The authors compared 
measurements of lipofuscin to traditional size-based methods to assess the differences in 
identifying accurate age of blue crab, a critical factor to determining future harvest 
potential, and to build in safeguards against overfishing. 
The winter dredge surveys provide stratified random sampling. Juvenile crabs 
were underestimated in abundance because they escaped the gear. Likewise, lipofuscin 
index in small crabs cannot be determined because of analytical limitations. At least three 
ages appeared (ages 0, 1, and 2) in both sampling years. Classifications using lipofuscin 
were drastically different from those using carapace width (CW) indicating this modal 
could “lead to substantial errors in determination of growth, mortality and fishery yield 
estimates” (Discussion, para 2). Population data drives policy. This article addressed the 
importance of compliance concerning the number of crab pots allowed and the mean size 
crab each pot catches. If the juvenile population is underestimated, then the importance of 
crab size to black market estimates is essential to determine loss of future potential 
harvest. 
Bjǿrndal, Lane, and Weintraub (2004) presented a limited review in Operational 
Research [OR] Models and the Management of Fisheries and Aquaculture: A Review. 
This article addressed the under investigated skew on harvest data and its relationship to 
84 
 
 
management of fisheries. The authors evaluated the use of OR models in fisheries 
management and aquaculture. They suggest the difficulties in fisheries are in response to 
required sustainability. The authors identified what they perceived as the prominent 
issues and presented successful cases of OR models. Population modeling was the focus 
of most fisheries’ management. Biological modeling may consider fish stock and 
recruitment behavior or apply age structure and class growth while recording mortality 
and forecasting potential yields. These models have led to quota assignments of available 
stocks. Likewise, economic modeling has persisted since Gordon (1954), simultaneous to 
population discussions. Mathematical programming and analysis have been incorporated 
by OR, which uses a systematic approach to five major areas: descriptive mathematical 
modeling, mathematical programming and optimization, statistical analysis and 
estimation procedures, computer simulations, and decision theory. This included 
minimizing costs for monitoring, surveying, and enforcement. 
Unreliable catch and effort continued to be a concern and the inability to view the 
fishery as a whole support the uncertainties in capture fisheries. Computer simulation of 
ecosystems theory became popular and was meant to simulate actual and potential 
outcomes. The authors contended that, OR models would continue to flourish as a source 
to fisheries management but that they would face new challenges as environmental issues 
change and expand. The review presents an important timeline in modeling attitudes for 
fisheries. It provided an avenue to make comparisons of finfish to blue crab science and 
what analysis designs were dominant in specific fisheries. As regulations evolved for blue 
crab, they may reveal shifts in modeling. 
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Assessing the Potential for Stock Enhancement in the Case of the Chesapeake Bay 
blue crab (Callinectes sapidus) compiled by Davis, Young-Williams, Hines, and Zohar 
(2005) was a leading-edge study pertaining to blue crab. The authors described the ideal 
model as one that rears juveniles with aquaculture and releases them after surpassing 
“early-life-history mortality” (p. 109) whereby they exponentially improve population to 
add to future resources. The authors reported that no empirical studies had previously 
been performed to discern opponents’ concerns. For example, farmed to wild fish may 
not survive, may have negative interbreeding results, may overtake wildlife, or may lead 
to exasperated fishing pressure. They touted the blue crab as ecologically important but 
the most “economically important fishery in the Chesapeake Bay, Maryland, USA” (p. 
110). The authors suggested a highly exploited fishery must be managed properly, and 
this was not the case with blue crab. In this regard, they insisted responsible stock 
enhancement aimed at restoring breeding stock was necessary in addition to traditional 
methods. 
Their experiment required only four mature females that were carrying wild blue 
crab sperm. After hatching and growing the crabs, crabs from each batch were tagged and 
released. Groups of crabs ranged from 3,800 to 9,600 per release. They conducted 
sampling of the wild and hatchery crab population in each site. The authors sampled for 
wild blue crab 1-3 times before the release of hatchery raised crabs. Regardless of gear 
used to catch crabs, gender and CW was recorded for all blue crabs. The experiment 
lasted 4-12 months as measurements were taken until no more hatchery crabs were 
located in any of the three coves. The experiment resulted in an equal ratio of females to 
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males hatching, but a lower female ratio to males found in the wild equal in size. It can be 
assumed that the hatchery crabs contributed to overall spawning stock of the Bay. The 
growth for hatchery crabs was 50% greater in a shorter time than wild crabs. Late 
summer releases did not favor the same. Because limited empirical evidence was 
available, the researchers had difficulty measuring the success of the experiment. 
Nonetheless, the potential to effect blue crab populations at a local level was a viable 
option if it can meet economic efficiency. In this article, the author demonstrated 
alternative management strategies that could be incorporated with traditional methods. 
Although the objective would be to supplement new breeding stock, financial feasibility 
would determine the outcome. The authors addressed the number of illegal and legal 
crabs fished from the Bay. Likely, the use of black market crab pots would be responsible 
for a number of this new stock being removed and uncounted. 
Rudershausen and Turano (2006) conducted an experiment for the conservation 
and protection of pregnant blue crabs (sponge crabs) in North Carolina, its most 
economically important fishery. The authors addressed how sponge crabs are injured by 
crab pots, which would prevent them from hatching their egg mass; these same damages 
can be assumed to be occurring in illegal crab pots as well. This influenced estimates of 
damages. The authors discussed the results in an article titled, Testing a Device to 
Exclude Ovigerous Blue Crab, Callinectes sapidus, from Commercial Pots. North 
Carolina had practiced restrictive sanctuaries for brooding females since 1865, but the 
harvest of sponge crabs was legal. This had offered minimal protection, and NC was 
considering other means to protect the sponge crab. The authors contend that rather than 
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the prohibition of capture, the gear crab pot can be manipulated to exclude the capture of 
the sponge crab. 
The criteria considered for assessing practicality of an excluder was that of 
Eldridge et al. (1979): reduced levels of harvest, reduced stress, and eliminated a barrier 
to migration for brood release. They collected data over three years from 1,061 control 
pots and 1,027 excluder pots. The results demonstrated that the pots with excluders 
barred legal male crabs and or deterred them from narrow entrances. Further, stress of 
capture caused brood scrubbing and delayed migration to brood release areas. This article 
linked brood scrubbing directly to crab pots. The gear crab pot continued under scrutiny 
anywhere blue crab was surviving. The study took place in NC, but it was relative to the 
current study in Maryland. 
In 2008, Zohar, Hines, Zmora, Johnson, Lipcius, Seitz, Eggleston, Place, Schott, 
Stubblefield, and Chung asserted that over the previous 15 years the blue crab population 
declined by 70 percent. The article, The Chesapeake Bay Blue Crab (Callinectes 
sapidus): a Multidisciplinary Approach to Responsible Stock Replenishment highlights 
the authors’ concerns about the decline in spawning stock as opposed to the decline in 
pounds landed by proffering a replenishment program. Seven years previously, the Blue 
Crab Advanced Research Consortium (BCARC) made up of scientists and stakeholders 
was formed to advance biological understanding, develop a hatchery program, assess the 
feasibility of such, and transfer the program to the fishing industry, if successful. The 
authors declared previous stringent regulations created a stabilization of blue crab, but the 
resulting population records did not indicate a rebound. They supported restocking must 
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take place. 
Specifically, research must include a consideration for migration patterns and 
specific seasonal and geographical behaviors of breeding and spawning blue crab. The 
authors completed research in nursery settings where they hatched 570,000 blue crabs 
between 2002 and 2006. Near 300 thousand were tagged and released into Chesapeake 
Bay. The plan involved beginning in small habitats in the upper and lower Bay and then 
expanding to the larger system. However, to reach optimum cost effectiveness, gaining 
control of juvenile production through ovulation, brood production, and hatching was 
necessary, but required a complete understanding of a complex reproductive process 
including gene and hormonal levels. An integral result of hatchery blue crab included a 
survival rate in the wild equal to that of the wild blue crab suggesting survival to sexual 
maturity. The authors recognized that with additional success a genetic marker would be 
necessary to eliminate the labor of tagging. Identifying release areas included considering 
density of wild plus hatchery crabs and available food sources. blue crabs were released 
between April and October, which was optimum growth and spawning time. 
Hatchery crabs were able to migrate and spawn the second year of life, while the 
majority of wild blue crab would not grow large enough to make the migration and would 
overwinter in its current habitat. Diagnostic tools were used to manage disease and 
health. Quality assurance measures prevent incoming diseases, release into disease 
potential areas, and disease-free releases from hatchery blue crab. The program was cost 
prohibitive until hatchery costs can be reduced, as biological processes were better 
understood by science. This required solid science. Restoration had the potential to 
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provide “substantial and long-term ecological and financial benefits” (p. 32). This article 
addressed rebound measures that were relative to compliance behavior by commercial 
blue crab fishers in Chesapeake Bay. Successful replenishment programs had the 
potential to reduce harvest pressures if the problem of crab pot enforcement was solved; 
otherwise, noncompliance would effect restocking programs negatively. 
Havens, Bilkovic, Stanhope, Angstadt, and Hershner (2008) discussed the 
negative effects of crab pots in their article titled, The Effects of Derelict blue crab Traps 
on Marine Organisms in the Lower York River, Virginia. Limited literature existed 
regarding crab pots environmental impact on the Chesapeake Bay. During trawl surveys 
taking place between 2002-2005, 91 crab pots were captured in trawling equipment and 
brought on board to document their contents. The authors chose to survey both active and 
derelict crab pots. Areas were selected based upon known fishing pressure. GPS recorded 
active pots and potential derelict pots were viewed using benthic mapping during non-
fishing periods using side-scan sonar to collect real-time georeferenced data. The sonar 
produced 676 potential derelict crab pots. Experimental designs included measuring 
encrustation and condition of the pots and baited and nonbaited pots. The results of the 
crab pot density comparison showed a ratio of 16:40 (40%) derelict to buoyed in 2005 
and 12:54 (22.2%) in 2006. Encrusted pots continued to collect blue crab throughout the 
13-month study. Pots fouled up with organisms that increased crab pot weight, then lost 
weight in the summer as diebacks occurred. The authors suggested vinyl-coated pots have 
an average life of 2 years or more. However, after time the crab pot acts as habitat to 
some creatures and continues to do so after it degrades beyond catching. The results 
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suggested that crab pots stop catching in at least 1 year in high salinity and much longer 
in lower salinities. This article addressed issues pertaining to the use of crab pots. It 
confirmed that there is limited literature on crab pot use beyond economic relevancy. The 
skew created by ghost pots referred to as derelict in this article suggests a 30% loss of 
gear yearly had the potential to be exasperated using black-market pots. 
In An Evaluation of the Effects of Blue Crab (Callinectes sapidus) Behavior on 
the Efficacy of Crab Pots as a Tool for Estimating Population Abundance, authors 
Sturdivant and Clark (2011) discussed the use of independent assessments produced by 
the individual blue crab fisher and how that assisted in estimating catch per unit of effort 
and population dynamics. The authors developed the ability to observe blue crab in and 
around crab pots. The study took place during July and August of 2003 and attempted to 
determine if intraspecific interactions affect catch and escape rates due to size or 
abundance, to determine if these factors were affected by abiotic factors like depth, and to 
assess the effects of behavior on crab pot efficacy. The authors used commercial crab pots 
to test catch rates. Field tests included seeding a pot with crabs to determine if the 
presence or size of a crab affected catch or escape rates. One meter to a maximum of 5 m 
depths was chosen along with a previously studied site that was free of vegetation and 
habitat. The minimum size crab was the legal minimum catch allowed in Maryland 
(2003) at 127 mm CW. 
The population of interest was legal crabs. Video was modeled after lobster trap 
video presented in 2001. The contraption allowed an aerial view of the pot, and a red 
light, unseen by crabs was used for night vision. Crabs observed entering level 1 had an 
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85% escape rate, but for those that then entered the second level escape decreased to a 
2% escape rate. The authors suggested that this skews population data, and population 
estimates should be measured from the second level counts only. The crabs exhibited 
limited quantifiable aggressive behavior, which leaves the authors to believe that this 
does not influence catch and escapes in a crab pot. They suggested patterns identified in 
this study may have been different using crabs in different molt cycles or gender. 
Enforcement tactics benefit from a self-culling crab pot. My research addressed 
identifying misconceptions about crab pot harvest numbers and mortality concerns that 
were exasperated. Crab pots act as the main gear for the harvest of blue crab, and 
research that discovers new behaviors in blue crab may assist in designing enforcement 
regulations.  
The article, Marine Extinctions and Conservation, written by Briggs (2011) 
discussed the collapse of populations that were once a major seafood source. The author 
suggested future demise can be controlled by an aggressive use of MPAs. Briggs asserted 
that a thousand plus small populations of fish and invertebrate are remnants of species 
that collapsed from overfishing, and some stem from 30-50 years ago. These populations 
were typical of coastal and estuary populations that had further been reduced by habitat 
destruction, yet they continue to survive. The author stressed a shift towards ecological 
based fisheries management to save the struggling smaller populations. He contended that 
with global warming many of these species face sure extinction unless this philosophy 
was adopted. This author addressed overfishing as the heart of this article, which was an 
accusation that has continued in the blue crab industry. Noncompliance that may lead to 
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extinction must be investigated. Determining when and why compliance issues arise is  
essential to any fisheries management plan, in particular, crab pot. 
Analyzing Large-Scale Conservation Interventions with Bayesian Hierarchical 
Models: a Case Study of Supplementing Threatened Pacific Salmon by Scheuerell et al. 
(2015) addressed the constant threat of extinction of multiple species. Interventions have 
included habitat restoration, hatchery restoration, and protected areas. The authors 
analyzed 43 years of data from 22 populations. Using a time-series model, the authors 
discovered that environmental variables had a profound influence on interannual 
variability in adult density. Hatchery supplementation over varying time spans appeared 
to have negligible effect on increasing density in naturally spawning adult salmon. 
Hatchery supplementation was expensive and “the effectiveness of these programs in 
achieving conservation goals remains poorly understood” (Introduction, para. 4). 
Scheuerell et al. proposes that correlations across time and space can cause problems for 
traditional approaches, but they demonstrated how a Bayesian hierarchical model could 
tackle some of these limitations. This can answer questions about ecological responses to 
drastic conservation efforts. This study provided a guide for the current crab pot study. It 
provided a means to address the response of commercial blue crab fishers to regulatory 
action. It can incorporate time series and event influence for a given regulation, in this 
case, crab pot compliance. 
Enforcement Theory Review 
Maryland took some drastic measures when it outlawed the use of crab pots 
during the 1941 legislative session, but it allowed the use of motor power on crab scrape 
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boats. Many blue crab fishers had invested heavily in crab pots, and beginning in June of 
1941, illegal crab pots were being confiscated. In July, a Dorchester county blue crab 
fisher filed a suit attacking the validity of the law; however, Judge Melvin of the Circuit 
Court of Annapolis upheld the constitutionality of the 1941 law (The Sun, 1941). 
Between June and October of 1941, the Tidewater Fisheries Department of Maryland 
confiscated 1,900 crab pots valued in excess of $2,000 (The Sun, 1941). Again, in 
November, a Dorchester county blue crab fisher filed a lawsuit against the Tidewater 
Fisheries Department requesting an injunction prohibiting enforcement of the crab pot 
law. Then, in an appeal, he made the same request to Maryland’s Court of Appeals who 
denied his request and upheld the law as it was written. In contrast to Maryland’s activity, 
Virginia issued 20,000 commercial crab pot licenses (The Sun, 1941) and fished “some 
40,000 pots” (Davis, 1942, p. 3). The Sun, December 11, 1941 printed a response from 
the Crisfield Times to the Watermen’s Association who supported lifting the ban on crab 
pots. It reads: 
The Times emphatically declares—in answer to [Emerson’s] appeal for the use of 
pots on the ground that they catch the ‘better grades of crab’—that “If there are 
better grades of crabs, Emerson, the crab pot certainly gets ‘em. For the crab pot 
works twenty-four hours a day and not only gets the better grades, but gets the 
intermediate grades and the commonest grades. The crab pot gets ‘em all. And, 
next to the destruction of sponge crabs, is the greatest and most formidable enemy 
the crabbing industry has (the Sun, 1941). 
In March of 1942, Maryland’s Governor O’Conor requested the Maryland Bureau 
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of Fisheries and Wildlife to complete a survey of conditions contributing to the blue crab 
decline for the past several years (The Sun, 1942). Governor O’Conor proposed a meeting 
between Maryland, Virginia, and conservation officials of both states, as well as the 
Secretary of the Interior to discuss possible “methods of rehabilitating” (para. 1) the blue 
crab population (The Sun, 1942). In April of 1942, Virginia called on Maryland to tighten 
their conservation efforts. The Old Dominion asserted the problem was an old one – 
blame placing. Further, ignorance, jealousy, and suspicion as well as indiscriminate laws 
regulating the Chesapeake Bay have led to a lack of cooperation among commercial blue 
crab fishers in both states. However, Virginia claimed that there were “ample laws” (para. 
5) but that “a determination on the part of every enforcement agent to see that compliance 
with the law is strict and complete” (para. 5) was necessary, as well as a better 
understanding of the need for conservation (Bentley, 1942). 
 The Board of Natural Resource, State of Maryland, Department of Research and 
Education produced Publication No. 53 – “A Study of the Crab Pot as a Fishing Gear” in 
November of 1942. Davis (1942) wrote that the dispute over the use of crab pots had 
been littered with a wide range of pet theory based largely on the economic interests of 
those making the statements without the benefit of facts. The purpose of this study was to 
provide facts to assist in writing management policy for the blue crab fishery. The time 
study ran from June 1942 to October 1942 using the same pots as Maryland blue crab 
fishers. Pots were set in various locations, but data collection lacked clear purpose; thus, 
different variables were collected at different sites. 
The focus of the study made comparisons between the use of a trotline and a crab 
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pot to harvest blue crabs. Pounds of crab harvested were the consistent variable 
throughout the data collected over the five-month study. Davis (1942) concluded that the 
crab pot was clean-cut and efficient, requiring less time and labor, as compared to 
historical methods such as the trotline or dip nets and catches roughly equal weight in 
crabs, pound for pound. If the pot was used in the open Bay and deeper rivers it was 
constructive gear, but in shallow water, becomes “distinctly destructive” (Davis, 1942, p. 
20). 
In April of 1943, Maryland gave the Department of Tidewater Fisheries power to 
regulate the blue crab fishery without waiting for the legislature to pass laws (Kennedy et 
al., 2007). Opponents were fearful of an inundation of new regulation, but the 
commissioners promised they would “contemplate action only when its advisability is 
clearly shown by scientific research” (The Sun, 1943, para. 4); nonetheless, the first 
action the commission took was to outlaw the use of crab pots in Bay tributaries. 
Maryland further demonstrated its commitment to conserving fisheries when it provided 
for a department of research in the conservation field (The Sun, 1943). Additionally, 
Maryland and Virginia announced a conservation program with three points pertaining to 
the blue crab (The Sun, 1943). 
• That both states should prohibit the use of crab pots in areas where undersized 
crabs predominate. 
• That both states study advantages and disadvantages of crab pounds.  
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• That Dr. R. V. Truitt of Maryland and Captain Selden Taylor of Virginia join 
officials of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service in their studies of the 
blue crab. 
A legal notice was posted in The Sun on June 25, 1943 (Warfield, Jr.) describing 
The Commission of Tidewater Fisheries’ four-section regulation to take effect on July 2, 
1943. Specifics of the regulation included crab pot construction specifications, territorial 
limits, license handling requirements, crab pot limit requirements, specific fees, and how 
license funds collected would be allocated within the Department of Natural Resources. 
At this time, the crab pot limit per licensed blue crab fisher was 35 pots. By October, The 
Sun suggested the cooperative effort between Maryland and Virginia resulted in a 
rehabilitation of the blue crab industry (1943) although there was no empirical evidence 
to support this claim. The following year, 1944, federal biologists supported Virginia’s 
claim that there was no effect of sponge crab harvesting on subsequent crab abundance 
(Kennedy et al., 2007). In contradiction to Maryland’s ban on the harvest of sponge crabs, 
it allowed the possession and transport of sponge crabs caught elsewhere (Kennedy et al., 
2007). 
The Chesapeake Bay Interagency Planning Committee was founded (MSA, 
2010). By 1971, enforcement of policy became urgent, and the Natural Resource Police 
was created, which combined the Marine Police and the Wildlife Law Enforcement 
Division (MD-DNR, 2015) giving both parties the ability to enforce on sea and land. The 
Bruce Decision, a court ruling, allowed a Maryland citizen to fish in any county in the 
state, potentially increasing harvest pressure on local crab resources (Kennedy et al., 
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2007) where previously, crabbing was a localized activity. However, these changes came 
with new regulations that required Maryland crab potters to maintain daily harvest reports 
and submit them monthly to the Department of Natural Resources (Kennedy et al., 2007). 
At last, in 1972, the necessity for population data becomes apparent, and a routine trawl 
and seine survey was begun for the blue crab by Maryland’s DNR Fisheries Service (Hall 
et al., 2004). At the same time, the Federal Clean Water Act was passed (Hall et al., 
2004). 
Interested parties would expect a plethora of compliance/enforcement behavior 
literature considering the angry, frustrated debates that continued into 2019 among the 
Chesapeake Bay blue crab stakeholders. However, it continues to elude the academics. 
The following literature describes an evolution of views relating to 
compliance/enforcement theory in the 21st century. 
M. Paolisso (2002) expressed his study in an article titled, Blue Crabs and 
Controversy on the Chesapeake Bay: A Cultural Model for Understanding Watermen’s 
Reasoning about Blue Crab Management. The perspective was from a cognitive 
anthropological window that attempts to employ the cultural and biological knowledge of 
the commercial blue crab community to build a cultural model of blue crab fishers’ views 
on managing the fishery. The author repeated that management agencies and science 
concluded that blue crab was at a level where a natural disaster could decrease the 
population to unrecoverable numbers. The causes were numerous, and the science was 
limited, but the managers and science believed the best action was immediately to reduce 
the commercial harvest. Blue crab fishers proposed looking to water quality and 
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predation instead of cutting the commercial blue crab fishers’ share of the resource. The 
author suggested anthropology can address “causes, consequences and possible 
resolution” (p. 227) for conflicts arising among stakeholders in the fishery. Paolisso used 
ethnographic data to identify the cultural model for understanding views regarding 
regulation and resistance to science. He suggested blue crab fishers would “resist any 
regulation, and the science that seeks to prohibit the harvest of crabs provided by God, 
yet they would be supportive of regulations that increase sustainability of the crabs 
provided by God” (p. 227). 
He reported 4,800 licensed watermen harvest blue crab with an average dockside 
value of $50 million a year. Resource managers argued that regulation was the most 
effective policy response to protect the spawning stock of blue crab because commercial 
fishing was a major source of mortality for blue crab. The author used semi structured 
interviews, in-depth and extensive conservations, and participant observation to collect 
data. The data revealed that the blue crab fishers’ propositions include nature manages 
crabs, which are for human use. Second, pollution destroys crab habitat and science 
studies effects of pollution – and they can agree that regulations promote sustainable 
harvests and greed threatens future populations. They contended nature controls them, but 
humans control pollution; thus, commercial harvest was not the enemy. 
However, blue crab fishers acknowledged that excessive harvest of small crabs 
and the use of significantly more crab pots than allowed was a problem. Their responses 
ultimately agreed that some regulations are necessary to sustain the fishery. The study 
addressed several variables for the current research. It discussed crab pots, compliance 
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attitudes, and revealed the thought process of commercial blue crab fishers as it relates to 
the ideal of regulating the fishery. Thus, the enforcement variable in the current study 
demonstrates patterns in blue crab fishers’ responses to upcoming regulation and or the 
aftereffects of. This literature showed that managements’ response to fisheries declines 
had been restrictive control measures or to ignore the problem. 
Nielsen and Mathiesen (2003) discussed that few measures had been taken to 
understand noncompliance behavior. The research from Important Factors Influencing 
Rule Compliance in Fisheries Lessons from Denmark, depicts the choices of three Danish 
fisheries; all were gill fish. One fishery’s focus was quota management, while the other 
two focused on mesh size and by-catch regulations. The research employed both 
quantitative and qualitative. Questionnaires were mailed, 1 to 1-1/2-hour interviews were 
conducted and included dominant figures in each fishery. It lasted for three years from 
1997-2000 and was analyzed around a 5-point framework. The first consideration was the 
industry structure, then control and enforcement, content of regulation, norms within, and 
morals of fishers, and last was the decision-making process. Five major themes 
developed with the possibility of a sixth determine factor influencing rule compliance. 
The first was the economic gain to be obtained, then deterrence factors, fit of 
regulation with practice, common-sense of regulation, and norms and morals associated 
with the regulation. The sixth was the perception of having influence over regulatory 
action. Fishers recognized that at a large scale of noncompliance, paper trails would tell, 
but on a smaller scale, opportunistic behaviors, and risk assessment play vital rules. The 
research demonstrated that “the implementation of output-based regulations like 
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quotas/catch rations was often in conflict with the mentality and prestige of fishers and 
undermines the socio-cultural norms in the community” (p. 414). 
Nielsen and Mathiesen asserted that the problem would not be solved with 
improved monitoring and controlled activities, but that these measures tended to build 
mistrust among stakeholders. This article addressed why regulations were not working 
and suggested improved voluntary compliance can occur when regulations adapt to 
practical fishing situations. In my research, I asked to what degree noncompliance 
occurred by comparing enforcement and compliance behavior against regulation. A new 
quota system was a regulation that was tested against enforcement data. Current 
enforcement technology included offshore cameras to scan for poachers. However, as 
Nielsen and Mathiesen’s study suggested, norms and mores or economic gain may 
determine the risk of noncompliance. 
In Project PR 26109 titled, Policy Research – Implications of Liberalization of 
Fish Trade for Developing Countries, Macfadyen (2004) discussed fisheries and 
aquaculture schemes. Certification schemes came in a variety of standards and labeling of 
such may or may not be helpful to any particular fishery. The costs for such a scheme 
may be prohibitive for fishers to comply and create inequity among small and large-scale 
fisheries. He identified 9 non-organic groups related to fisheries management and 
guidelines. The common theme in these groups was each lacked social and poverty 
emphasis, each focused on environmental concerns or social issues, lacked any social 
element, or favored social and economic relationships focusing on sustainability of the 
resource. Seven organic groups were identified, and none of these included a social or 
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poverty element in its guidelines of management or focus on terrestrial agriculture that 
related to aquaculture operations. Many schemes focused on the environment and lacked 
concern for the social issues that compromise fisheries management. The author 
suggested there was a lack of participation from the small-scale fishery and this effected 
legitimacy of management. He suggested that “open access and overlapping multi-
species fisheries” (p. 10) using assorted gear with a multitude of landing sites was 
characteristic of the small-scale fishery. 
Macfadyen contended this lent itself to noncompliance issues that occurred from 
poorly monitored or reported harvests. As the demand for labeling increased so would the 
need for policy recommendation for developing countries; however, little research existed 
about the impact this may have on developing countries. Certifying products regarding 
their source and style of catch could be a costly measure. The author addressed 
misreporting of harvests in small-scale fisheries, which appeared as a frequent problem in 
the Maryland blue crab fishery. My research considered how often this occurred. Further 
it addressed legitimacy of regulations as perceived by the small-scale fisher who often 
lacked participation in the decision-making process. These variables relate to the skews 
identified in blue crab dockside landings as compared to actual harvest reports, which 
threatens compliance efforts. 
In 2004, Fogarty and Miller studied the effects on reporting harvests after 
Maryland changed from a self-reporting system to a randomized selection of blue crab 
fisher program. They reported the findings in a 3-page paper titled, Impact of a Change in 
Reporting Systems in the Maryland Blue Crab Fishery. The authors employed time series 
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models to demonstrate changes in abundance of blue crab. They included an intervention 
model to demonstrate changes in the regulation on reporting harvest. Secondary data of 
recorded harvests and population data provided before and after the event were employed 
as variables. This cut and dry quantitative study revealed a substantial impact in numbers 
of blue crab reported; however, the differences in total abundance showed minor change 
in fluctuations. The authors addressed a change in regulation for reporting harvest. It 
provided an example to follow to discover discrepancies in reporting based on historical 
populations, crab pots allowed, and harvests reported, which would answer the questions 
regarding skew on harvest data. The time series model and intervention model provided 
the current research a means to demonstrate enforcement against regulation. Further, the 
current research  overlaps with this study in that time slots for comparison of enforcement 
events coincided with the 1981 change in reporting requirements. 
Hankin et al., (2005) introduced California’s Dungeness Crab: Conserving the 
Resource and Increasing the Net Economic Value of the Fishery. The authors discussed 
the indirect effects of regulation that turn into direct effects in another fishery. Effort 
changes to other stocks when regulations limit harvest potential of the crab. Three points 
were discussed. The economics of processing the fishery, industry participants’ 
perceptions of management, and biological components of the species were reviewed for 
data. Primary and secondary sources were used and interviews from six processing firms. 
The authors stressed because of the natural fluctuations in crab landings, data collection 
over substantial time worked best. They hit a barrier for the last sequential year as 
regulation changes prevented the acquisition of ticket landings indicating quantity and 
103 
 
 
price received for the value-added analysis. Estimates were applied based on the previous 
year. 
The findings suggested a variety of benefits could be experienced with 
management that considered individual quotas. The highest yield-adjusted market prices 
and value added represents picked and frozen crab. Phase two involved mailing 616 
surveys after two pretests resulting from multiple revisions discussing regulatory tools 
used in the crustacean fishery. Forty percent respondents completed the survey 
representing the total crab fleet. The fleet consisted of small, medium, and large vessels, 
but 75% of those fished less than 400 traps. Seventy-three percent of respondents stated 
that at least 40% of their income was derived from the crab fishery. The authors stated 
fishers of small vessels believed their license held a value of $10,303, while medium 
vessels were $18,187, and larger vessels considered their worth $31,111. This seems to 
equate to the number of traps a boat can transport. 
The survey uncovered three major themes in attitudes of blue crab fishers and 
management. The first apparent opinion suggested maintaining status quo. The next 
opinion suggested a majority approved of the 1-trap limit for all vessels regardless of 
size. The last theme suggested emptying traps during daylight hours only. The authors 
state that the Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen’s Associations was currently creating 
legislation to create trap limits per vessel at least as an experiment. Nonetheless, all 
discussion relating to additional regulation as opposed to seasonal management tools was 
received negatively by fishers. Finally, phase three considered biological crab processes. 
The authors wanted to estimate natural and fishing mortality rates of sublegal and legal 
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sized male crabs. Further, they worked to determine the validity of the mating marks used 
to determine mating activity that can act as a marker for future stock potential. 
They implemented a tag recovery project over three successive years on 
approximately 2000 crabs. Two timeslots for testing included just before the season open 
and after the harvest were reduced drastically at the end of the season. Their assumption 
contended that all-natural death should occur between April and November. Flyers and 
posters were placed offering a $10 reward for the return of legal and $5 reward for the 
return of sublegal crabs. The last year of the research, the rewards were increased by $5 
each. Of 10,735 tagged male crabs released, 1,446 were returned by commercial or sport 
fishing people. The study did not produce any evidence that mating markers are a 
significant source of activity. The authors suggested that mating success following a 
season results in 100% mating. No empirical evidence existed to support the idea that 
primarily harvesting the male crab effected the pregnancy rate of the female crab in this 
species in California. 
This article addressed the influence of regulations and management of the 
California commercial blue crab fishers. The current study tested the enforcement 
environment against changes in regulation. This article contradicted the management 
strategies employed in the Maryland blue crab fishery. Population markers were 
measured by females and males at specific ages, and the general belief by science was 
that restricting both the female and male harvest was necessary for sustainability. This 
included number of pots per person, number of pots per boat, and number of crabs per 
season. Measurements of enforcement in the current study against regulations that change 
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limits for male and female crabs may show definite patterns. The skew on population as it 
relates to crab pots allowed and gender specific regulations could be significant.  
In Fisheries Science and Sustainability in International Policy: a Study of Failure 
in the European Union’s Common Fisheries Policy, Daw and Gray (2005) attempted to 
explain why fisheries management had failed to create a sustainable fishery. Examining 
political systems and fisheries science caused the authors to determine scientific data 
often inhibits effective fisheries management. Their study presented the chronological 
order of the science that has guided policy in the European Union (EU) Common 
Fisheries Policy. They followed the routes that scientific advice takes, if it was acted 
upon, and the factors that act as barriers in translation from idea to policy. The authors 
examined the breakdown in translations from the point of view of decision makers and 
fishers as well as the scientists who make the recommendations. The first barrier was that 
policy rarely adopts in full the advice of science. The second breakdown was that changes 
in gear such as technical or structural are often stalled for many years. Finally, poor 
enforcement was a major contributor to sustainability management. Fishing mortality 
occurring above the recommendations of science, poor catch records, and illegal landings 
influenced the EU failure. Ideally, science must be separate and thought of as 
independent from state regulatory agencies. Science was for science sake, yet the state 
needs this science to convince the public that these policies were necessary. They 
suggested the tragedy of the commons, and fisheries were known to be difficult to 
enforce, short of privatization and regulation. 
The authors asserted that economic discount rate theory, which was to exploit it 
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while the opportunity presents itself and reinvest the profits. Popularity in politics acts as 
another barrier to sustainability; most politicians lean towards the people’s choice as 
opposed to sciences’ advice. Fisheries science was limited in scope and offers zero 
certainty. Fishers cautiously view the act and results of science. Single species assessment 
limits most science. This makes MSY a poor management tool where many fishes 
interact via predation or as by-catch. The authors asserted that the political and scientific 
framework in EU states create barriers to fisheries sustainability. This research addressed 
the need for a realignment of research objectives towards usable management goals. This 
related to answering the number of times blue crab fishers had fished more than their 
license allows. This study correlates with the current research in that identifying barriers 
in advance of regulation solves indirect problems associated with regulating. The authors 
specifically addressed poor enforcement, illegal landings (black market fish) and poor 
record keeping as key issues. My study demonstrated a skew on harvest was possible and  
associated with the use of illegal gear.  
The author, Betsi Beem (2006) reviewed the course of blue crab management in 
her paper Planning to Learn: blue crab Policymaking in the Chesapeake Bay. She 
discussed the traditional Fisheries Management Plan and the development of the Bi-State 
Blue Crab Advisory Committee (BBCAC). Beem argued that the value the blue crab 
fishers assigned to the group, how conflict was managed between science and practice, 
and the degree that participants were involved in the planning process were key factors to 
its success. It was common knowledge the people are managed -- not fish. The author 
asserted that accurate representation of recreational and commercial crabbing was a 
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necessity to assure proper management strategies. She further contended that when 
economic modeling data was not available, policy makers must depend upon self-
reporting from blue crab fishers to analyze the economic health of the industry. 
Additionally, social impact assessments were necessary to address the effects of 
regulatory action on fishing community. 
To determine if learning had occurred in the process, empirical evidence relating 
to the evaluation of objectives and instruments was required. Beem used semi structured 
and focused interviews, personal observation, and content analysis to perform her study. 
The analysis tracked conflicts over time and changes in understanding of factors effecting 
the blue crab. Size limited this study. Some participants were unsure of dates, times, and 
places making isolation of variables difficult. Last, the participation of key decision 
makers from the legislature and natural resource department lent credibility to the 
BBCAC. This study addressed the learning process and what may inhibit it. This was 
essential to accepting and complying with regulations - compliance. This research 
addressed several barriers that could lead to noncompliance that management attempted 
to remedy with further regulation. The current research reviews compliance behavior of 
commercial blue crab fishers as it relates to crab pots. Many changes occurred in 
regulations for blue crab that effect commercial blue crab fishers who use the gear, crab 
pot. Science and blue crab fishers have remained in conflict over recommendations and 
methodology for studies of population.  
Hastings (2007) presented The Chesapeake Bay Blue Crab Conflict in her Honors 
Thesis supervised by Dr. Shunlin Liang, University of Maryland. The author reviewed 
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how social, economic, and political factors have effected blue crab spatial distribution 
and population size. Harvest prior to 1950 was used to determine “boom and bust” (p. 6) 
natural periods to discover if natural patterns do occur. She suggested that before 
solutions can be created for the “crisis” in the Bay, the most important causes must be 
isolated. Maryland and Virginia waters were considered in data collection and interpreted 
into broad generalizations. The decline in blue crab can be contributed to nutrient 
overload in the Bay, habitat destruction, and over-fishing. 
Two common byproducts of sewage treatment, urban areas, and agriculture are 
phosphorous and nitrogen. Another controversial threat was that of overfishing. 
Disagreement between science and commercial blue crab fishers was blue crab fishers 
believe the blue crab is extremely prolific; however, during a BBCAC meeting, 76% of 
blue crab fishers expressed concern over their futures. Enforcement concerns include 
agriculture noncompliance as well. This article addressed overfishing as one main 
contributor to the decline in the blue crab fishery, which was an enforcement/compliance 
issue. This supported my research, which sought to determine if a pattern emerged 
between noncompliance and regulation and if so, did patterns present, and to what degree 
did they occur? 
Fahy (2008) discussed what occurs with passive enforcement in his research titled 
Performance of in Inshore Fishery in the Absence of Regulatory Enforcement. According 
to the author, inshore fishing fleets have smaller rigs with a maximum vessel size of 12 
m. Crews were teams that split profits equally. They operated passive and static gear as 
opposed to mobile fishing gear. The author’s study addresses relaxed regulatory 
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enforcement of an inshore whelk fishery. Until 1990, the fishery was hand operated, but 
with new demands, it had turned to mechanical gear for harvesting resources. This fishery 
was like the blue crab fishery in a variety of ways, which made it an interesting 
comparison for comparison sake. Lack of risk perpetrates noncompliance like blue crab 
pots. The whelk fishery harvests approximately 350 pots per day akin to crab pots. 
Further, regulation was geared toward quota-regulated and minimizing TAC per 
fisher like blue crab pots. Fahy stated that until 1996, census codes did not include the 
commercial fishery, and crew members were considered as co-operators responsible for 
their portion of taxes and other business-related responsibilities. Some demographics 
were collected through the two main commercial buyers of the product and from 
interviews. Larger vessels had a greater fishing potential as the ability to carry more pots 
existed. In the southwest Irish Sea, the status of the stock determines the performance 
because it was a single species fishery. The new demand from the orient had added to 
noncompliance through undersize harvest that contributes to catch, but it has no true 
value by weight. Vessels have left and returned to the fishery based on these catch 
reports. Accordingly, in this open access fishery, there was no incentive to conserve 
because a casual competitor was able to harvest illegal sized whelk.  
Nie (2008) presented, The Underappreciated Role of Regulatory Enforcement in 
Natural Resource Conservation. He explained how regulatory enforcement can lead to 
new ways of addressing conservation. He suggested a “co-evolution” of regulation and 
litigation was occurring. Likewise, he asserted that when regulatory enforcement was 
weakened simultaneous strategies also were weakened. He contended that the “command 
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and control” style was poorly suited to some resources and that “analysis paralysis” 
occurred because of burdensome procedures. 
In contrast, some groups had called governmental regulation a barrier to less 
adversarial approaches to management. Further, the courts had been used as a first line of 
defense as opposed to collaborative problem solving. He suggested the development of 
environmentalism was a result of the chronological order of lawsuits filed in its name. 
However, the judiciary response was to ensure legislation becomes reality. This became a 
problem when resource law was too “open-ended, vague, contradictory,” or problematic 
in its vernacular. The result was that agencies filled in the blanks using “best available 
science” that undoubtedly supported its view for management. On some occasions, 
litigation was essential to “check on unresponsive and/or captured agencies” (p. 143). 
Often, it seemed the literature undermined regulatory enforcement. Some theorists 
suggested command and control, or top-down methods of management were not designed 
to address current complex problems such as non-point sources of pollution. The 
judiciary as opposed to the agency does not have to contend with trade-offs and 
compromises destined for the political arena of decision-making. Many problems go 
unexamined as a result. 
In collaborative efforts, which often were preferred as less adversarial, were not a 
comparable replacement and could undermine the usefulness of regulation. Regardless, 
population advisory committees had become a part of the establishment. These groups  
had success in that they had been able to achieve some regulatory goals and objectives, 
but the ability to quantify this was difficult. Similarly, agencies that place undue practice 
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on acquisition of resources often do this to avoid unpopular processes like rule 
enforcement; however, “this is a grave error” (p. 152). The author suggested that the mere 
threat of active enforcement causes some people to take the money, rather than face the 
penalties for noncompliance later. However, this does not build long-lasting effective 
social behavior for compliance issues. Last, the eco-system strategy continued to evolve, 
but Nie contended this was a tool rather than the one size fits all model that was often 
projected. As cited by Nie from 40 C.F.R. §1508.7, 
the impact on the environment which results from the incremental impact of the 
action [regulation] when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable 
future actions regardless of what agency (Federal or non-Federal) or person 
undertakes such other action…[and]…can result from individually minor but 
collectively significant actions taking place over a period of time. 
Adaptive management styles had a renewed emphasis on monitoring, but this 
raised suspicion, which was counterproductive to the idea of collaboration with 
stakeholders. However, agencies and interest groups could agree in advance of the steps 
to be taken when video apparatus identified any violation. This would provide a means 
for agencies to share accountability. Nevertheless, task forces or groups ran the risk of 
appearing as a public relations ploy to further agency agendas without risk. However, if 
these champions of collaboration shout loud enough to get all interests to the table, the 
movement would likely continue to gain strength in influence. This author discussed 
regulations as a cooperative effort to manage natural resources. This article caught and 
addressed the true essence and conflict of over-regulating. It described some unintended 
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consequences of breakdowns in belief systems. Nie’s study sought patterns in 
enforcement in response to regulation much like my study. I applied several ideals from 
this research to my study in the blue crab problematic areas in the recommendations 
section. Regulation and enforcement were reviewed in my study, and the results of my 
study may in fact effect future enforcement ability and interpretation by the judiciary. 
Nøstbakken (2008) presented Fisheries Law Enforcement – a Survey of the 
Economic Literature. The author advised that commercial fishers would harvest more 
than a socially optimal harvest under the common property scheme. He suggested that 
fishers and the industry do not self-enforce regulations regardless of what people witness. 
Likewise, he contended that not all regulations required full compliance. He viewed the 
idea of crime from an economic view and suggested fishers measure the risks and expect 
to take risks as a facet of the business. The author reviewed the literature of Burke, 
Polinsky and Shavell, Malik, Mullin, and Snyder, and more as to the measurement of 
illegal activity as it pertained to personal profit for the fishers. He asserted that penalties 
in the form of fines were the preferable deterrence because they were the least costly - 
socially. Further, he emphasized the structure of the compensation might encourage 
employees to commit crimes on behalf of employers. 
Thus, I considered principle-agent theory. Nøstbakken’s article addressed the 
development of the fisheries law enforcement model and presented manipulations of the 
model to fit assorted scenarios in fisheries. The author’s article complimented my study 
in that the idea of adding law enforcement to the economic equation created a new 
variable to consider. Managers had to determine priority of budget placement. Some 
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enforcement was indirect such as the cull ring in the crab pot to allow the escapement of 
undersize crabs, while other enforcement required site on scene or the use of 
technological advances to catch illegal behavior. my study adds to the literature 
concerning the illegal activity that surrounds crab pots. The extent of discovery in 
patterns necessitates additional enforcement research.  
In 2009, O’Connor Shelley and Crow in The Nature and Extent of Conservation 
Policing: Law Enforcement Generalists or Conservation Specialists, asserted that little 
information was known regarding fisheries law enforcement agencies. Accordingly, they 
asserted the need to add to the academic literature in order “to understand the nature and 
extent of modern conservation policing” (p. 10). They asked questions about the Florida 
fish and wildlife resource police. Specifically, they wanted to discover what the actual 
activities of the officers included and if these were different from previous literature. Law 
enforcement in rural areas was understudied, even though more than 45 percent of 
American law enforcement agencies employ nine or less employees. MD-NRP activities 
lacked studies in general. The authors contended that the literature that does exist focused 
upon personal interests such as job satisfaction and stress. However, several studies 
suggested that natural resource police lack time for conservation crimes as city type 
crimes were increasing that included traffic and drug arrests. Regardless, the content 
analysis discovered in the literature supported the fact that criminal enforcement tended 
to be a secondary response to fishing, boating, and hunting regulation enforcement. 
The authors’ findings indicated that in Florida 72.9 percent of their total work 
activities were allocated to non-fish or wildlife enforcement. The authors utilized Berg’s 
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(2001) model for content analysis that included latent and manifest analyses of the data. 
Initially, counts of incidents were sorted to predetermined categories for comparison. 
Latent coding was required to interpret the meaning of wording in reports. The variables 
were drafted reports and secondary data collected about enforcement crimes. The mixed 
method analysis provided a rare view of law enforcement data. The study addressed and 
decidedly described the traditional criminal law model as ineffective for understanding 
the dynamics of natural resource policing as a generalist opposed to a specialist agency. 
Their study sought to review types of enforcement occurring like my study. My study 
provided an entire overview of regulations that directly affect crab pot use in Maryland, 
and then I narrowed each to a type to create a comprehensive working list of data for 
enforcement comparison. I did not ascertain, wholly, that illegal gear enforcement and 
regulations demonstrated patterns. 
Reassessing the Value of U.S. Coast Guard At-Sea Fishery Enforcement addressed 
misleading data in the literature. King, Porter, and Price (2009) presented evidence that 
asserted many actual violations go undetected, and compliance rates used to demonstrate 
success of enforcement created a veil that keeps managers from recognizing this problem. 
The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery conservation and Management Act (MSA) issued by the 
Federal government had failed in its mandate to end overfishing. Amendments occurred 
in 1996 and 2007 that added legal vernacular to require stock rebuilding targets and 
timetables. As of 2008, a report to Congress identified that of approximately 230 
economically significant U.S. fish stock, 45 continued to be overfished. Accordingly, a 
great deal of literature attempted to explain how regulation had failed these fisheries. 
115 
 
 
Much of the literature blamed a lack of political will, the institutional structures, mix of 
council members, scientific uncertainty, and disagreement about estimates, past 
regulations that were implemented without empirical evidence, and short sightedness of 
fishing interests. 
The authors asserted that noncompliance of regulation was understudied in the 
United States. Most of the science was based on the theory of compliance and the 
economic incentives to commit crime. However, in fishing, it seemed that crimes fall into 
3 distinct categories, which include chronic or frequent violators motivated by economic 
gain, occasional violators who normally obey the law, but may cheat when the benefits of 
noncompliance significantly outweigh the likely costs, and accidental violators who 
unintentionally fail to comply to a misunderstanding of the law, faulty electronics, or 
other reasons. Several U.S. studies suggested 70-90 percent of fishers occasionally 
violate regulations, while 5 to 15% are chronic lawbreakers. The authors argued that the 
performance standard for the USCG was an inaccurate representation of enforcement 
data because they did not know how many violations go undetected, therefore, they 
cannot assign a percentage to those that they know occur. 
King et al. analyzed enforcement and prosecution data for USCG using NOAA’s 
Enforcement Management Information System (EMIS) database. In general, if violations 
did not carry some economic loss, permit sanction, or the like, they did little to encourage 
compliance. The authors concluded that the “USCG-observed compliance rate APM was 
seriously flawed and should not be used as an indicator of the success of the USCH 
fishery enforcement program” (p. 365). They recommended an initiative that would target 
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chronic illegal activity by fishers. Like my study regarding blue crab, the authors 
addressed and concluded that the number assigned to criminal and or noncompliance 
activity not reported or measured in the fin fishery was likely substantially under par. 
Many of the regulatory restrictions on fishers discussed in this article were identical to 
that of the Maryland Chesapeake Bay fisher. 
Ali and Abdullah (2010) examined influences on compliance behavior in a fishing 
industry in Malaysia in their paper titled Impact of Enforcement and Co-Management on 
Compliance Behavior of Fishermen. As violations escalate so do the expenditures of law 
enforcement. This paper addressed the enforcement question as to what types of crimes 
are occurring. My research addressed how often these crimes were occurring. Malaysia 
expected a decline in harvest since it had reached its MSY. As fishing gear had become 
more efficient, the need for better management had become essential. Industry 
participators have open access and are in a race to harvest more than the next guy. 
Malaysia used management zones to create equality between small and large-scale 
fishers. Determinations for zoning depended upon gear type and vessel size. Major 
complaints included large-scale fishers ignoring the ban, creating a smaller catch for 
small-scale fishers. 
Pilot studies of questionnaires borrowed from Kuperan & Sutinen (1998) and 
Hatcher, Jaffry, Thebaud & Bennet (2000) were conducted on a group of 40 fishers. After 
changes were made in the wording or other areas of concern, the actual survey took place 
between November 2001 and April 2002. The authors retrieved secondary data from 
several fishery sources and statistical offices. Using disproportionate stratified random 
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sampling sum 284 fishers were interviewed. Three groups arose because of the category 
“type” of fishing gear. The authors analyzed primary data using Statistical Package for 
Social Sciences. A comparative analysis represented four main characteristics of the 
fishers. 
The author discovered that those involved in co-management were more likely to 
follow the rules. The mean income of fishers was higher with violators than for those 
who followed the rules. Their study discovered that the higher the probability of getting 
caught performing illegal fishing activity, the more people would be discouraged from 
doing so. In addition, considerable monetary gains would likely lead to noncompliance if 
there was less chance of detection. Third, the authors ascertained that trawl fishers were 
likely to violate zoning regulations more than any other harvester types. Last, compliance 
decisions seem to be influenced by the involvement of fishers in co-management 
activities. The empirical study provided evidence in support of co-management strategies 
and that more time should be spent strengthening these relationships. 
This study was pertinent to my study if co-management teams in Maryland’s blue 
crab fishery were actual participants for the particular gear crab pot. If this was the case, 
compliance by these members would be assured based on the result of Ali & Abdullah’s 
study. However, zoning management in Maryland is not determined by vessel size; 
although, this idea could easily be argued for the blue crab fishery based on a great deal 
of previous research in the uses of the crab pot within and outside of shoal areas. 
In The Unintended Consequences of Formal Fisheries Policies: Social Disparities 
and Resource Overuse in a Major Fishing Community in the Gulf of California, Mexico, 
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Cinti, Shaw, Cudney-Bueno, and Rojo (2010) investigated the local, social and fisheries 
impact of formal policy. The authors argued that the licensing system used to manage this 
fishing resource provides the wrong incentives for compliance. This article addressed the 
non-verbalized rules of fishers and how this may or may not represent actual regulations 
used to manage resources. Likewise, my study suggested that the timing of regulations 
effect these non-verbalized rules. The authors reviewed the Northern Gulf of California, 
Mexico where this fishery provided thousands with food and employment. The 
Institutional Analysis and Development Framework (IAD) framed this research and 
helped identify variables for analysis. Three categories addressed in this research are the 
local rules in use, characteristics of the resource, and characteristics of the community. 
Structured interviews were conducted with 45 divers that were active in 2007. Other 
interviews included local authority and local leaders of the permit holders’ sector. The 
authors collected secondary data including statistics on catch, bylaws of cooperatives, 
and logbooks from a voluntary program. These study respondents included 82% of 
independent fishers who were not legal permit holders and only 18% were members of a 
cooperative holding fishing permits. 
Existing requirements for permit application and economic status of the diving 
communities created disparities. Most of the direct fishers were uneducated and poor like 
many scenarios around the world. The formal Mexican system only allowed ownership of 
fishing equipment, including vessels, by permit holders; however, the study identified 
that 24% of fishers without permits owned their own equipment, while 47% were owned 
by permit holders, and the remaining were in the process of buying equipment from 
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permit holders. This allowed permit holders to push the burden of maintenance onto the 
actual fishers. A common criminal activity included sheltering illegal harvest under 
another permit number. The community called them buyers because they can legitimize 
the illegal catch. Communities fear the intrusion of institutional management because 
they believe it would open their small fishery to other communities who would invade for 
specific seasons. The authors suggested that because the area was vast and shared with 
numerous fishers, permit holders, and cooperatives, little incentive exists to be 
responsible, work together, or comply with institutionalized rules. Further, they 
contended that the federal government needs to take steps to formalize the informal labor 
system hiding behind the existing permit holders. This can provide them a secure right 
and encourage them to follow the rules to a sustainable fishery. 
My study reviewed regulations in the blue crab fishery that may or may not create 
incentives to harvest blue crab illegally. Commercial license holders were the only fishers 
allowed to harvest and sell crabs, but it had been a concern that recreational blue crab 
fishers sell their catch for profit. Although the current research did not identify 
recreational regulations or violations, any practice of illegal crabbing skews the data that 
was analyzed to create future management decisions. 
In his study, Arnason (2013) asserted that compliance was generally “a function 
of the state of the fish stock” (p. 361) at any given time. He titled the article, An Optimal 
Dynamic Fisheries Enforcement. He defined management into two components that were 
a management system and an enforcement system. The management system was a set of 
rules, and the enforcement system was supposed to make certain the rules were followed. 
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He contended, enforcement changes behavior, not a set of words. The author added to 
Becker’s (1968) theory of law enforcement and Nøstbakken’s (2008) review of the 
literature to create a specific dynamic framework. He discovered that an optimal dynamic 
policy might be impossible to express. To counter this, the author created a numerical 
fisheries enforcement model and then optimal enforcement paths were derived and 
discussed. In contrast, management measures were easy to characterize. Regardless, the 
model was misrepresentative because the assumption was that enforcement was costless. 
After analyzing the path that became apparent to the model, assuming costless 
enforcement, the results were illustrated in a numerical model. Then the author utilized 
the model to derive optimum penalty levels for specific management measures with the 
assumption of some enforcement taking place. The results of the study led Arnason to 
affirm, “fisheries advice on the basis of the conventional fisheries models ignoring 
enforcement costs may be seriously misleading” (p. 375). The article addressed my 
study’s question as to whether regulation and enforcement demonstrated a pattern 
because of blue crab related noncompliance. 
Lack of enforcement and attempting to separate it from management was a 
serious mistake towards reaching management targets and or changing compliance 
behavior. Although collecting the necessary data may be a daunting task for enforcement 
agencies, and the practice may not align with traditional agency practices, the outcome 
was the ability to create optimal dynamic fisheries management that was enforceable. The 
results of the study suggested that optimal level of enforcement declines with the rise of 
fish stock biomass. Regardless, the expense of enforcement might be uneconomical, but 
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without it, the practice would lead to low quality fisheries management. It may be that for 
a particular species the costs were so high, management was not worthwhile. The results 
of this study would only apply to those management systems that can maximize benefits 
from the existing fishery. 
I presented a similar assumption in my study that enforcement was the ultimate 
management strategy for fisheries noncompliance. It identified noncompliance behavior 
using regulation as a barometer. It identified types of noncompliance rather than times. 
Enforcement may benefit from this analysis to determine optimal enforcement times 
based upon types of regulations enacted and even locations. 
Modelling Enforcement and Compliance in Fisheries: a Survey, presented by 
Coelho, Filipe, and Ferreira (2013), employed theoretical analyses grounded in Becker’s 
theory of crime and tested the data using a bio-economic model (Gordon/Schaefer). The 
study focused upon the available literature on monitoring and enforcement, which were 
lacking in the research. Costs were often neglected in analysis of fisheries management. 
The authors presented a model for illegal behavior and enforcement costs assuming that 
any catch above the permitted quota was illegal, but that not all violators would be 
caught. Then, the authors analyzed how expensive and imperfect enforcement might 
influence optimal management policies. However, enforcement costs would be zero if 
quotas were large enough to reach free access equilibrium, but there had been a shift 
away from this because of overfishing that was increasing net benefits and enforcement 
costs. This article addressed noncompliance behavior in response to regulation such as 
ITQ management that was also prevalent in commercial female crabbing. 
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The complexities involved in enforcement and compliance demonstrated 
advantages to private property rights-based management because they self-enforce. 
Where the cost of enforcement becomes uneconomical, command and control measures 
work best. Studies demonstrated that ITQ systems face illegal behavior. Current studies 
demonstrated the need for empirical research relative to compliance in an attempt to 
ensure it. The economic studies had proven that fishermen’s perception of detection 
heavily influence whether they would break the law. My study identified how many 
violations were written in a given time and addressed when blue crab fishers might be 
breaking the law. This would allow enforcement agencies to plan in advance of responses 
to new and or upcoming regulations. In this case, specific time slots might be cost 
effective enforcement as opposed to visual monitoring at no particular time. 
DaRocha, Villasante, and González (2013) presented, Credible Enforcement 
Policies Under Illegal Fishing: Does Individual Transferable Quotas Induce to Reduce 
the Gap Between Approved and Proposed Allowable Catches. Their model had two 
components. The first was that illegal fishing does exist because of imperfect 
enforcement technology, and “the enforcement agency cannot commit on announced 
penalties” (p. 1047). It had become common knowledge that excessive fishing effort 
leads to exploitation that causes economic waste of common property resources. Further, 
science had proven the potential of ITQs to curb the problems of overcapacity in fishing 
industry systems. However, there were few studies highlighting ITQ systems when 100% 
compliance cannot be guaranteed. The authors examined enforcement agency behavior 
using game theory under total harvest numbers and ITQs within those limits using the 
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assumption that scientific recommendations were ignored. This article addressed how 
regulation may or may not influence compliance behavior. 
Regardless of the scientifically approved total catch number, fishing fleet numbers 
had not changed with the setting of sanctions. Enforcement agencies had an incentive to 
lower sanctions and legalize some of the harvest. Economic efficiency had been proven 
to improve with ITQ, but this did not address the issue of equity and social justice as 
perceived by fishing communities forced to accept ITQs. The authors asserted that 
overfishing was a result of overcapacity and that without compliance ITQs would not 
prevent a “tragedy of the commons.” The authors employed a case study approach to 
their research. In short, it appeared that government approved Total Allowable Harvests 
were higher than science recommended, and the actual reported landings were higher 
than what government approved. The study demonstrated that enforcement agencies were 
in conflict over science, landings, and illegal harvests. The authors questioned the 
advisability of widespread ITQs. In Maryland, ITQs are employed for the hard crab 
industry. The concerns demonstrated in this article were pertinent to my research in that 
noncompliance continues to occur as demonstrated by the majority of natural resource 
research.  
Scheld and Anderson (2014) discussed Market Effects of Catch Share 
management: the Case of New England Multispecies Groundfish. They share that in 
2010, the NE fishery transitioned to a collective rights-based management strategy. 
Studies produced by NOAA led to a swarm of catch share program for underperforming 
US fisheries. Evaluation needed to occur to refine these programs during the growth of 
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new ideas. The NE had two options that included receiving group allocations for 
individual multispecies stocks or to continue with the common pool TAC but receive 
drastic cuts in days allowed to harvest. Following the introduction of catch share 
programs to the multispecies stocks, price increases were observed. This article addressed 
the costs that commercial fishers might consider when choosing noncompliance. 
In the US, management has been in a reactive state as opposed to a proactive 
position, developing regulations in a disjointed manner. Price response to quantity 
changes would influence how fishers’ respond. If market patterns could be identified, it 
might be possible to control for exogenous price determinants, whereas prediction 
reaches validity and revenue effects may be estimated. The NE Fishery Management 
Council FMP had experienced 18 amendments and 50 framework adjustments. As 
restrictions piled up, harvesters solely dependent on groundfish were forced to diversify. 
As new exports and domestic markets grew, collapses of many multispecies stocks 
occurred. Annual harvest strategies remained unchanged after the introduction of the 
catch share program. Although there were not major differences in landings after its 
induction, there were specific changes in when a species was harvested and landed. 
Between 2007 and 2010, observations of 375,000 individual species were observed and 
used to assess the effects of catch share management. The individual dealer determined 
prices at landing based on the entire region’s harvest of varied species quantities. 
Complex context often leads to statistical methods that use existing data before and after 
a “treatment” (p. 1839). 
The author contended that earlier model of rights-based management did not 
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control for exogenous factors, and this led to results influenced by spurious correlations 
and weakened data through aggregation. In contrast to the positive aspects of the catch 
share program, they may lead to increased mortality of other differently managed stock. 
Multispecies catch share programs may drastically alter the working waterfront 
community and may impose unintended cultural and societal costs. I reviewed secondary 
data that reflected a relationship between regulations and enforcement. I presented time 
by year and through count data. Enforcement as a variable in management continues to 
be discussed and remains undetermined as to its rightful place in a working model.  
In 2014, Hentati-Sundberg, Hjelm, and Österblom presented a study on the 
misrepresentation of reported harvests in a paper titled, Does Fisheries Management 
Incentivize Non-compliance? Estimated Misreporting in the Swedish Baltic Sea Pelagic 
Fishery Based on Commercial Fishing Effort. The authors asserted that accurate baseline 
data was essential to stock assessment. In cases where little or no official catch was 
reported, development of a new method to recalculate historical reporting was 
constructed. The studies demonstrated that estimates range between 30 to 75 percent 
higher than what was reported. This article addressed the skew on reported historical 
harvests that had influenced regulation and compliance. Reasons such as discard catch, 
recreational catch, economics, and misreporting from over capacity of fishing stocks led 
to misrepresented statistics. The Baltic Sea was not limited until the late 1990s. 
The author explored capacity of the fleet relative to the fishing quotas available 
for harvest. The data collected for statistical analysis came from logbook data and 
changes in regulations that led to ITQs in this fishery in 2009. The pelagic fishery harvest 
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had continued under scrutiny since 2004 when fishing patterns seemed to change 
statistically. The authors asserted that estimating with effort was more accurate than 
depending on the frontline stakeholders. They employed the use of two General Linear 
Models (GLMs) and developed 2 models. The first model presented species composition, 
and the second model estimated total catch quantities. The variables included, “total 
effort, trip length, engine power, depth, latitude and longitude, month, gear, and 
abundance” (p. 1847) of the two species. Total capacity was represented by the capacity 
as sum of the entire fleet. All the variables were applied to both models in order to select 
the best fit. 
The authors identified quota skews and overcapacity parameters throughout the 
entire study period. The results indicated that different types of over-reporting occurred at 
different times and cycles in the fishery. Their study was validated in that several fishers 
faced sanctions during the same period for misreporting and misrepresenting their 
logbooks. The authors stress that non-compliance and species misrepresentation has 
occurred because of overcapacity in the field, unreasonable TACs in light of biological 
realities, and lack of sensible management. The authors argued that the major challenge 
involved changing policies and management that led to unexpected outcomes in 
management policy. This article provided resources for a time to event analysis that 
covered historical data that may or may not be accurate. It provided a means to count for 
inaccurate data or misrepresented data, which was one phase of my research. Further, it 
demonstrated the divide between fishers and management much like the situation in the 
Maryland Chesapeake Bay region. 
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Dresdner et al. (2015) declared Sutinen and Andersen (1985) hold claim to a 
seminal conceptual work on fisheries law enforcement. The authors reviewed the 
consequences of weak enforcement and how this plays into noncompliance behavior. 
Enforcement programs that had been empirically analyzed had led to two distinct 
regularities in compliance. First, in line with Becker’s (1968) study, the expectation of 
penalties or sanctions acted as a deterrent to noncompliance, and second, more 
compliance than was expected had been taking place. Comparing results from assorted 
studies was difficult because different measurements were used as well as an assortment 
of variables. The authors utilized a set of questions meant to test the role of mortality on 
compliance as well as the ability to measure individual morality. The results suggested 
that moral considerations, peer effects, and legitimacy are the three most key factors to 
one’s willingness to comply with any one regulation. In fact, rarely had mortality been 
operationalized beyond a one-point approach. 
This article addressed the response of noncompliance to regulation. The authors 
used the Morally Debatable Behaviors Scales (Harding and Phillips 1986). They 
suggested evidence appeared that warned against the endogenous nature of the variables 
that measure social response based upon peer effects. The evidence supported that one’s 
perception of the groups’ compliance defines the individual’s compliance behavior; this 
can create spurious correlations in the analysis. In the authors’ analysis, noncompliance 
was based upon self-reporting and the collection of 301 observations. Information was 
collected for 10 different regulations. The results of the study indicated that policy that 
considers the moral considerations and perceptions of the fishers, but these must be 
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context accurate to communities. The authors reviewed noncompliance from the view of 
human nature and perception. Whatever the reason for noncompliance, the 
noncompliance must first be identified. In my research, the types of noncompliance were 
analyzed from 6 categories. Measurements were made to determine the degree of 
noncompliance occurring before and after a regulation took effect that changed the rules 
for blue crab in any manner. 
Arias et al. (2015) discussed noncompliance in Levels and Drivers of Fishers’ 
Compliance with Marine Protected Areas. They asserted that the 20% estimate for illegal 
catch in the world fisheries was a conservative figure, and their interest lies in what 
influences noncompliance behavior. More importantly, it demonstrated that more than 
one-half of the deaths of nature rangers were the result of poachers. This paper enhanced 
the literature by providing empirical research where academia lacked studies concerning 
the importance of compliance and the negative effects of a lack of such. This article 
addressed skewed harvest reporting and shared the degree of noncompliance as self-
reported by commercial fishers. 
MPAs were context dependent and illegal fishing was a broad topic. This dictated 
no simple solution to the problem. The authors asserted that localized, well-designed 
intervention was how compliance would be achieved. Between February to April 2014, 
data was collected using questionnaires and interviews. Participants included commercial 
and sports fishers that provided vessels and gear. Both these groups spend a majority of 
their time at sea. Response and nonresponse bias created inaccurate data. The authors 
hoped to decrease this bias by using nonthreatening approaches. Interviewers identified 
129 
 
 
themselves as students, interviewees were assured anonymity, the questionnaire began 
simply and advanced towards more personal requests, and last, indirect questioning was 
employed in the survey that masked personal action but highlighted the actions of others 
as perceived by the interviewee. Ninety-nine questionnaires and 41 key interviews were 
conducted. The authors used a linear mixed-effect model to quantify perceived 
compliance in specific areas. The results demonstrated that enforcement was not the 
entire answer, but it added positive influence in areas that were solely dependent on 
fishing, while in areas where livelihood alternatives existed, such as sport fishing vessels, 
compliance was perceived as occurring more. I investigated the type and number of 
noncompliance occurring in the blue crab fishery in Maryland. 
Common Property and Rights Based Theories Review 
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) passed a Federal resource law referred 
to as the Fish and Wildlife Act of 1956. The emphasis was on the commercial fishing 
industry, but the Act was to be administered in such a way as to promote common-
property theory “with regard to the inherent right of every citizen” to enjoy the activity of 
fishing (FWS, 2015). The Act puts into writing the intention to “develop measures for 
‘maximum sustainable production of fish’” (FWS, para. 3) and to “make economic 
studies of the industry and recommend measures to insure stability of the domestic 
fisheries” (FWS, para. 3). The importance of data collection continued to develop, but the 
current theories caused some relaxation in regulation. Maryland packing houses record 
keeping requirements changed from daily to weekly reporting in 1956 (Kennedy et al., 
2007), easing some pressure on those stakeholders. 
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In Maryland, John P. Tawes, commission chair, reports that sport blue crab fishers 
leave their pots in the water a week at a time without checking them. Eels, which get into 
the pots, are feeding on the crabs, which was not good for conservation or for commercial 
reasons. He suggested setting up more stringent requirements for crab pot licenses (The 
Sun, 1958). For instance, one such idea involved requiring commercial blue crab fishers 
to have 2 years crabbing experience before receiving a license (The Sun, 1958) similar to 
the 1998 Apprenticeship Program established for commercial fishers. In 2013, the 
General Assembly repealed the 1998 Apprenticeship Program and replaced it with the 
earlier version (1994) of a prepayment of license fees for candidates to be placed on a 
waitlist with no guarantee of receiving a license (MD-DNR, 2013). 
Once again, in 1958, Virginia and Maryland joined forces. They cooperated to 
administer, regulate, and manage the Potomac River fisheries (VMRC, 2010). In Kent 
county Maryland, several blue crab fishers appealed for marker changes effecting how 
the gear, crab pot, was utilized. Some blue crab fishers wanted to be allowed to string 
together 25 crab pots with 2-3 buoy markers on the line. Single pot blue crab fishers 
complained that a line of strung pots would interfere with vessel maneuverability. The 
consensus was that the problems could be solved with strict crab pot license regulations. 
Moreover, they agreed that sport blue crab fishers (recreational blue crab fishers) could 
be restricted to gear besides crab pots (The Sun, 1958). The annual crab pot license fee 
was $10.00, which permits fishing up to 50 crab pots (The Sun, 1958). Approximately 
800 crab pot licenses were issued during the crabbing season (The Sun, 1958). 
The early 1960s brought about concern for “possible effects of the thermal 
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discharge from the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant on the blue crab population in the 
Chesapeake Bay waters adjacent to the plant” (Abbe, 2010, para. 1). A biologist, Rachel 
Carson, for the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service published a book in 1962 that brought 
attention to the use of pesticides and their effect on the environment (NOAA, 2011). 
Resource consumption came to be considered gluttonous and a mistrust of science and 
government took root (NOAA, 2011). The concern at Calvert Cliffs led to a series of 
studies between 1968 to 1983, which was only 1 of 4 major fishery independent surveys 
conducted using crab pots to study the crab population (Abbe, 2010, para. 1). The 
conservation movement took root, and value judgments concerning the environment 
became dominant in public policy (NOAA, 2011). Once again, Virginia and Maryland 
united in 1963 to manage the Potomac River’s fisheries and created the Bi-State Potomac 
River Fisheries Commission, (Kennedy et al., 2007) a commission that continued into 
2015. 
By 1964, the Bi-State Potomac River Fisheries Commission creates blue crab 
licensing and harvest statistic procedures superseding those of Maryland and Virginia 
state laws (Kennedy et al., 2007). Maryland created The Department of Chesapeake Bay 
Affairs Commission. New regulations were enacted that included a reporting system that 
categorized crab harvests by gear type. They categorized the crab pot as commercial gear. 
Since there was no reporting system for recreational blue crab fishers, crab pot use by this 
group was outlawed (Stagg & Whilden, 1997). The conservation movement led to the 
1967 formation of the CBF, one of the largest regional environmental groups in the 
United States (Horton, 2005) and continues to exist in 2019. It is common to witness 
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CBF license plates anywhere in Maryland. However, their conservation policies impacted 
the economics of the commercial fishing industry. By 1968, Maryland experienced a 
record low for blue crab, from which they recovered, and used this data to set 
benchmarks for present day calculations of the stock (Cascorbi, 2004; MD-DNR, 2015).  
Nineteen sixty-nine ushered in the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). 
This Act required that all policies 
• utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach which would insure the 
integrated use of the natural and social sciences and the environmental design 
arts in planning and in decision making which may have an impact on man’s 
environment, and 
• identify and develop methods and procedures…which would insure that 
presently unquantified environmental amenities and values may be given 
appropriate consideration in decision making along with economic and 
technical consideration…. (NOAA, 2011, para. 6-7).  
Common property and rights-based theories faced new demands that altered the 
ability to test and measure valuables using previous means. However, division of 
stakeholders continue to effect positive group cooperation. Current theory attempted to 
explain the pros and cons of the common property theory and the variables that 
influenced its success or failure. 
George D. Santopietro (economics) and Leonard A. Shabman (agricultural 
economics) presented Common Property Rights in Fish and Water Quality: the Oyster 
Fishery of the Chesapeake Bay (1990). The authors introduced the concepts of property 
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rights in fisheries. The New Resource Economics (NRE) perspective from the 80s 
suggest that change occurs when business proprietors formulate new property rights 
arrangements that would improve economic potential of resources, while the neoclassical 
economic decision model based individual decision makers choices upon benefits and 
costs. 
This analysis presented the continuous change from open access to private 
ownership of natural resources. Another group of economists suggested that 
consideration must be given to social values, environmental conditions, and non-
economic sources of political power. Varieties of social values that changed from 
community to community had heavily influenced this fishery. Scientists, who were less 
favorable of the NRE ideology, were specific in distinguishing the difference between 
open access where the resource had zero restrictions and common property, which was 
group-owned, and rules of access existed. Private property was a resource held by an 
individual who made his or her own rules. The research was meant to explain why the 
oyster grounds in the Chesapeake Bay had developed into a mixed property model. This 
article addressed how regulations evolved and effected community models and attitudes 
that effect noncompliance. 
In both Virginia and Maryland, the public oyster beds can be described as “state 
oyster farms.” However, VA and MD manage their resource differently. While both states 
hire watermen to plant oyster seed on natural beds, MD’s annual oyster seed plant (spat) 
was around 6 million and VA’s was between 500,000 and 1.5 million bushels per year. 
The structure in the Chesapeake was fully developed by 1910 and has persisted. In MD, 
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watermen have fought vehemently since the 1880s to maintain public beds, while in VA 
private beds hold majority. Maryland’s governance of oystering was premised by the idea 
that watermen were underclass, and privatizing oyster beds would lead to social 
economic stress; those who would have the money to plant seed were considered 
outsiders, and only those near the Bay became involved in the political battle over oyster 
beds. The concerns of the Maryland watermen must be factored into understanding the 
evolution of the oyster fishery. 
Shortly after rights were established, water quality concerns became active. Germ 
theory evolved and became the catalyst to water treatment disposal. In 1897, the first 
recommendation of a sewage commission recommended the discharge of raw sewage 
into the Bay. Industry participators came together and halted this through the Maryland 
General Assembly. However, after compromises were made, this project became the 
largest undertaking in the country to purify sewage. Water quality protection for oyster 
harvesters private and public came to court in 1932. For over 100 years, biologist and 
economists have asserted the privatization of oyster grounds as the only efficient way to 
harvest oyster. The Chesapeake Bay as the single supplier of oysters in the country soon 
dwindled to second place in 1976. Regardless of the revitalization needed in the oyster 
fishery and the call for privatization of oyster beds, history had proven that this change 
was not likely but that only regulation management of the common grounds would 
evolve. 
My research discussed the evolution of regulations. Common property and or 
rights-based models had dominated the commercial crabbing fishery. Natural resources in 
135 
 
 
Maryland are considered common property to be enjoyed by all. The evolution of 
regulation in Maryland was a means to control and manage both the resource and the 
human. However, regulation without enforcement lacks results. Enforcement data 
compared over time in commercial crabbing presented and predicted unexpected patterns 
as watermen feared the economic results of these changes. 
Elinor Ostrom (2000) presented Private and Common Property Rights in relation 
to natural resources. She suggested there are common misconceptions relating to the 
differences between common property and open access, common pool, and common 
property, as well as resource systems and the flow of resource units. Further, she asserted 
that the argument over the supremacy of one versus the other continues to reign. She 
suggested many economists considered common property as an inefficient means to 
management because of rent dissipation, high transaction and enforcement costs, and low 
productivity.  
During the 1960s, the rise in concern for natural resources prompted the 
nationalization of all land and water resources that had not been recorded as private 
property. This caused a shift in enforcement. Local governance and participants once 
controlled management, but after this shift, bigger government became responsible who 
lacked the resources to guard and protect the fisheries. The ability to gain accurate 
measurements of the variables that are involved in the management of resources was 
essential to establishing a common property pool that was equal. However, when 
resources were mobile such as fish, it was more difficult to develop effective systems. 
The author suggested that most important was the involvement of industry participants in 
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planning these rules and creating quotas which might alleviate common issues in the day-
to-day administrative costs. This article addressed how the rules can effect day-to-day 
decisions made by the user group. 
My research addressed noncompliance as a response to regulatory action that may 
increase the fear of watermens’ perceived economic losses. The newest blue crab 
regulations involved assigning transferable quotas for the hard crab fishery, which 
sparked a discrepancy in reporting harvests. This suggested that new regulation might 
trigger noncompliance behavior, and I tested for this in my study. 
Robert T. Deacon (2012) presented Fishery Management by Harvester 
Cooperatives. Until recently, cooperative like organizations have been largely ignored by 
academia. The author argued that assigning user rights to a group can generate efficiency 
gains. However, no support has been concluded that suggests cooperative management 
adds value. Further, his research does not account for rent seekers in transferable quotas. 
This article addresses how rules within and without groups can effect compliance. 
No empirical evidence supported the operation of fishery cooperatives, but theory 
could predict performance in practice. The author asserted that when individual 
harvesters were separate entities, the common good might not be realized in management. 
In other words, coordination leading to profit depended critically on the condition of a 
key input, the stock of fish, and the stock’s condition because of the individual actions of 
all the participants. Catch quality could be enhanced through collective action. However, 
this required all fishers to participate to reap the benefits. 
Success and failure of fishery management depended upon the ability of 
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government to perform its function. ITQs were susceptible to weak government 
enforcement. Cooperatives had the means to combat this situation through self-
governing. One way to improve compliance behavior was through sharing catch or catch 
revenue. However, empirical evidence was mostly anecdotal. Assigning harvest rights to 
individuals would not address stewardship or policing problems. Distribution among 
individual users was plagued with problems. Evidence demonstrated that that group 
rights rather than individual rights made the group responsible to each another. Fishery 
cooperatives present an under researched management strategy. Evidence exists that 
suggests cooperatives can solve many issues that other strategies fail to resolve. 
One regulation change during my research included assigning ITQs to individual 
hard blue crab fishers. This led to a discrepancy in harvest reporting for the blue crab. 
This discrepancy acted as a catalyst for this research as I measured enforcement after this 
and other blue crab regulations that effected the use of the crab pot.  
Wealth, Rights, and Resilience: an Agenda for Governance Reform in Small-scale 
Fisheries (Ratner & Allison, 2012) reminded the reader to recognize the opportunities to 
improve growth and reduce poverty in developing countries’ fishing communities as a 
byproduct of responding to the fishing crisis. The authors stated that more than 90% of 
the world’s fisher people operate in small-scale fisheries. Earlier debates diagnosed these 
as inefficient, poorly developed, misguided, and ineffective. Correcting this included 
privatizing state support services like ice, boat yards, and fisheries training colleges, as 
well as financial investments in boats, gear, and industrial technology. Several projects 
emerged in the 1990s and 2000s exploring avenues to increase fishing livelihoods and the 
138 
 
 
associated industries in which they were embroiled. Recent debates continue to assert 
economic inefficiency but focus upon the “inadequate rights of property over common-
pool or open-access resources” (p. 373). These debates suggested over-capacity adds to 
overharvesting the theoretical maximum economic yields. This article addressed the 
methods used to create rules and how commercial fishers’ response may be influenced by 
this. The authors contended that despite positive examples of progress in fisheries 
management, few examples can be found of economic, ecological, or socially sustainable 
well-managed fisheries. Many countries’ fisheries policies still managed resources using 
production targets. The authors contended the process of determining goals for the fishery 
mattered not the appropriate balance of goals. This provided them legitimacy. 
The authors presented their perception of a balanced approach to fisheries 
management, which included three perspectives: rights-based, wealth-based, and social-
ecological resilience. Practical guidance on analyzing the governance context of fisheries 
management plans remained deficient making strategies such as the ecosystem approach 
underdeveloped. As such, the authors suggested a critical rather than normative 
framework that was quick to identify practical flexibility. They further suggested that 
economic characteristics as to suitability of reform in a specific fishery need to be taken 
into consideration in the face of reform suggestions. Their literature reviewed identified 
eight principles to assess reform options. The authors supported, through these principles, 
the small-scale fisheries as it faced governance reform. However, they asserted success 
would depend on the cooperation of science, politicians, and development practitioners 
beyond the traditional scope of the fishing industry. 
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This article provided evidence that could be generalized to the Maryland crabbing 
industry as part of the 90% small-scale world fishery. This article lent credence to the 
finding in my study that show  increased enforcement that equates to noncompliance after 
changes in regulation. Maryland failed to consider the unexpected consequences of ITQs 
in a common pool fishery. Patterns found in my study presented new data for 
management and enforcement guidance.  
Brewer (2012) presented Don’t Fence Me In: Boundaries, Policy and 
Deliberation in Maine’s Lobster Commons. The author asserted that common property 
theory requires the “need for clear boundaries” (p. 383); this includes material and social 
boundaries that define and describe a specific community. Federal pressures in the fishing 
industry generated a formalization of a “more statist comanagement regime” (p. 383). 
Captains worked to take control of decision-making leaving crew and locals to deal with 
the results. Some experts proposed that regardless of positive benefits found in common 
property ideals, there had been applications that fell short of following general 
democratic processes within the community. The authors contended successful common 
property ideals in practice can be found in numerous cases. 
The authors offered the Main lobster fishery as a case where social norm 
contributed to the conservation of resource outside the government and market control. 
Current investigation depicted commons theory via the human-environment geography 
lens, which considered dynamic relationships as a component of small and larger 
socioecological systems. Some examples included historical and formal legal institutions, 
local to national control, as well as the relationship between the individual fisher person 
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and the collective interests of the industry. The “tragedy of the commons” dates to early 
economic works. It contends that without government intervention, the commons would 
use the resource to decimation, while common property scholars contend that groups do 
work together to prevent exploitation of common pool resources using informal rules and 
that this can be more effective than government interaction. 
Commons ideals and practice were often found in rural areas where government 
did not assign budgets or effort. The authors argued that comanagement had become a 
catchall term to describe relationships between government and resource user groups. 
The authors referenced Ostrom’s (1990, 2005) claim that governments must support local 
common property rights for these systems to succeed. She further argued for clarity in 
defining the boundaries of who can use the resource otherwise for whom was the 
resource being managed? Many coastal towns lack any employment options outside of 
the fishing industry. This was a generational industry and few women have entered it 
until the late 1990s as crew. The literature showed that the lobster population was 
growing for the past 20 years without clear rhyme or reason that could be supported by 
empirical data. By the 1990s, NOAA institutionalized moratoria as a management 
strategy. However, the lobster industry fought against this and relied upon regulation 
formalizing entry through apprentice programs that dated back to the 70s. A 
commissioner who did not support this management style repealed this later, and new 
legislation exempted young lobstermen who could prove three years of trapping before 
the age of eighteen. 
The vision of comanagement waned from face-to-face discussions to mail in 
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ballots, and this lead to the removal of local context to weakened communication. The 
authors argued the necessary measure for conservation was defining clear user group 
boundaries as urged by Ostrom and other “commons” theorists. A balance must be struck 
between communitarian and individual interests about day-to-day fishing practices. 
Resource managers were more comfortable with statistical models than with sociological 
discoveries, depending on fixed and rigid lines that can appear to be supported by 
mathematical formulas that look to create sustainable harvest levels that in theory look 
good on paper.  
However, this may move decisions beyond the necessity of equity and 
sustainability that can be reviewed by public scrutiny. The authors purported that the 
common literature needed to move towards new empirical and theoretical arenas to 
master the common resource pools. Blue crabs are a common resource pool that 
government has attempted to manage for 60 years. I reviewed regulation and enforcement 
data for the current research that was the result of management strategies grounded in 
common property theory, which was demonstrated through the newest regulation - ITQs. 
These were analyzed using enforcement data to determine if unexpected outcomes 
occurred because of new regulation. 
Allison, Ratner, Åsgård, Willmann, Pomeroy, and Kurien (2012) presented the 
article Rights-based Fisheries Governance: from Fishing Rights to Human Rights. The 
authors reported that 24,000 fisheries related deaths occur throughout the world annually 
because of unsafe conditions. They suggested that many pirate vessels enslaving crew fly 
flags of convenience to avoid monitoring of their illegal activity. The past several years 
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had focused upon governance in fisheries; however, the assumption on formalized 
regulation was that the fishing industry would go along with reform because their 
livelihoods depended upon it. The authors contended it was unwise to ignore the 
economic motives of fishing people and what this means to resource conservation. They 
argued that the more secure a fishing community was, the more likely they would 
overfish, and the less vulnerable they perceived themselves, the more likely they would 
support fisheries reform. This article addressed the fear of fishers and how this may have 
led to noncompliance by the user group.  
In developing their argument for the rights-based approach, they contended that 
government must uphold the basic economic, social, and cultural rights held within a 
small-scale fishery. They suggested this appearance of protecting the basic human rights 
of these communities would strengthen their cooperation in fisheries management. 
Policies had been focusing on sharing a defined total allowable catch using group-based 
quotas. The authors stated that naming these property rights was a play on words as the 
rights pertained to the harvest as opposed to controlling the resource, which they did not 
do. Further, they asserted that this division generally occurred with the large fishing 
operators. The authors contended that fishing people want to claim and defend their 
rights; however, their conception was broader than their theorists’ counterparts were, and 
fishers’ ideals aligned more with right-based approaches. The authors believed that a 
rights-based approach was equitable for resource access. Local systems management 
fishing rights could deal with threats that effected the group such as damming of rivers or 
coastal development and pollution. The problem was that many small-scale fisheries were 
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made from those who lacked the incentive or capacity to claim and defend their fishing 
rights. 
The human rights-based approach to rights-based fishing aims to target the 
constraints that bind sustainable small-scale fisheries and attempt to address these first. 
Removing any perceived threats to their livelihood could secure governance support by 
fishers. The authors suggested that failure in fisheries management stemmed in part from 
disregarding the complexities of perceived human rights in fisheries within the social and 
ecological dimension of fishing communities. My study variables included enforcement 
and regulations that effected blue crab fishing. This article touched on the fear aspect of 
present and future earnings for fishing people. One theory presented by MD-DNR in the 
current work was that blue crab fishers reported false harvests as a response to the fear of 
losing future earnings because of an ITQ regulation in discussion in 2008. 
In 2013, Luc van Hoof published Design or Pragmatic Evolution: Applying ITQs 
in EU Fisheries Management. He opened with the thread that binds many researchers 
who preach the “Tragedy of the Common.” He suggested the people would make 
decisions that benefit their personal interests. He suggested the core question in fisheries 
should be to answer how management can bridge the gap between personal interests and 
those of the larger group as it effects the natural resources and society in general. The 
theory was that the implementation of individual fishing rights would work towards 
closing this gap. This article addressed noncompliance responses by fishers using the ITQ 
system to new regulation. 
A variety of transferable and nontransferable rights exists, but some negative 
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impacts of ITQs include discards, underreporting, and a dwindling of individual fishing 
rights within communities. This results in a reduction of fishing industry employment in 
general. If quotas fail to reach individuals, the costs of lease rates then outnumber these 
fisher folks. The European Commission expected five basic principles to guide decision 
making about ITQs. These principles included resources must remain public good, the 
transferring of quotas must be guided by strictness, relative stability was a necessity, and 
members’ states must reserve some of total harvest for future industry participants. A case 
study of the Dutch demonstrated that regardless of these principles, illegal fishing and 
underreporting continued. One variable mentioned was a lack of policing and 
enforcement in the Dutch state. Regardless of several setbacks over a period of years, the 
Dutch system evolved into a system of transferable rights based on ITQs. This brought 
about a system of improved enforcement controls.  
Several problems remaining were the over grading of harvest and the discard of 
others. This was difficult to monitor in terms of landings as opposed to actual catch. The 
author pointed to an important concern because of the contrast in theory and practical 
application, which was that the design of ITQs was to reduce overcapacity in the industry 
by moving the rights to the most efficient operation, which disregarded the distribution of 
rights and income within the fishing community. He contended that for success the legal 
vernacular regarding “entitlements, privileges, and responsibilities are defined in detail” 
(p. 469). 
In my study, the correlation concerned the response of commercial blue crab 
fishers to the implementation of regulations that directly effected blue crab harvesting. 
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Measuring enforcement against the regulations in this study emphasized the patterns that 
became apparent. The implementation of ITQs as regulation in Maryland were a single 
measurement of enforcement and regulation analyzed in this study. Many of the author’s 
contentions were related to the blue crab industry within coastal communities on the Bay.  
Brigham Daniels (2015) wrote The Tragicomedy of the Commons highlighting 
three significant scholars that included Garrett Hardin (ecologist), Carol Rose (legal 
academic), and Elinor Ostrom (Nobel Laureate). Hardin labeled the concept of the 
“Tragedy of the Commons;” Rose suggested the commons can lead to positive ends, and 
Ostrom argued that such tragedies can and have been avoided. While many authors 
sought the causes of fishery tragedies, Hardin sought the consequences. He contended 
individuals benefit from the use of a resource, but all users share the cost of that 
consumption. Rose’s research uncovered cases where the crowd benefited from 
additional users of the resource. This was the opposite of what to expect based upon 
Hardin’s studies. The comedy was in that social settings were representative of the 
commons; thus, to some degree “the more the merrier.” For instance, the game of chess 
requires two, and many forms of recreation benefit from groups, i.e.: volleyball, baseball, 
frisbee. Intellectual and cultural resources such as libraries and internet forums further 
supported this concept. Ostrom’s seminal work, Governing the Commons, presented a 
common thread, which she referred to as “design principles of long-enduring 
institutions.” She cited Spain’s huertas as an example. This long-standing water 
allocation system had existed and worked since before the days of Columbus, and it was 
as old as the time when the Moors ruled Spain. This article addressed the group at large 
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and how those who do not follow the rules influence regulation that effects those who do 
follow the rules. 
Daniels connected these three diverse depictions of the commons and suggested 
that positive and negative effects would continue to coexist. He asserted that the 
commons were consistently exceeding the limits of sustainable resources. He cited outer 
space as an example. Companies now race to embed satellites in a limited orbit in space. 
Space appears a continuum, but access was limited. Thus, the perception of crowding 
depends upon the perception of robustness. He suggested, “rapid shifts” (p. 1358) in 
numbers of users for a resource could establish an end to a tragedy when it did not appear 
immediately evident. Additionally, invention can effect consumption rates of users. There 
are complex connections in resource management, and a demand that outweighs the 
resource was the central problem facing managers. Further, solving evident problems 
might lead to creating unexpected problems. He illustrated this using smog. A regulation 
reduced fog tolerance within a county; producers corrected the problem by heightening 
the dispersement towers, which solved the immediate problem, but led to regional 
problems. He asserted that pure public-goods do not exist because rivalry often plays a 
role.  
The author purported Ostrom’s principles entwine three main principles for long 
standing institutional common systems success that included:  
1. credible commitments from the government for the sacrifice of the immediate 
benefits and a trust that the effort would reap rewards 
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2. credible threats to those who did not follow the rules, which would protect the 
interests of those who were making the sacrifices was necessary 
3. the costs associated with these new transactions must be affordable. Reducing 
costs was essential, which could be accomplished with assignment of 
management responsibilities to resource users, providing a local means to halt 
free riders. 
Regardless, these principles do not prevent the conflict over use of resources as perceived 
by diverse groups. It was common to regard current historical structures in law as the 
source of conflict for problems in the here and now. This attitude creates an “us-against-
them” fever that makes changes more difficult but possible. The author presented three 
perspectives for the underlying principles of the commons and how they might influence 
the results of the current study. Thus, the credible threats in this study would be the actual 
enforcement that took place against commercial blue crab fishers, but this data would not 
be compared to the number of actual NRP active. 
Emily Self (2015) presented Who Speaks for the Fish? The Tragedy of Europe’s 
Common Fisheries Policy. As of 2014, more than 75 percent of EU fisheries were 
overfished because lawmakers have failed to conserve the resources they believed to be 
plentiful. Contributors to the failing fishery included a more mobile fleet, overcapacity, 
and technological advances. These problems in combination threaten financial 
devastation of the fishing industry. Ignoring sustainability enhanced negative trends in an 
open access industry. Agreement of fishing people as well as enforcement was essential 
to conservation measures. If industry participants believed their competitors could cheat, 
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they in turn would cheat. This article addressed how overharvesting impacted rule 
making and compliance by the total group. 
The author believed that in contrast to the goals purported by the Common 
Fisheries Policy, overfishing continued to occur. She contended that a successful 
management scheme required eliminating the open access regime that played out 
between fishing people within and without a region. She asserted that poor enforcement 
was a catalyst for fishers to disregard blatantly the rules of compliance. Although the 
changes made in the new policy were a better version, it did nothing to prevent cheating 
through overharvesting. Originally, the Common Fisheries Policy was enacted to protect 
fishing open access in response to several international laws that thwarted this practice. 
Some North Atlantic state announced the extension of their coastline, which would 
exclude some EU members from fishing areas that had been considered common. In 
response, EU member states did the same. This would upset the open access ideals 
favored by the EU fishing industry. 
At the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development, the European 
community vowed to take steps towards diminishing overfishing and rebuilding stock to 
sustainable levels by 2015. The author contended that standing up to the fishing industry 
came with great political costs. The policy had no clear hierarchy, which often led to 
income pressures outweighing the concerns for conservation. Over 2007 to 2008, the EU 
fishery passed the Integrated Maritime Policy and the Marine Strategy Framework 
Directive, which decentralized authority-deciding challenges in the fishery would be 
better handled at the regional level. The new directive had a multitude of environmental 
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objectives that should be achieved by 2021. The Treaty of Lisbon created a reform 
measure to involve European Parliament in the decision-making, which created 
representation for European citizens as opposed to the fishing industry and their member 
states. They became champions of conservation. Lawmakers adopted measures to 
produce the MSY for a given population. However, quotas would still be allocated to 
ensure the livelihoods of small fishing communities. 
In 2013, the Common Fisheries Policy stressed the importance of data collection 
to provide empirical studies that supported or negated rules. The author asserted that all 
must be bound by the same rules for conservation measure to meet success. Although the 
new policy might not correct the problem of overcapacity, the guidelines supported a 
new, conservative direction towards a sustainable fishery. Within a fishery system, it was 
necessary that all violators were equally deterred by enforcement; thus, regional 
enforcement as opposed to localized enforcement was best suited to achieve legitimacy. 
The author contended that an ideal system would create fines that would be comparable 
to the value to be gained by cheating. She further asserted that more binding authority be 
given to regional councils to overcome member states’ or fishermen’s behavior regarding 
overfishing. 
Maryland instituted MSY several years ago, but enforcement of current 
regulations seemed to be relaxed. Variables of enforcement and regulatory action in detail 
present a picture that identified several trends. If nearly every fishery in the world that 
has been studied was cheating conservation measures through overharvesting, it was not 
a stretch to assume the same was occurring in Maryland’s commercial crabbing industry. 
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Economic Theory Review 
In 1944, A. G. Huntsman defined the problem of fisheries depletion in economic 
terms. He suggested the “take in proportion to the effort fails to yield a satisfactory living 
to the fisherman” (Gordon, 1954). Although some research mentioned the term 
economics, no research or models had been developed. In 1976, the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers built a computer-generated model of the Chesapeake Bay at a cost of $14 
million. By 1983, it was abandoned as a massive, expensive flop (Powledge, 2005). The 
EPA spent $27 million over a five-year study of the bay’s environment (Powledge, 2005). 
What was once a local, cultural tradition changed by 1982 when the Federal Court ruled 
in favor of Maryland and Virginia commercial blue crab fishers, allowing them to fish in 
each other’s state (Kennedy et al., 2007). Arguments about equality and types of crabbing 
took root again, and in 1983, the harvesting of sponge crabs was allowed in Maryland 
(Kennedy et al., 2007). However, Maryland restructures the crab license causing a drop 
of 57% in the number of commercial licenses issued from 14,348 in 1983 to 6,166 in 
1984 (Davis & Speir, 1997). A Junior and Senior crab license was introduced allowing 
children 14 and younger as well as folks 64 and older to crab license free (Davis & Speir, 
1997). 
Maryland introduced the Tidal Fish License (TFL) in 1984 to Maryland citizens 
allowing the harvest of all commercial species and the use of up to 300 crab pots under 
one license type (Davis & Speir, 1997; Lawrence, Clark, van Montfrans, & Musick, 
2013). Complaints from the 1950s and 60s continue to resonate in 1985. Wilen (1985) 
recounts the lack of attention paid to fishery economics. Still, no theories or models exist 
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that consider microeconomic behavior concerning the decision-making nature of 
commercial fishing people, yet other industries such as utilities were benefiting from 
microeconomic theory attempting to decipher real world work environments (Wilen, 
1985). He suggested a valid need exists to shift away from normative towards predictive 
modeling for fishery economics. By 1989, it became illegal to possess, transport, or pack 
a sponge crab in Maryland (US EPA, 1990; Kennedy et al., 2007); however, Maryland 
continued to allow Virginia blue crab fishers to sell sponge crabs in Maryland. Maryland 
developed a long-range conservation strategy called The Fishery Management Plan 
(Kennedy et al., 2007). The Nation recognized that “the blue crab supports the largest 
crab fishery in the United States, representing about 50 percent of the total weight of all 
species of crabs harvested [National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), 1986]” (Mercer,  
1989).  
Thirteen thousand twenty-seven recreational blue crab fishers harvested 6 million 
pounds of blue crab in 1989 (US EPA, 1990). The MD-NRP conducted a recreational 
crab survey that reported recreational blue crab fishers spent an average of 4.8 hours of 
crabbing per visit and landed 41 crabs per trip (US EPA, 1990). The Chesapeake Bay 
region comprising of Maryland and Virginia represents 90% of the commercial blue crabs 
harvested in the Mid-Atlantic Region (Mercer, 1989). 
In 1990, blue crabs were reported as the most valuable commercial harvest in the 
Chesapeake Bay (US EPA, 1990). Between 1990 and 1994, blue crab harvests had a 
dockside value of more than $200 million (Stagg & Whilden, 1997). Concern existed that 
“biases relating to landings of out-of-state blue crab fishers and shoreline property 
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owners were not adequately dealt with in the [dredge] survey” (Stagg & Whilden, 1997, 
p. 7). Blue crab fishers were utilizing cull rings on a voluntary basis allowing small crabs 
to escape the crab pot (US EPA, 1990). The EPA asserted Maryland’s evaluation of the 
economic and social impacts of containing blue crab harvests were too broadly stated in 
its Fisheries Management Plan (US EPA, 1990). The MD-NRP conducted a survey of 
crab shedding operations (US EPA, 1990). Maryland’s crab catch report was modified to 
include a separate total for dozens of soft crabs and numbers of peeler crabs (US EPA, 
1990). 
Current literature continues to attempt to explain the relationship between 
economics and the fishery. However, collecting quantifiable harvest data will continue to 
thwart the accuracy of its value and validity. In 2019, blue crabs in the Chesapeake Bay 
provide for a large group of stakeholders that equates to billions of dollars generated by 
this fishing industry. 
Van Iseghem, Quillérou, Brigaudeau, Macher, Guyader, and Daurès (2011) 
presented, Ensuring Representative Economic Data: Survey Data-collection Methods in 
France for Implementing the Common Fisheries Policy. Economic theories had become 
embedded in many international institutions, particularly fisheries because of ecosystem 
approaches. However, accurate and reliable data was a necessity for a good economic 
depiction of fishery assessments, but this variable had been neglected in the literature. 
Even less analysis had been placed upon the quality of data. In France, 59% of the fleet 
was of small scale but demonstrated great underestimates of landings. Two stages defined 
this work. The first employed sampling from the entire fleet for a given year throughout a 
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multitude of districts assigned by the Common Fisheries Policy. The second sought to 
improve response rates on questionnaires using assorted grouping of interviewees within 
the districts. The authors provided evidence of underreporting harvests using official 
statistics, which was rarely reviewed. The authors collected data derived from the French 
Ministry of Fisheries and a survey conducted by Ifremer. Segments were groups by vessel 
types and sizes, with small scale fishers grouped into a single category. Probability 
random sampling provided representative data. However, the budget limited the survey to 
600 fishing boats. This article addressed noncompliance by fishers concerning under-
reporting their harvests. 
Ifremer’s observers covered the French MRDs between February and June each 
year for the previous year’s information, and they carried out thirty economic surveys. 
Five categories of gear were chosen from a fleet of 34 to represent the diversity of the 
fishery. Although the overall fleet of the NSCA decreased by 18%, the small-scale fishers 
declined by only 13%. Economic assessments employed samples as opposed to census, 
so identifying bias was essential to the design. Of 533 interviews conducted, 75 were 
classed as non-responders. Of the original panel from 2007, nine fishers refused the 
second interview in 2008. Economic performance was evaluated from gross revenue, fuel 
costs, operational costs, and opportunity as full-time equivalent calculated as the average 
monthly crew size for any given year. The authors examined productivity from days at 
sea and engine hours clocked. They examined capacity by the horsepower of the average 
vessel. The study revealed that small-scale fishers’ landings demonstrated discrepancies 
as high as 46% meaning official statistics are underestimated. Small vessels have 
154 
 
 
alternative outlets for their catch, which provides opportunity to cheat. Three popular 
types of data collection included a census of the entire population, a probability-sample 
that uses random sampling of the population, and a non-probability sample that was not 
random. My study answered the question whether enforcement changes after a regulation 
takes effect. The patterns that developed provided new details concerning compliance 
behavior. 
Holzer, Lipton, and François (2012) analyzed unrestricted access to fisheries in 
their article Rent-Seeking and Incentives for Compliance in the Commons. Over the last 
30 years, managers had employed the use of limited entry to control overcapacity in the 
fisheries. This did not sustain fish stocks because effort could be produced differently via 
engine power or gear use. Managers used input controls to regulate effort, but outputs 
were difficult to control. TAC was another means to control harvest, which was often 
tradable. This article examined and addressed the behavior of fishers whose rent seeking 
interests might lead to noncompliance. They further examined if the vulnerability of the 
resource to these actions depended on whether input or output controls manage the stock. 
This article added to the empirical literature on fleet composition and attrition and how 
these contributed to the landings or profits realized in the fishery. Further, they analyzed 
how managers failed to meet biological goals for a fish because they did not account for 
fishermen’s behaviors. This article added to the previous research on tradable fishing 
rights. They used secondary data in the form of Maryland license transfers for blue crab 
and striped bass. Their evaluation provided evidence that fishing people were practicing 
informal leasing of licenses. 
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The law states no revenue can be exchanged for the transfer, which was intended 
for family, crew, or others within his close network during times of poor health or other 
unforeseen circumstances. Each season the license holder faces three options. The first 
option was to harvest his own license; the second option was to remain out of the 
common pool, and the last option was to temporarily transfer his license and receive 
payment. Leasing licenses encourages the least skilled to leave the fishery, while the most 
efficient remain. 
In Maryland, MSY controls the annual harvest. Two popular types of crab gear 
include the crab pot and the trotline. MD-DNR has relied heavily on input controls to 
manage the harvest within its target harvest. In September 2008, bushel limits were 
enacted for the female crab. In the striped bass fishery, fishers use a variety of gear. 
Allocation of quotas was based upon gear selected. Quotas can be controlled daily, 
weekly, or seasonally. In Maryland's case, payment for transfer is forbidden; regardless, 
fishers negotiate a lease rate in advance of the season, as actual harvest has no bearing on 
this negotiated amount. The license owner is responsible for reporting harvests. In striped 
bass, fishers may hold numerous permits while owners do not have to transfer their actual 
license. 
The authors asserted that the lower the enforcement budget was for blue crab, the 
more likely this illegal leasing would continue in Maryland. Leasing occurred more often 
in the striped bass fishery as opposed to the blue crab fishery. The latter only provided 
more pots to fish per day, while the striped bass provided catch limits and or quotas. 
Although leasing in general added to an efficient fishery, bypassing the regulation 
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through rent seeking created a barrier to assessing the fleet’s true fishing power. 
Specifically, blue crab was sensitive to environmental variation, and this situation added 
one more confounding variable to an already complex fishery. The occurrence of illegal 
license transferring was relative to enforcement data collected for crab pot use. If blue 
crab fishers set more pots than a license allowed, it decreased conservation effort.  
Schnier and Felthoven (2013) reported that economists have argued that secure 
property rights and markets can solve the problems of open access fisheries in their 
article Production Efficiency and Exit in Rights-Based Fisheries. Although consolidation 
of vessels would occur, little research was available to assist in predicting which vessels 
were likely to remain or leave the fishery after enactment of ITQs. Pre-ITQ reform 
efficiency of vessels might influence owners’ decisions to remain in the fishery. The 
author contended day-to-day operations might change under the two different regimes 
and what was efficient prior to ITQ may no longer be efficient. Without identifying this 
first, using measures of efficiency before a regulation change to predict fleet changes was 
flawed. The authors used an empirical model to estimate a vessel's measure of technical 
inefficiency and the owner’s decision to exist or remain in an ITQ fishery. This article 
addressed how commercial fishers respond to a new regulation, ITQ. 
The research demonstrated the cost savings and efficiency gains resulting from 
rights-based management. Although the assumption was that the technically efficient 
captains would remain, there was little research to support this. However, it was 
economic theory that predicted the most efficient vessels would remain. Limited data 
prevented the authors from performing a dual model, so a primal model best reflected the 
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periods presented. The authors focus on the 5 years prior to the regulation change to 
ITQs. The results of their analysis demonstrated that the more inefficient a vessel was 
prior to the change in regulation, the more likely it would exit the fishing industry. 
Although the authors employed the single stage estimation process, the results were like 
those studies that utilized a dual stage estimation process. The authors stated these results 
are specific to this fishery but are in line with economic theory. 
Enforcement is a cost to Maryland, and risk-taking via noncompliance carries 
costs for the fishing people. The implementation of ITQs was a time slot considered in 
the current study. Enforcement data for 2008 was reviewed after the ITQ regulation took 
effect in Maryland. Since the study did not consider the sanctions imposed, the study 
would not identify if ITQ was effected by the offense. 
Chávez and Stranlund (2013) discussed the costs of implementing and managing 
the ITQ system in fisheries in their study titled Who Should Pay the Administrative Costs 
of an ITQ Fishery? Administrative costs included formulating and implementing rules to 
guide the regulation, monitoring, and enforcement tactics, as well as research in marine 
science and economics. The authors developed a theoretical model of harvests under an 
ITQ regime. They explored how administrative costs and their distribution can affect the 
equilibrium of an ITQ program. Some research asserted the fishers should bear the costs 
since they are the direct beneficiaries of the policy. Conversely, fishers rarely bulk at 
regulations for which they would benefit but not have to pay. This article addressed how 
group fiscal responsibility might lend itself to self and group regulating, which would 
curb compliance issues in response to new regulations.  
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Three factors were identified that can influence distribution of costs. The first was 
quota price effect, which asserted noncompliance increases with quota price; the next was 
individual harvest effect, whereby costs might increase directly with individual harvests, 
and the last factor was fleet size effect, where the public bear a larger part of the costs but 
can lead to additional entry in the fishery creating aggregate administrative costs. 
Existing literature made valid arguments for fishers to bear 100% of the costs; however, 
this conceptual analysis suggested that this end was difficult at best. Equity consideration 
might have influence over these decisions, and distribution factors might influence the 
design and other factors of an ITQ policy. This analysis could be applied to other 
regulations that might contribute to the design of a more efficient management system for 
ITQ fisheries. 
General funds were a greater part of the M-DNR budget, and fees were paid into 
this fund from resource users, which in turn were used to create and implement new 
conservation/regulation rules. Factors relating to the discussion and implementation of 
ITQs in Maryland’s crab industry might have led to noncompliance on the part of blue 
crab fishers. ITQ were based upon historical record keeping, and commercial blue crab 
fishers attempted to manipulate those numbers in 2008 by what was reported as over-
reporting of harvests. However, no studies demonstrated whether this over-reporting was 
an intentional community effort or an individual response out of fear because of the new 
quota rule. In other words, how can a person determine if the effect had been under-
reporting all along? Since patterns occurred by comparing regulations and enforcement 
data, this peaks future questions to address. 
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Felthoven (2014) presented Cooperative Formation and Peer Effects in Fisheries. 
The author contends that fisheries management was famous for command-and-control 
tactics even though research had shown that fisheries might be more efficiently 
prosecuted if rights-based fishing was utilized. The literature referred to this as 
rationalization. Changes could be expected in the extensive margin when inefficient 
vessels leave the fleet or in intensive margins when changes in behavior and economic 
performance occurred rather than fleet changes. Economics literature focused on 
achievable gains before and after a change to ITQ systems. This article addressed how 
fishers responded to regulation changes as a group via information sharing about harvest 
locations. 
The authors discussed the effect of information sharing, which they referred to as 
“peer effects,” and this had gained little attention in the literature. The authors 
hypothesize that fishers would share information within the same cooperative to harvest 
total quota at a minimum cost. The authors employed an empirical model to discover if 
information sharing was present across different cooperatives. They contended that 
fishers would continue to exert too much search effort to maximize their competitive 
edge through information. The authors would assess the extent to which cooperatives 
effectively shared information and capitalized on those opportunities. Likewise, peer 
input could lead to congestion externalities that lower one’s harvest. 
The author’s focused on two crab species, and they allocated harvest through 
catch quotas. The authors collected data from eLandings - electronic reporting system. 
The authors employed a stochastic production frontier model for the years leading up to 
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ITQ in the crab fishery. They studied two interactional variables that included vessel’s 
horsepower and the number of days spent on a single trip as well as a vessel’s horsepower 
and the number of pots fished. The research provided support that fishers do share 
information to make greater gains. However, the researchers were unable to assert 
whether this was a construct of regulatory changes or a response to the rights-based 
regime itself. Traditionally, rights-based fishing continued to promote the independent 
fishing people. These marginal effects and differences were an important aspect to rule 
planning in the ITQ fishery. 
My study concerned a similar stationary gear called crab pot. Like this research, 
Maryland’s industry utilizes TAC and ITQ to manage the hard crab fishery. Enforcement 
data generated information to consider. I measured group noncompliance year by year. 
Socio-economic and Institutional Incentives Influencing Fishers’ Behavior in 
Relation to Fishing Practices and Discard prepared by Eliasen et al. (2015) discussed the 
issues of by catch and the discard of unwanted catch in the fishing industry. It was 
impossible to avoid by catch in nets, pots, trawls, or almost any fishing gear. Several 
perspectives provided a view to this problem. For instance, assessment perspective 
reviewed harvest data, economic perspective reviews the waste of income, an ethical 
perspective reviewed the waste of nutrition in a world of starving people, and the 
environmental perspective concerned itself with the natural resource system. There were 
three facets influencing fishing practices, which were the community, the state, and the 
market. Unfortunately, early business decisions might lock a fishing person into a certain 
species because of investments in species-specific gear. This article addressed the 
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continuous implementation of new regulation and how this led to compliance and then 
how fishers perceived it. 
The authors conducted a desk study using the list of factors influencing discard 
behavior in the Greek and Danish fisheries. English studies were conducted for the 
fisheries department and utilized in this study. Interviews were conducted at the end of 
2011 and the spring of 2012. The study was nationally defined but was specific to the 
bottom trawl fishery. Experience in the fishery was a limiter for interviewee selection, 
and grounded theory was applied to analyze these interviews. The cross-case findings 
demonstrated that discard rates have a profound influence over stock recovery, and a 
scientific or management definition of discard has yet to be accepted across stakeholders. 
The Danish and English had taken steps towards decreasing discards as a problem, but 
the Greeks only viewed this as an economic hardship. 
The authors suggested the differences in attitudes can be explained by political 
and managerial historical practices. In community, most fishers did not see themselves as 
discarders nor was social pressure mentioned as an enforcement means. Many fishers 
considered themselves in agreement with some measures but were upset at the substantial 
number of new measures occurring in short periods. The fishers identified the state as a 
formal institution that initiates input or output type regulations to control the industry. 
The perceived rightness of any given regulation was linked to the efficacy of the formal 
and informal communication structures. Enforcement exerted improved actual discard 
levels and behavior in the Danish and Greek cases. However, it proved difficult to get an 
overview on noncompliance registration; thus, this became irrelevant in the list of factors. 
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The market seemed a major player in the discard rate and illegal behavior. Indirect 
costs, black-market, and risk costs are difficult to measure, but fisheries that faced 
constant fluctuating prices and costs considered risks. Fishers never mentioned the 
market pressure for fish from certified minimal discard vessels as an influence in either 
case study. Although the list of factors that influence behavior has been tested only on 
three cases, it proves to be a tool to help identify things that influence discard behavior. 
Performing additional case studies could assist in refining this list to perpetuate its 
usefulness. 
In my study, regulations that pertain to by-catch were reviewed in the literature. 
Crab pots required an open ring for undersize crabs to escape, and dumping the pot 
should have eliminated the rest of unwanted catch. However, discards had not been 
defined in Maryland and are categorized under illegal harvest whether because of size, 
season, species, or other.  
Reimer, Abbott, and Wilen (2014) discussed the transferability of fishing quotas 
in their paper titled Unraveling the Multiple Margins of Rent Generation from Individual 
Transferable Quotas. The authors asserted that the ability to transfer eliminates excess 
capita thereby creating an efficient fishery. The literature purported both extensive and 
intensive marginal changes with an ITQ regime. The authors contended that identifying 
the types of rent generated was important to policy, and to analyze this required an 
experiment like setting where scenarios could be tested. This paper used the 2005 ITQ 
data for the Bering Sea red king crab fishery to separate the types of rent generated after 
ITQ implementation. They based the simulation upon a limited entry fishery and an 
163 
 
 
individual non-tradable quota. They introduced a detailed description of the production 
process to focus the context-specific intensive margin decision made immediately 
following a new ITQ regime. A simple input-output model would not capture the subtle 
strategic use of gear choice over time and space. The authors found that the interaction of 
economic, technological, and biological parameters determine the degree and 
components of rent generation. This article addressed both timing and response to 
regulatory action. 
Production decisions met by blue crab fishers are not typical of conventional 
economic models of production processes, but these were the major decisions - although 
short run - that blue crab fishers made daily concerning their income. This study 
identified a 64% reduction in the average variable cost to operate in the fishery and a 
16% increase in fishery rents after ITQ was implemented. However, the magnitude of the 
effects, whether consolidation of the fleet or incentive to rent the license, was determined 
by the timing of the introduction of the ITQ regime. They discovered that consolidation 
of the fleet did not always lead to less intensive fishing. The authors asserted that to 
access accurately the impact of regulation changes, a person must include a description of 
the production process in depth to be invariant to regulatory changes. 
ITQ in Maryland continues to be debated but has been evolving since 2008. Each 
specific change that has occurred in the ITQ fishery impacts crab pot use; thus, I 
measured each addendum or new regulation pertaining to ITQ for noncompliance using 
enforcement data. 
Huang (2015) presented An Inverse Demand System for the Differentiated Blue 
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Crab Market in Chesapeake Bay. The author asserted the financial importance of the blue 
crab industry produced from the Chesapeake ranges from $46 to $103 million annually. 
Huang studied the demand for the blue crab from its various life cycles. He suggested it 
was inaccurate to treat fish species of varied sizes as a single group, and further asserted 
that policy makers need to consider these differentiated values in advance of regulatory 
changes. This article addressed policy making for the harvest of blue crab, which includes 
the gear – crab pot. 
The Inverse Almost Ideal Demand System (IAIDS) was a common model for 
agricultural markets and the inverse demand systems were representative of wholesale 
markets where trade was limited asserting that this model was the right choice. However, 
this model required treating quantities of fish as exogenous, but in fish studies 
endogeneity was the standard, and fishers do not make decisions based on expected price 
at the market. In this study, the author used stock estimates to correct for this potential 
problem. It was an objective measure that was correlated with harvests but exogenous to 
the market in the year following the assessment. The author examined season demand by 
including binary variables for shifting the demand equations. 
The author reviewed five market categories that included the #1 Male, #2 Male, 
Female, and grouped the Soft and Peeler (SP) crab. He stressed that the SP was the most 
valuable market crab. The author contended that separating economic studies from 
species’ characteristics could cause potential problems. He suggested the development of 
a structural form of the quantity equation would deal with endogeneity. Without its 
consideration, incorrect estimates would be generated. 
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Considering endogeneity, it was essential to consider how a regulation for specific 
category effects other categories; likewise, my study measured noncompliance in the blue 
crab industry. Maryland categorized the crab pot industry by two gear types, one was for 
SP, and the other was for male or female hard crabs. This fact had been neglected in the 
literature, and costs were associated with it. Therefore, regulatory changes to the pots in 
general were evaluated for enforcement response. 
Current Literature Research 
In the twenty-first century, several themes have become known in the fisheries 
research. After decades of neglect, compliance and enforcement variables were getting 
some investigation. Items of interest included illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing 
harvest and activity. Several authors call to a shared information / enforcement model 
(Kaye, 2014; Witbooi, 2014). They suggested that cross-referencing vital information 
about vessels could aid enforcement at port states and on the high seas. Important data 
entry would include historic compliance behavior, harvest limits, harvest rights, catch 
data, inspection data, and the like. However, small-scale fisheries would be too numerous 
to record. Hentati-Sundberg et al. (2014) suggested some management strategies may 
incentivize non-compliance in the form of misreporting harvests. Other research 
attempted to identify any triggers that may lead to noncompliance behavior. For example, 
several important influences recorded in their study include many fishermen’s decisions 
stem from personal and community morality, legitimacy of the regulations, the perceived 
behaviors of others (Felthoven, 2014), community, and individual poverty, and the efforts 
of enforcement agencies (Arias et al., 2015; Dresdner, 2015).  
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Although there were several researchers who had taken an interest in enforcement 
and compliance studies, many of them lean towards the conflict of common property or 
rights-based fishing activities (Brewer, 2012; Deacon, 2012; Ratner & Allison, 2012). 
Since the introduction of ITQs in the fisheries in the late twentieth century, many authors 
continued to study ITQs and the effects of this regulation on small and large-scale 
fisheries; however, the main interest seemed to be in the economic sphere concerning 
production efficiency and rent creation (Holzer et al., 2012; Iseghem et al., 2011; Reimer 
et al., 2014; Schnier & Felthoven, 2013). Huang (2015) created an analysis to evaluate 
polices in terms of socio-economic outcomes and the impact of regulations on each 
another. However, the literature did not seem to address specific compliance issues in 
time or place or in a specific response to setting. My study compared enforcement data to 
regulatory action in time and place for blue crab gear. Blue crab regulations were the 
independent variable. The dependent variables consisted of available enforcement data 
that was compared to regulations to determine if compliance was influenced by 
regulatory action in unexpected ways. 
Synthesizing the Current Research 
The Maryland Register and COMAR hold all the fisheries regulations. From these 
documents, six key independent variables were categorized for simplification in the 
study. What was known was that the Maryland crabbing industry had continued to evolve 
since the use of crab pots in 1940. Multiple changes had been made to licensing, the 
number of crab pot allowed, the use of crab pots, times of year and day, size requirements 
for harvest, and changes in harvests of male and female hard crabs. The dependent 
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variable of enforcement data had been sporadic throughout the history of the industry. 
DNR and NRP including news releases, would provide the necessary enforcement data. 
Kuperan and Sutinen (1998) suggested empirical evidence was limited in making 
connections between fisheries crime and compliance. Studies had continued since 
Nielsen and Mathiesen (2003) concerning factors influencing compliance in fisheries. 
Beem (2006) asserted planning policy for the Chesapeake Bay blue crab caused decision-
makers to come to the realization that they were managing people not resources. 
However, a constant conflict remained between science and commercial blue crab fishers 
because they rarely agreed (Hastings, 2007). Variety of task forces and planning 
committees had surfaced to deal with these conflicts. Since 2008, ITQ had created a 
variety of responses, the most important was the discrepancies in harvest reports 
discovered by MD-DNR. Compliance and enforcement were lacking in the Maryland 
literature involving blue crab. Since this is the number one fish export for the State, 
gaining a handle on the timing and frequency of blue crab noncompliance is essential to 
policy. 
Lord (2011) addressed the social changes fishing communities must face and 
conquer in response to continuous regulations. Science has reported time-and-again the 
misreporting and under-reporting of harvests (De Roacha et al., 2013; Hentati-Sundberg 
et al., 2014; Witbooi, 2014). Although common property and rights-based fishing had 
existed since humankind discovered fish as a natural resource, the division of this 
resource continued to be debated by scholars who intimately studied the fishing industry 
(Allison et al., 2012; Brewer, 2012; Guyader & Thébaud, 2000; Lam & Pauly, 2010; 
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Ostrom, 2000; Ratner & Allison, 2012; Santopietro & Shabman, 1990; Stewart & 
Callagher, 2011; van Hoof, 2013). Economic theory had played a vital role in the 
development on views of the fishery as a sustainable resource (CapLog, 2011; Mazany et 
al., 2005; Nasser, 2013; Roberts, 1905; Wilen, 1985). 
Current Research Methodologies 
Ali and Abdullah (2010) examined factors believed to affect compliance in 
fisheries pertaining to zoning regulations in their study titled Impact of Enforcement and 
Co-Management on Compliance Behavior of Fishermen. The Malaysian fishing crew 
experienced new zoning regulations that were meant to act as an equity lines between 
small and large-scale fishers. However, large-scale fishers continuously ignore the 
regulation. The rate of non-compliance can be significant, and deterrence means higher 
enforcement costs. The authors asserted that a great deal of research has been completed 
on criminal behavior as formulated by Becker (1968), and Sutinen, Rieser & Gauvin 
(1990) studied regulatory enforcement and compliance using deterrent theory in an 
econometric study. The authors used primary and secondary sources. They collected 
secondary data from The Department of Fisheries and the Fisherman’s Association. They 
used the individual commercial fisher as the unit of analysis. They analyzed the primary 
data using SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Sciences) and STATA. The report began 
with a descriptive analysis followed by the result of the hypothesis testing. 
Hentati-Sundberg et al. (2014) discussed the lack of data or misreporting may lead 
to unreliable stock assessment data, which in turn results in bad advice. They asserted 
stock assessment methodology was dependent on accurate data. Commercial data can be 
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biased particularly in highly regulated commercial fisheries. Overcapacity can promote 
economic incentives for non-compliance. The authors built a statistical analysis using 
logbook data from fishing operations. The time was selected because it marked an 
important change in management systems. In fisheries, it is important to distinguish 
between catch and landings. The authors used two General Linear Models to estimate 
total catch. Explanatory variables included depth, latitude, longitude, month, gear, total 
effort and were spatially explicit. The sensitivity of the model was tested by 
parameterizing the model to individual years in the beginning and end of the time-series. 
Arias et al. (2015) discussed management by marine protected areas and fishers’ 
compliance response. The authors suggested that the 20% catch estimated to be illegal 
was conservative. This was becoming a serious topic in the conservation and rebuilding 
of fish stocks. They contended that the ecological success of MPAs has been linked 
directly to compliance. However, little empirical evidence existed to support these 
assumptions. Illegal fishing was a broad topic and comes in many forms. There would be 
no simple solutions. The authors studied 12 sites. MPAs were chosen purposefully to 
prove a varied sample. Data collection involved quantitative questionnaires. Since this 
was a sensitive subject, the questionnaires were prone to no response and response bias. 
Levels of compliance were measured for each MPA. 
Guenther et al. (2015) investigated what happens to displaced fishers when MPAs 
were implemented in historical fishing areas. As an adaptive strategy, fishers were 
accused of fishing the border of the MPA. In recent years, researchers have applied the 
use of spatial methods in their studies. Few of these studies have mixed various spatial 
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methods. Units of analysis come from secondary sources. The authors tested for 
reallocation of effort after the implementation of MPAs. The authors reviewed captains’ 
daily fishing logs over a span of 10 seasons that included five before and five after the 
implementation of the MPA. The authors used a Chi analysis to test whether fishing effort 
aggregated along the border of the MPA. Comparisons of catch were analyzed using a 
paired Student’s t test of the mean difference of the fisherman’s daily CPUE in and out of 
the MPA border.  
Scheuerell et al. (2015) discussed the effects of a large-scale supplementation 
program on the density of the fishing population. They asserted when designed 
accurately, a priori, large-scale interventions could be treated as large-scale experiments 
with effect sizes estimated through carefully constructed analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
applied to data from before and after control-impact (BACI) studies. Time series models 
could overcome when no true “control” existed and could overcome some of these 
problems. It could address the data sequentially. A lack of explicit experimental design 
was supported in a hierarchical model. It could support missing data, different error 
distributions, and data from varying sources. A multivariate, hierarchical time-series 
model could describe year-by-year changes.  
Ronald E. Wilson, Program Manager for Mapping and Analysis for the Public 
Safety Program at the National Institute of Justice in Washington, D.C. (2010) discussed 
developing a theory for the use of the DDACTS (Data-Driven Approaches to Crime and 
Traffic Safety) model, which was a time and space-to-event means to track repetitive – 
high crime areas. This model tracked incidents that had occurred over time in specific 
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geographic locations. This model might uncover a pattern that demonstrates certain areas 
attract crime. The new theory under development was referred to as Place-Based Theory. 
The author suggested that B.F. Skinner’s theory on learning strengthens the conditions for 
crime in certain locations. Wilson suggested that consistent enforcement in these same 
areas would simultaneously send a message of less opportunity. He asserted that 
geographic type theories of crime that demonstrated the ebbs and tides of crime patterns 
would effect policing and lead to creating preventive policy to stop patterns from 
developing. 
Variable and Methodology Rational 
The common methodology in fisheries has been quantitative. The common theory 
was economics, so the combination had been an interest in income and costs as they 
relate to fishing effort. The introduction of MPAs and ITQs has had an impact on the 
literature about income efficiency before and after the implementation of such regimes. 
Compliance concerning the theory of open access or rights-based fishing was another 
studied variable. However, the interest in compliance was not to what degree it was 
occurring, or how often it was occurring, but what was the costs associated with this risk-
taking activity. Much of the data was collected from primary sources such as the fishers 
themselves or from secondary sources which were marine fisheries agencies. 
Enforcement studies were nearly zero in the literature except in the form of related costs. 
To view compliance from a different lens, my study tested for direct responses to 
regulatory action. This included all major changes to fishing commercial blue crab. 
Recognizing if noncompliance was occurring in patterns was an important policy 
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implication. 
Summary and Conclusions 
The race for fish in a common property fishery and non-compliance in the ITQ 
fishery were common themes throughout the literature. Common property concerns date 
back to the 1950s and continued through the present research. Social sciences were 
attempting to uncover why commercial fishers practice illegal activity. The theory of 
prisoner’s dilemma was a common theme, and it was used to explain the responses of 
fishers to regulation. If a fishing person was concerned about the other’s behavior, he or 
she would continue in self-interest for immediate gains that might be had by the 
competition. For all the literature representing common property, enforcement, and 
economic theories, they were seldom found simultaneously. In my research, I focused on 
actual true enforcement and analyzed this effect over time against a specified set of 
regulations filling a continued gap in the literature.  
It was well documented that illegal activity was occurring in the fishing industry. 
This included but was not limited to harvesting illegal catch, under-reporting catch, 
utilizing illegal gear, and or misrepresenting geographical locations of harvest. 
Enforcement was lacking in many of the worlds’ fisheries; allotted budgets are often cited 
as a reason for weak enforcement. Equitable distribution of TACs and ITQs continues to 
be a problem in large and small-scale fisheries. What science has yet to discover was to 
what degree this illegal activity was occurring. Without long-term data, noncompliance 
patterns cannot be accurately analyzed. Often, regulations are not enforcement friendly, 
making it impossible to monitor certain fishing activities. 
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 In Chapter 3, I presented specific details for data collection and testing. 
Identifying and sharing unexpected responses as a problem in policy making with 
academia might stimulate research in specific coastal areas in the 
enforcement/compliance field within the social sciences. It is American coastal states’ 
frontlines where the problem exists, and states can take direct action against criminal 
behavior related to its fishery resources – setting a precedence of zero tolerance. Larger 
patterns along coasts could develop over years of data collection and systems 
development. Identifying patterns of enforcement would assist in identifying underlying 
behaviors that might be addressed in future policy or corrected in current policy. I 
collected this crucial secondary data and presented it as a model for present and future 
data collection using continued time and space analysis procedures. 
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Chapter 3: Methods 
Introduction  
The purpose of this quantitative, correlational study was to find whether there was 
a statistically meaningful relationship between commercial blue crab enforcement and 
regulatory action and type on years with none, one, or multiple regulatory actions 
spanning 2009-2017. My goal for this quantitative, correlational study was to share the 
findings with industry stakeholders to affect a positive social change between policy 
makers and commercial fishers. Since I identified trends in the research, interested people 
must delve further to learn what drives these trends. The results of this study can aid in 
making regulatory actions meaningful for all vested parties. 
The primary objective of this research was to appraise commercial blue crab 
fisheries related regulatory activity beside enforcement data. The results of this 
correlational study may aid in making regulatory considerations pertinent to blue crab 
management strategies (see Osbourne, 2010). The research contributes to future 
investigation of often-neglected variables that may halt a regulation’s ability to meet its 
intended purpose. Specifically, this research addressed Maryland’s commercial blue crab 
fisheries regulatory action within its boundaries of the Chesapeake Bay. I focused on non-
positive law titles that represented all commercial fisheries related regulations dating 
2009-2017.  
Enforcement data and blue crab regulations served as variables for comparison. 
Logically, by comparing data, this quantitative design incorporating a correlational, time 
series study uncovered any direct relationships between the numbers of recorded blue 
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crab citations, warnings, and commercial Maryland blue crab regulatory action. These 
relationships may skew harvest data that then drives policy. This research was not meant 
to answer why this phenomenon occurred but simply to assess whether it was occurring. I 
analyzed the data using descriptive statistical analysis. 
In my role as researcher, I made valid assumptions based upon the results of the 
research. I collected data methodically, then grouped and categorized the data in 
relationship to the variables under study. I resisted all bias and presented data as they 
were uncovered. This scientific study was a means to produce empirical results about 
enforcement and regulations. I collected enough data to ensure detection of even the least 
meaningful relationship between variables. I found and collected secondary data. I 
entered the data into a statistical software program, surveyed and summarized the results, 
and presented the results in a clear, concise manner using empirical evidence as support 
for future research. 
The population under study was the licensed Maryland Chesapeake Bay 
commercial blue crab fishers. Most significant, enforcement data related to the 
commercial blue crab fisher and the gear used to harvest blue crab was investigated. The 
research took place in Princess Anne, Somerset County, Maryland – a mere 13 miles from 
the Bay and several working commercial fishing communities. This stretch of peninsula 
in Maryland is referred to as the Lower Eastern Shore, and the Bay is divided into two 
more sections – Middle and Upper Bay. The sample included a collection of commercial 
blue crab enforcement data and regulatory actions in Maryland’s Chesapeake Bay. 
Harvest data from institutions and historical print media dating to 1939 provided 
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background for discussion. Further, regulatory action and harvest data provided a 
timeline to discuss the economic growth and status blue crab has earned in Maryland. 
Data collection procedures included searching agency websites and relying on 
educational and scientifically based websites related to the Chesapeake Bay blue crab. 
Public notices posted by MD-DNR announcing commercial crabbing related proposed 
regulations provided a timeline. Secondary data collection included retrieving annotated 
codes of Maryland via the Maryland Department of Legislative Services and the 
Maryland Register, which comprises regulations passed each congressional session. I 
collected active and proposed regulations via the MD-DNR and enforcement data via the 
MD-NRP, as available. 
Data collected throughout the history of commercial crabbing in Maryland was 
inconsistent at best. For this research, I grouped regulatory action into six specific blue 
crab strategies dating from 2010. The MD-DNR provided archival blue crab population 
and regulatory data. The retrieval of this data was pertinent to the research in that the 
sample size must represent blue crab related enforcement and regulatory action at a 
number large enough to make valid assumptions from the results of the research. I 
reported on 96 time events that represented 2010 – 2017 enforcement data, viewed 
monthly and analyzed by year. 
I acted as the main data collection instrument. Instrumentation involved the 
coding of archival and print media data for grouping. I coded the data in order to group 
types of blue crab regulations, crime, and number of licenses and crab gear allowed 
during a given time slot into useable sets. I entered all the data into a statistical analysis 
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program to be sorted and measured. The population, comprising commercial blue crab 
fishers, is licensed by the State of Maryland to harvest blue crab commercially from the 
Chesapeake Bay. Blue crab is a popular species of crab harvested in three out of seven of 
its lifecycles. This includes the hard crab, the peeler crab, and the soft crab. The blue crab 
regulations included all gear with a focus on both hard crab pots and peeler crab pots. 
Crime collection included enforcement data related to blue crab harvested by a licensed, 
commercial blue crab fisher, regardless of license type or the legal outcome. Legitimate 
agencies or print media from reliable sources provided historical and or missing data. 
Timing or slots of time included the year after a regulation, the time after an emergency 
regulation, and the time after zero regulatory action, that is, in-season and out-of-season 
spans of time for correlation.  
Quantitative, correlation in time series research demonstrates the importance of 
the continued problem. In Maryland, commercial blue crab fishers continue to reject 
regulations enacted or proposed individually or in combination before, during, and after 
commercial fishing seasons (Chisolm, II, 1940; MD-DNR, 2015; Maryland Register, 
2017), which results in noncompliance. The legislative practice of constant, cumulative 
implementation of commercial fishing regulations without empirical evidence lends itself 
to noncompliance by user groups. Rejecting regulations threatens baseline data, which 
furthers regulatory action that then effects stakeholder decision-making, and conservation 
plans fail. I expressed the data in numbers that provided a base for descriptive statistical 
testing including the mean, median, and standard deviation. Descriptive methods 
provided the foundation for the variables discussed in the research. I tested the least 
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amount of reduction in variables to reduce Type 1 error rates. Both tables and figures I 
developed have created a reader friendly environment to present such tightly woven data. 
This research provides a volume estimate of enforcement data relative to commercial 
blue crab regulations in Maryland’s Chesapeake Bay. The sample was large, spanning 8 
years, and included six specific regulatory categories that provided for reliable statistical 
analysis. Enforcement and regulation may present how a group responds to new 
regulation and the unexpected consequences that may result. In this research, I attempted 
to identify trends on a specific demographic.  
Several threats to validity stemmed from archival data. Data collection systems 
for tracking commercial blue crab fishers and harvests have dramatically evolved since 
1939. Typos and transposed numbers are obvious factors with dated material. Further, 
sampling and collection of data was sporadic at best. Grouping and sorting this data into 
crime and regulation variables that accurately worked to answer the research question 
was essential. Sporadic, archival data influenced my ability to make fine distinctions in 
the representative data. Accuracy would be impacted if the measurement did not capture 
the differences and similarities of the variables in the analysis. The measurement showed 
through the available data that a phenomenon occurred. Last, measurements of crime 
against regulations have covariates that change from crab season to crab season, 
influencing outcomes. 
Ethical issues related to research included the fabrication or falsifying of the 
archival data. This data may originate from previous quantitative and qualitative studies. 
Previous miscoding of data through negligence or bias was another consideration. My 
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goal was to promote accuracy of data in this research to discover unexpected 
relationships. Transparency of key informants was essential to attaining honest, voluntary 
cooperation for providing sample documents and historical matter. Further, cultural 
sensitivities must be respected to avoid conflict of interest. Decision makers would 
benefit from a full-circle review of how their intentions are unfolding. 
Research Design and Rationale 
I investigated whether blue crab enforcement data correlates with regulatory 
action by number or type. I based the study upon one primary research question: What is 
the relationship between annual commercial blue crab related regulations enacted as 
measured by individual count and type and noncompliance by commercial fishers as 
measured by the number of tickets written annually? Regulations and enforcement data 
provided the variables for the intended correlation. The data set encompassed years that 
included regulatory actions as well as reported enforcement data for years with zero 
regulatory activity.  
Equally important questions were: How many times has fishing illegal gear 
occurred during the study years? Based on enforcement data related to illegal gear, what 
is the skew on harvest data because of commercial blue crab fishers exceeding the crab 
pot limit? Do years with no regulatory activity have less enforcement (crime) compared 
to years with regulatory activity? What percent is noncompliance behavior of total 
licenses reporting activity? 
Independent Variable 
The independent variables under investigation included a selection of blue crab 
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regulations. I determined the regulation selected by the commercial blue crab 
enforcement data available; therefore, I reviewed regulatory actions dating 2009-2017. 
Regulations are nominal variables. I included blue crab regulations, acts, laws, public 
notices, management practices, and proposals. My selection process included those 
regulations that had a direct enforcement relationship to the commercial harvest of blue 
crab as defined by the MD-DNR.  
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable under investigation was blue crab commercial 
enforcement data. The enforcement data comprised citations and warnings reported or 
recorded by MD-NRP since a specific regulation’s inception. I reviewed material to the 
earliest recorded enforcement of commercial blue crab as reported by Maryland. 
However, the variables tested included enforcement data spanning the years 2010-2017. 
Covariate Variable–Continuous and Control 
 Time was one covariate variable I used in this research. Time selection mirrored 
enforcement data relative to regulatory action. Thus, sampling was sporadic in that some 
samples were continuous, while other dates had zero regulatory action and enforcement. 
Samples were drawn for each action or inaction starting in 2009 and ending 2017, while 
samples for enforcement were limited to 2010-2017 and further divided into months. This 
model did not allow random sampling. 
Mediator Variable 
 The number of licensed commercial blue crab fishers in Maryland for a given 
season was one mediator variable I used in this research. Several other mediator variables 
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I considered included weather conditions and emergency regulatory actions. 
Moderator Variable 
 The harvest of blue crab by commercial blue crab fishers was one moderator 
variable I considered in this research. This number, if accurate, should not skew from 
total crab pots allowed in Maryland’s Chesapeake Bay during a given season. A second 
moderator variable to consider was the harvest of blue crab as reported by NOAA. This 
number, if accurate, should not skew from Maryland’s harvest reports. 
Connection to the Questions 
I used a correlational design to demonstrate positive and negative correlations 
among the variables. I examined the independent variables (commercial blue crab 
regulations) and dependent variables (enforcement data) during specific time slots to 
determine if associations existed. The time I studied consisted of the season that occurs, 
pre - through implementation or rejection of a regulation, in or out of regulatory season. I 
eliminated missing data as a variable.  
The right or licensing - or historical lack of - to participate in commercial blue 
crab harvesting has evolved since the invention of the crab pot. I considered this 
information in order to hypothesize its influence on any patterns that  became apparent, 
but the resulting data was not measured for the purpose of this research. 
Constraints  
The most vital time constraint I faced was a completion deadline required by 
Walden University. Time was of the essence. Second,  I was constrained to conduct data 
collection individually because keen accuracy concerning typos and or transposition error 
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would dramatically influence the results. Further, much of the data lexicon and or jargon 
was legal vernacular, which can be difficult to interpret. The sample size was gigantic in 
terms of chronological availability, but the resources had content accuracy challenges. I 
was progressive in reading and writing law, as well as hands-on experience with cultural 
jargon. Missing data may skew time comparison of variables over time, so I eliminated 
them. Cooperation from state agencies and scientific organizations was expected, but it 
became a constraint when legislative documents had to be printed individually for 
accuracy and organization. 
Advancing Knowledge 
A great deal of literature presented the fishing industry using qualitative studies 
with a concentration in conservation management. In and of itself this appeared as a 
validity problem; conservation management was perceived by the fishing industry as a 
direct threat -- in general. Guaranteeing truthful responses from human participants in an 
already threatened industry lacked acceptable validity. Prior to expansive marine 
destruction, common sense cited historical harvest data as valid since there were limited 
threats to the crabber’s livelihood. Skews in modern data were expected, since perceived 
threats had increased with the increase of regulatory action for commercial crabbing in 
Maryland’s Chesapeake Bay these past 15 years. I presented a quantitative, correlational, 
time series study using descriptive statistics. My study provides an empirical review of 
important variables related to blue crab management. Particularly in enforcement of crab 
pot regulations, many blue crab management decisions lacked empirical evidence. I 
discovered negative and positive correlations by comparing the variables. I provided 
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secondary questions for additional data discussion and consideration. Objective, bias-
free, hard numbers should be necessary for decision makers to support or reject pet 
theories promulgated by special interest groups. 
Methodology 
Introduction  
The crux of my research was correlation and comparison. I aimed to discover if 
an unexpected relationship existed between regulation and enforcement. The independent 
variable used for comparison was commercial blue crab related regulations. I created six 
sets of regulations that involved the policing of blue crabs. The variables I provided for 
measurement were enforcement data on specific regulations selected from a broad group 
of laws enforced under Maryland’s direction. My main research question aimed to 
discover if any patterns became clear over time between regulatory action and law 
enforcement – specifically for blue crab related laws in Maryland’s Chesapeake Bay. 
Those who use this research will benefit from the regression analysis because it 
will assist in deciding if future similar events will occur. However, even with a before 
view of events, without a control group, no true assumptions can be made as to whether 
commercial blue crab fishers rejected a specific regulation. Regardless, future crimes 
may have the potential to be curtailed in advance of regulatory action based upon the 
outcomes of this research. 
Quantitative Justification 
Time was the standard by which this research began and ended. However, it 
became apparent after I performed a thorough literature review that the terms Time Series 
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and Time to Event models had been used interchangeably. For this research, I collected 
data  in and out of season for each independent variable. This may be described as before 
a regulation occurred or zero time when no regulation was enacted in a specific year. 
Enforcement data available and regulation activity predetermined data collection. This 
research benefited more from sample size than from equal dispersion. Because data 
collection times were sporadic and dependent upon actual enforcement and regulatory 
activity, a Time to Event Model using Paired t tests to measure events seemed logical. 
 Parametric tests were possible for this research, as meeting the size guideline was 
possible over the spread of years representing this combination of nonnormal, continuous 
and discrete data. Twenty samples in a parametric test with 6 research variables provided 
substantial data. Each of 6 variables stood for a set of specific regulatory actions that 
effected blue crab harvesting in Maryland’s Chesapeake Bay. Nonparametric tests were 
useful in that the median  best represented the center of distribution, so they were utilized 
for comparison sake. A time to event model based in descriptive statistics guided my 
research. 
Trochim & Donnelly (2007) discussed the time series model, but it offered several 
major problems. It was difficult to identify other influential factors, and the researcher 
must consider the sample objective, remain bias free and ethical while giving a 
representative sample of the population. The independent variable requires attention in 
that considerations must be made for all things that can affect the dependent variable. 
Then, these items are measured creating longer “real-time” issues. However, I was unable 
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to  provide equal time slots because each measurement was random in that enforcement 
and regulation are random.  
Predictive analysis could measure possible explanatory variables. However, the 
more effects sought the more chance of Type 0 error rates. As such, the effects on the 
dependent variable as covariates, weather and crab availability, could effect the 
participation of commercial blue crab fishers, which ultimately effects the outcome of 
enforcement. These covariates could make the study cumbersome and stray from the 
purpose of discovering unforeseen patterns in the historical data. Therefore, I chose 
descriptive analysis because it cannot be confirmed that a regulation met its intended 
purpose, nor can all the covariates be considered in the research.  
I considered qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods  for this study. The 
study became quantitative when I decided to analyze the use of existing enforcement data 
and review license and harvest data. Exhausted finances and time for my education 
reduced my ability to conduct a thorough mixed methods research. I chose a 
comprehensive quantitative study because it provided a large data set from which to view 
enforcement and regulation from a historical perspective with descriptive analysis. Most 
important, I achieved this research  with my limitations. 
Role of the Researcher 
I observed outcomes in my role as researcher. My role began with deciding where 
data would be collected, what would be collected, how much would be collected, how it 
would be recorded, and how it would be grouped or categorized best to answer the 
research questions. Then, I made valid assumptions based upon the results of the 
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research. I identified and collected data, as well as entered it into a statistical software 
program, surveyed and summarized the results, and presented the results in a clear, 
concise presentation using empirical evidence as support for future research. To protect 
the validity and reliability of the results, I employed structured and systematic data 
collection and employed concise measurement tools. I collected data methodically then 
grouped and categorized the data in relationship to the variables under study. I collected 
enough data to ensure the detection of even the least meaningful relationship between 
variables. I resisted all bias and used scientific studies to produce empirical results. I took 
precaution against numerical typos and or transposition, as this would void all study 
results.  
I chose to use secondary data because it reduced effects of earlier personal and 
professional relationships with participants. However, I was intimately involved in the 
commercial crabbing industry since 1992. I am well known as a grassroots lobbyist in 
support of Maryland’s commercial watermen and community interests. Once heading a 
120+ membership of commercial watermen, I worked to introduce bias free data in 
support of an apprenticeship program for licensing as opposed to a moratorium. I 
followed the data to its end. I used statistic software to present the patterns that 
developed. I used hard numbers for citations to find possible patterns. I included 96 time 
slots using data from MD-DNR. My design managed my bias. I continue to own a home 
in a commercial crabbing community. Unguarded information was shared with me in 
community settings. This information had the power to influence or bias me for or 
against any matter discussed at local gathering places within the crabbing community. 
187 
 
 
Previous participation in the commercial crabbing industry as a boat mate subjected me 
to both ethical and unethical behavior of several licensed blue crab fishers. Grassroots 
lobbying for license changes in the commercial blue crab fishing industry encompassed 
12 years of my time. These intimate experiences demanded a strict protocol for data 
collection, assembly, and presentation. 
 To address possible ethical concerns, I remained bias free, and I provided a 
representative sample of the population. I reviewed regulation and enforcement data to 
the turn of the 18th century; however, enforcement data was limited and organized by the 
number of occurrences per regulation as opposed to occurrences per person. Personal 
knowledge of the offenders or their criminal history was unnecessary to answer the main 
research question. 
Target Population  
The main research question I had to answer was whether criminal activity related 
to Chesapeake Bay blue crab increased with the number or type of additional blue crab 
management strategies - regulation. To answer this question, I reviewed criminal activity  
during years that regulatory activity occurred and did not occur. The population under 
study were folks who held the legal right to harvest Chesapeake Bay blue crab for 
commercial purposes in the State of Maryland. This included those who held a valid 
commercial crabbing license. The number of license holders changed throughout the data 
collection period because of outside influences such as the gasoline engine, war, and 
opportunity. In my study, the commercial blue crab fisher must have currently held an 
Unlimited Tidal Fish License (TFL), a Crab Harvester License (CB-3, 6, or 9), or a 
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Limited Crab Catcher License (LCC) or the equivalent of any combination of these 
licenses. Regardless of the license type, according to current COMAR, a commercial blue 
crab fisher may not have more than 900 crab pots utilized on or by a boat at any given 
time regardless of the number of licensed blue crab fishers aboard the vessel. I did not 
consider any other characteristics  for this population for the intent of this study. 
 A second population and most significant to this study was the independent 
variable, which included a selection of blue crab regulations. Regulations were nominal 
variables with neither one nor the other being more important than the last. For the 
purpose of this study, blue crab regulations were not limited to those that were signed into 
law. It included all past and current regulations, acts, laws, public notices, management 
practices, and proposals submitted to the General Assembly dating between the years 
2009-2017. This included direct and indirect impacts on the use of crab pot in the 
Chesapeake Bay in Maryland. The selection process I used included regulations that had 
a direct enforcement relationship to harvest blue crab commercially as defined by the 
MD-DNR. 
A third population under study was enforcement data for the commercial blue 
crab industry. Specifically, I limited this data  to Maryland and the Chesapeake Bay. I did 
not include any enforcement for any other types of fishes. Further, I included 
geographical waterways that at a minimum begin in Maryland or that ultimately empty 
into Maryland’s Chesapeake Bay, otherwise known as tributaries. I included enforcement 
for all regulations effecting the commercial harvest of blue crab. This data included 
citations and warnings reported or recorded by MD-NRP. I recorded this variable as count 
189 
 
 
data and by type of criminal activity when available. 
Finally, the Chesapeake Bay blue crab was the population of interest for me. 
Providing opportunities for blue crab to proliferate is meaningful to all vested parties. For 
the purpose of correlation, I did not review crab harvest as a variable. I  limited the study 
to commercial blue crab violations perpetrated by commercial fishing persons as reported 
by MD-DNR.  
Summary 
Maryland licensed commercial blue crab fishers inclusive of each type of crab 
license was 5,500 approximate licenses issued as of 2017. In earlier years, size of the 
crabbing fleet would impact the number, harvest available, regulation, and outside 
influences such as war. Since 1939, Maryland has put forward and carried out an 
exorbitant amount of commercial crabbing regulations in one form or another. This could 
be as many as 500 or more individual passages or rejections of potential commercial 
crabbing regulations. Enforcement has not been measured in the State of Maryland. There 
were no hard numbers by which to make an estimate of citations and warnings issued. I 
collected this count data from the MD-NRP.  
Sampling and Procedures 
I used purposive, non-probability sampling  to complete this study. This sampling 
strategy allowed me to place the research in one or more specific predefined groups 
without using random collection methods (Trochim & Donnelly, 2007). I  included 96 
time points and held valuable nonnormal, continuous and discrete records that were used 
to investigate regulatory action and its cohort - enforcement. Regulations that directly 
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control for blue crab harvest predetermined my sampling strategy. I ensured sampling 
validity by the range of topics selected for this subject (see Trochim & Donnelly, 2007). 
Each variable represented a set of specific regulatory action based upon a COMAR title 
and number. Twenty samples are a minimum for using parametric tests (see Allison, 
2009). This research provided more than 20 points over 8 years. I noted each of the 6 
variables as R1 – R6 respectively, and I used specific criteria to limit the representative 
sample.  
In the early years, I found regulatory and enforcement activity were reported via 
newsprint. Further, I found that the legislature maintained copies of enacted regulations 
for blue crab, while enforcement records lacked systematic storage by agencies. In later 
centuries, television, public hearings, radio, and now internet had provided a means to 
collect regulatory data concerning Maryland’s Chesapeake Bay blue crab and 
enforcement. The data set for regulatory action was cumbersome to review. Specifically, 
for this research, blue crab harvest in Maryland’s Chesapeake Bay drove the collection of 
data. Therefore, I considered only enforcement data related directly to blue crab harvest 
for this research. The above-mentioned resources: legislature, agency, news media, public 
hearings, and internet provided me access to the data set. I collected this information by 
hand in hard copy, via U.S. mail, by telephone via experts, by personal correspondence, 
and by downloading internet resources. I reviewed these items for limiters, accepted, or 
rejected as pertinent, and recorded on a spreadsheet for coding categorically. Recorded 
information included the incident, summary, source, author if appropriate, and other 
applicable information. 
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The sampling frame included Maryland statutes specifically named by Maryland’s 
Congress. Congress named and categorized COMAR - Natural Resources. Maryland 
titled each independent variable as Title 4. Fish and Fisheries. Subtitles and sections 
define the independent variables into subject matter. Each of these statutes had the 
potential to be identified on a citation or warning concerning blue crab harvest. Only 
statutes that effected commercial blue crab pot harvest were selected for this research 
from among all Maryland’s natural resource statutes. The following is a list of selected 
Maryland Statutes. 
• §4-701 Natural Resources, Title 4 Fish and Fisheries, Subtitle 7 Licensing,  
Regulation, and Supervision of Fishing and Fisheries in Tidal Waters, Section 
701 Tidal Fish License. 
• §4-703 Natural Resources, Title 4 Fish and Fisheries, Subtitle 7 Licensing, 
Regulation, and Supervision of Fishing and Fisheries in Tidal Waters, Section 
703 Issuance of new tidal fish licenses after September 1, 1988. 
• §4-803 Natural Resources, Title 4 Fish and Fisheries, Subtitle 8 Crabs,  
Section 803 Rules and Regulations Generally; Public Hearings Before Rules 
and Regulations Become Effective. 
• §4-804 Natural Resources, Title 4 Fish and Fisheries, Subtitle 8 Crabs,  
Section 804 License for Catching Crabs for Commercial or Noncommercial 
Purposes. 
• §4-809 Natural Resources, Title 4 Fish and Fisheries, Subtitle 8 Crab,  
Section 809 Limitations and Prohibitions on Catching and Possessing Certain 
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Kinds and Sizes of Crabs; Regulations: … 
• §4-810 Natural Resources, Title 4 Fish and Fisheries, Subtitle 8 Crabs,  
Section 810 Rules and Regulations Pertaining to Female Crabs. 
• §4-812 Natural Resources, Title 4 Fish and Fisheries, Subtitle 8 Crabs,  
Section 812 Use of Crab Pots in Chesapeake Bay Waters in Dorchester and 
Somerset Counties. 
• §4-813 Natural Resources, Title 4 Fish and Fisheries, Subtitle 8 Crabs,  
Section 813 Harvesting Crab with Crab Pots in Somerset County. 
• §4-814 Natural Resources, Title 4 Fish and Fisheries, Subtitle 8 Crabs,  
Section 814 Limitation on Number of Crab Pots. 
• §4-1201 Natural Resources, Title 4 Fish and Fisheries, Subtitle 12 Penalties 
and Fines,  Searches, Seizures and Forfeitures, Section 1201 Penalties 
• §4-1205 Natural Resources, Title 4 Fish and Fisheries, Subtitle 12 Penalties 
and Fines, Searches, Seizures and Forfeitures, Section 1205 Seizure and 
Disposition of Fish Unlawfully Caught, Sold, Offered for Sale, Transported, 
or Possessed. 
• §4-1206 Natural Resources, Title 4 Fish and Fisheries, Subtitle 12 Penalties 
and Fines, Searches, Seizures and Forfeitures, Section 1206 Seizure, 
Forfeiture, and Disposition of Devices, Equipment, or Property. 
The statutes were reduced to six key categories from existing Maryland Statues to 
limit the independent variables into a workable data set. The independent variables, 
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indicated by R1, 2, 3 … in the research exist as Maryland laws and statutes and are housed 
in the Maryland Registry. Each set corresponds directly to a title and sub-title. 
• Regulation 1 (R1) Tidal Fish License, License for Catching Crabs for 
Commercial, Penalties, Natural Resources – Authorization to Catch Crabs – 
Revocation; 
• Regulation 2 (R2) Removing Fish, Nets, or Gear of Another Prohibited;  
• Regulation 3 (R3) Rules and Regulations Generally, Use of Crab Pots in 
Chesapeake Bay, Limitation on Number of Crab Pots, Crabbing – Crab Pots – 
Requirements; 
• Regulation 4 (R4) Rules and Regulations Generally, Closed Season for Hard 
Crabs; 
• Regulation 5 (R5) Limitations and Prohibitions on Catching and Possessing 
Certain Kinds and Sizes of Crabs Purposes; and 
• Regulation 6 (R6) Rules and Regulations Pertaining to Female Crabs 
I limited enforcement data collection to the selected Maryland Statutes 
categorized into the above 6 categories. Enforcement data included all citations and 
warnings issued by the MD-NRP. G*Power 3.1.9.2 (2017) downloaded free from the 
internet provided a calculator to perform a power analysis. I computed a priori power 
analysis for the required sample size and actual power, given α, power, and an estimated 
effect size. The one-tail t test using a point biserial model provided the required 
information. According to Cohen (1988), so long as three of the four parameters were 
fixed, the fourth was predetermined. This research had a preset sample size (n) because 
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data for the years 2010-2017 was available from the MD-NRP. Sample size (n) was 
present at 96, which reflects each month for eight years. Because I was measuring effects 
between regulatory action and number of recorded enforcement warnings and citations, 
effects that become apparent in either direction were important to the study. This 
provided a data pool of 96 enforcement samples. Therefore, n=96. Alpha level was set at 
.10, and effect size was estimated at the social sciences common use of .10, which 
indicates a significant difference. Identifying the degree to which the phenomenon was 
present was called the effect size (ES). The literature did not provide a common effect 
size. Therefore, the ES was set using the above assigned values to the mentioned 
parameters, Power (1 – β) was set at .90 and required a minimum total sample size of 34. 
Archival Data Use 
Procedures for recruitment included using public records access. Maryland’s 
Public Information Act (PIA) allowed me to access regulatory action and enforcement 
data without bias or an ethical threat to the anonymity of the accused. Further, I requested 
documentation that was unavailable from government bodies via the internet databases 
through Gmail using typewritten correspondence. MD-DNR provided this data in 
downloadable form. I collected other data from credible websites that included .org, .edu, 
and .gov in its URL. Last, I learned background knowledge by thoroughly reviewing 
historical Baltimore Sun newspapers that consistently reported on the politics of the 
legendary blue crab since the turn of the 18th century. 
 Procedures for participation were not necessary as this research employed the use 
of archival data. Secondary resources were available through government and public 
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access websites. Procedures for data collection included the use of Microsoft Excel to 
log, track, and sort data. This included entering count data that represented enforcement 
data, active commercial crabbing licenses, blue crab harvests, commercial crabbing 
seasons, and years of activity. Further data entry included statutes listed by number and 
title. After logging incoming data, I reviewed it for accuracy and completeness. To deal 
with missing data, I determined to delete that data. Status quo has been to remove these 
samples from the research or to replace missing data with estimates (see Trochim & 
Donnelly, 2007). Both options were considered for the most valid conclusion. 
Public record materials made up much of the data that I collected for this 
research. I collected data from websites of legitimate organizations and government 
agencies. For example, NOAA, VIMS, MD-DNR, MD-NRP, and professional journals 
provided a great deal of information. To produce a valid study and create a solid database 
of information, all possible data collection points were contacted by one or more of the 
following: Gmail, U.S. mail, telephone, and in person where physical distance was not an 
issue. I gained permission to access the data easily. Archival, primary, and secondary data 
stem from public records for this research. Request letters were necessary to fill in any 
missing data. A departmental hierarchy exists in the MD-DNR and the MD-NRP. This 
hierarchy saved me time and provided me the contacts relevant for specific variable data. 
In the early years of commercial crabbing, few regulations existed. There is a 
limited number of Maritime police charged with enforcement of regulations. Most 
detrimental to this study was that record keeping of enforcement and harvests was not 
required by natural resource agencies. Most information was delivered via the Sun, a 
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historical Maryland newspaper. However, as time progressed, and the government 
became active in natural resource development, data began to be collected by scientists 
who visited the Chesapeake Bay crabbing regions. Sadly, this data was not organized by 
method of collection, tested, or cross-referenced with any existing records to measure for 
accuracy. 
 With these limitations, early newspaper, judicial, and legislative reports along 
with scientific research were the most reputable and accurate points of background 
knowledge for the start of the 1900s. As the decades progressed, the research depended 
upon agency reporting requirements and its scientific estimates. As the century turned, 
the research provided multiple points of collection from interactive agencies and marine 
science institutions. In combination, these data collection points are both reputable and 
represent the best sources of the required data. These changes in data archiving further 
limited the study to a financially acceptable investment of eight years dating 2017 
backwards to and including 2010. 
Instrumentation and Operationalization 
I acted as the main instrument for data collection. Instrumentation involved 
grouping archival and print media data for transformation of regulatory discussion and 
crime reported into a statistics software program. I coded regulation into groups and types 
of crab pot regulations and types of crime into useable sets and based upon specific 
criteria. For instance, I grouped Regulation 1 (R1) as all regulations pertaining to license 
changes effecting commercial blue crab fishers.  
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I collected each regulation defined for this research that effects commercial blue 
crab and grouped it accordingly. Blue crab pot use included rules for hard crab pots and 
peeler crab pots. The Maryland Register and COMAR are published by Maryland’s 
Division of State Documents (DSD) that collects and publishes regulatory activity (DSD, 
2017). I collected additional information from professionals working at both agencies – 
MD-DNR and MD-NRP. I contacted these scholars via landline to assist in reducing 
missing data to the minimal amount. 
I contacted and collected from MD-NRP data on crime and occurrences. I 
reviewed codes to identify by Title number and subsection the regulation’s 
noncompliance history (2017). The Maryland State Archives collects and disseminates 
government reports and publications (2017). I accessed this database via the internet. I 
calculated crime as a rate of occurrence and counted it. MD-NRP shared much of this 
data using public crime blotters. The data describes the offender as recreational or 
commercial and the crime he or she has committed. Crime collection included warnings 
and citations related to blue crab harvested by a licensed, commercial blue crab fisher, 
regardless of license type and the legal outcome. 
Historical and or missing data for regulatory and enforcement discussion are 
housed within other legitimate agencies and reliable print sources. I contacted these 
agencies and sources as this data adds to the time model. It demonstrated slots of time, 
that is, in-season and out-of-season spans of time for correlation. I entered this data into 
MS Excel, a common statistics software program to analyze. 
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In contrast to the mixed methods research conducted by Hentati-Sundberg et al. 
(2014) on mobile Swedish Baltic Sea fin fish fishermen heavily dependent on the 
population sharing the truth of their individual noncompliance over time, this approach 
amassed a statistical analysis of regulatory activity and enforcement data for commercial 
blue crab fishers working in Maryland’s Chesapeake Bay from 2010 - 2017 using 
secondary data. I studied the population crab pot as a fixed gear. For the background and 
literature review, the 1939 - 2009 period was selected because it represented the intense 
growth of the gear known as crab pot in the fishing industry in Maryland, which 
culminated in the use of MSY and ITQs for blue crab in 2018. I selected this research 
period because MD-DNR’s historical data collection practices limited the data pool. 
I consider regulatory activity an incentive for commercial blue crab fishers’ 
noncompliance such as under or overreporting harvests. It was likely that effort, defined 
as crab pots allowed for a given season, was an accurate representation of actual catch. 
As noted by Hentati-Sundberg et al. (2014), it is essential to distinguish between actual 
catch and landings reported. Actual catch includes culled blue crab or possible black-
market harvest, while landings represents the harvest of blue crab reported to Maryland. 
This research used General Linear Models (GLMs) as published by Hentati-Sundberg et 
al. (2014) to compare regulatory activity to enforcement data. While Hentati-Sundberg et 
al. (2014) utilized trips to sea for time reference, this research reviewed eight years 
making n months = 96. Guenther et al. (2015) used Chi2 analysis to compare before and 
aftereffects of regulation using a spatial model.  
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I used a t test to demonstrate any significant differences in the proposed time 
model. Descriptive statistics employed by Ali and Abdullah (2010) and grounded in 
criminal behavior theory were beneficial to this research. Their main assumption “is that 
the individual was a rational decision-maker who considers the costs and benefits of 
participation in illegal activities” (p. 115). Their model extended Kuperan and Sutinen’s 
(1998) research in fisheries. They asserted that time spent on non-compliance by fishers 
was a result of income generated from the activity, and this contributes to their overall 
ability to invest in their operation. Specifically, they use a logit model to test binary 
variables. Correlation coefficient can quantify the direction and strength of any 
correlation that becomes apparent. However, I believed discovering median as equally 
important because I used it to determine percentages. Over time, cumulative regulation 
may increase the potential for law breaking, which may have skewed the means.  
I sent a letter to the MD-DNR requesting permission for the use of its instruments. 
I grounded this study in enforcement theory and used secondary data to analyze 
enforcement and regulatory activity side by side. I built upon existing fisheries research 
relative compliance behavior in the commercial industry by making multiple comparisons 
over decades in search of correlation. 
The operationalized variables were selected from research that spanned decades 
and continues to be a crucial factor in today’s commercial fishing industries all over the 
world. Time models and descriptive statistics have been the backbone of fisheries 
research. However, much of the research has been grounded in economic theories or the 
decision-making process of non-compliers. My study builds upon these ideas and models 
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but chooses to reflect upon the unexpected patterns that may emerge. The published tools 
have held reliable and valid results for this industry and its relative variables – marine 
resources. Although much of the previous work focused upon finfish, this research 
expands on that by testing a commercial crabbing community fishing blue crab in 
Maryland’s Chesapeake Bay and pattern development of noncompliance.  
The following authors employed the use of common instruments employed in 
fisheries research. They built upon previous research and sought to uncover phenomenon. 
All three studies provided primary and secondary data as each sought to understand why 
the phenomenon occurred. I sought to determine if a phenomenon in noncompliance 
occurred as an unexpected outcome of regulatory activity. The variable selection, design, 
and methods cross decades of fisheries research and can be considered both valid and 
reliable for this type of study. 
 The selected instruments were used to determine the differences in lobster fishing 
effort before and after the State of California established MPAs for the industry. It was a 
spatial model that analyzed the stationary gear – lobster trap –, and reviewed compliance 
behavior using spillover theory. Specifically, Guenther et al. (2015) wanted to identify 
how close to “the line” commercial lobstermen would chance to fish and how this 
effected fishing effort and direction over 5 seasons and the mapping of 10 seasons of 
logbook data. The authors derived their work from primary and secondary sources. The 
authors determined the participants had no reason to lie as the study was concerning 
where a person fishes as opposed to whether he or she breaks a fishing law.  
 The selected instruments were used to determine if management incentivizes non-
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compliance among fishers in Hentati-Sundberg et al. (2014). They asserted that harvests 
are misreported by as much as “30% to 75 times higher than officially reported” (p. 
1846). The authors filled two separate models with all combination of the independent 
variables and selected the model using AIC, as did Burnham et al. (2010). They fitted 
their model with overcapacity and technological creep for consideration on catch 
quantities. This approach proposed possibilities for “reconstructing historical catches 
based on commercial effort data” (p. 1847). They used the uncertainties from both 
models to calculate the confidence intervals for conservative catch numbers.  
The selected instruments were used to determine what factors affect compliance 
behavior among Malaysian fishers. The authors used the basic deterrent theory model, 
which integrated economic theory and theories related to human psychology. They used 
SPSS to analyze the primary data. The authors used logit regression which uses the 
maximum likelihood method. Descriptive analysis was followed by hypothesis testing 
using the logit model. Their model expressed what types of licenses are committing more 
crimes through probability testing. They used 5% as the significance level for this 
occurrence. Five percent was the standard used in this research. They considered the 
results as an informational benefit to public policy making bodies. 
Operationalization of Variables 
Commercial blue crab fishers (licensees). A discrete independent variable that 
represented the number of Maryland licensed commercial blue crab fishers whose 
workday begins and ends in the Maryland region of the Chesapeake Bay and or its 
tributaries. Each season a number of licensees actively harvests blue crab. Commercial 
202 
 
 
blue crab licenses are categorical variables that can be grouped by limitations set for each 
license type. For this research and correlation, the digit will express the total number of 
licenses issued for each type of commercial crab license. This variable was ratio data. It 
would  supply base data for each month and year totals. The number stood for the number 
of allowable licenses. I meant to use this number  for comparison of harvest reports to 
license violations to investigate discrepancies; however, the data did not provide 
sufficient detail. Comparing enforcement totals to license totals provided percent of crime 
occurring over time. 
Compliance behavior (crime incidents). A discrete dependent variable that 
represented enforcement by the number of warnings and citations issued to Maryland 
licensed commercial blue crab fishers during any season and year for a specific Title and 
Subtitled law. I limited the study to 6 specific categories of regulation pertaining to 
commercial blue crab activity. The total number of enforcement incidences in Maryland’s 
Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries pertaining to commercial blue crab fishers licensed for 
crabbing expressed this digit. For this research and correlation, I expressed in digits the 
total number of incidents and percent recorded for each categorized regulation. This 
variable was ratio data. It provided the number of incidents related to regulatory action. I 
counted incidences after each regulatory action. This number supplied a total of crime 
incidents by which to measure against regulatory action to seek patterns. Crime compared 
to licensees were expressed in percent for each year. This measure of compliance 
behavior provided base line data to view criminal activity. 
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Regulatory action (in-session, emergency, out-of-session). A discrete independent 
variable that represented public or agency discussion and or introduction of a legal action 
altering commercial crabbing activity in Maryland’s Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries. 
When action occurred, I assigned a score of 1 and a value of 0 if action did not occur. 
This variable was nominal data. This variable expressed whether regulatory activity took 
place or not. It provided the total number of actions taken to alter commercial crabbing 
via agency or Congress. I listed actions by type to provide detail to regulatory activity 
compared to specific changes in management. I counted actions, and this number 
supplied a total of regulatory actions by which to measure against enforcement data to 
determine if patterns emerge. 
Season (in-season and out-of-season). A continuous independent variable that 
stands for time by month and year that the commercial blue crab season begins and ends 
in Maryland’s Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries. I listed these digits by month and year 
for correlation tables. This variable was interval data. Although this data was abstract, it 
was measured by the life cycle of the blue crab living in the Chesapeake Bay. The blue 
crab harvest cycle runs from early spring to early winter. Each year the “legal” season 
may vary. For this research, a season will be divided into individual months and years. 
This variable represented the in or out of season time compared to regulatory action. The 
variables were expressed month to month and year to year. 
Harvest (blue crab). A discrete independent variable that represented the number 
of blue crab harvested by Maryland commercial blue crab fishers. This variable was 
intended for comparison. This number was meant to be measured against the number of 
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crab pots allowed or seized to uncover reporting discrepancies. However, the available 
data did not provide enough detail to measure for this.  
 I measured effects between regulatory action and number of recorded 
enforcement warnings and citations. Effects that became clear in either direction are 
important to this study. Thus, a=.10 was the scientific rate of rejecting the True Null 
hypothesis. I sought to measure enforcement over 8 years beginning in the year 2010. 
This provided a data pool of 96 samples. Therefore, n=96. The ES was set at .10 effect. 
Power equals .90. Once I collected the secondary data, I measured for means and 
standard deviation. However, in correlation design, hypothesis testing was unnecessary to 
identify patterns. 
Data Analysis Plan 
Microsoft Excel 2016 analysis software allowed me to arrange and sort data in 
ascending or descending order. It allowed me to filter data in and out of the worksheet for 
a variety of tests. Once I entered the data, filters and formulas were embedded to group 
items and perform mathematical algorithms. Excel provided a variety of charts for visual 
representation. It provided both validation and consolidation tools. Correlational, 
descriptive statistics and the secondary, quantitative data were used to compare regulatory 
activity to enforcement of regulation for the natural resource, blue crab, in Maryland’s 
Chesapeake Bay. Microsoft Excel 2016 was the latest version available for statistical 
analysis. I have had the opportunity to learn and perform Excel commands in previous 
professional positions. This experience prepared me for the requirement to enter data, 
perform calculations, and analyze the data collected. Correlational analyses provided a 
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venue to examine relationships between regulation and enforcement. Parametric and 
nonparametric testing provided distribution norms by examining data year to year. 
This quantitative, correlational study required a mass amount of data entry. As 
such, duplicate entries could be a concern. MS Excel can identify and eliminate or deal 
with these cells, as necessary. Missing data was one other concern. I eliminated missing 
data cells from the study. Data collection procedures limited entry in the software using 
limiters in the selection process. I coded this data into specific categories. To illustrate, 6 
categories exist for regulatory activity. I categorized enforcement activity using Title and 
subtitles of regulations. The software allowed me to perform data screening. Outliers and 
other significant problems were deleted or retested, as necessary. 
I based the current study upon one predominant question: What is the relationship 
between annual commercial blue crab related regulations enacted as measured by 
individual count and type and noncompliance by commercial blue crab fishers as 
measured by the number of tickets written annually? Regulations and enforcement data 
will provide the variables for the intended correlation. The data set encompassed years 
that included regulatory actions as well as reported enforcement data for years with zero 
regulatory activity. This research question would have led to the following hypotheses 
that are stated in null and alternative form; however, correlation design did not require 
testing for hypotheses. 
H01: The number of commercial regulatory actions enacted does increase the 
number of blue crab citations and warnings reported annually. 
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H11: The number of commercial regulation action enacted does not increase the 
number of blue crab citations and warnings reported annually. 
H02: The type of commercial regulatory actions enacted does increase the number 
of blue crab citations and warnings reported annually. 
H12: The type of commercial regulation action enacted does not increase the 
number of blue crab citations and warnings reported annually. 
Equally important questions were: How many times has fishing illegal gear occurred 
during the study years? Based on enforcement data related to illegal gear, what is the 
skew on harvest data because of commercial blue crab fishers exceeding the crab pot 
limit? Do years with no regulatory activity have less enforcement (crime) compared to 
years with regulatory activity? What percent is noncompliance behavior of total licenses 
reporting activity? 
 This data, expressed in numbers, provided a base for statistical testing. 
Descriptive statistics underlined the mean, median, and standard deviation. A large 
sample, spanning 8 years and employing 6 regulatory categories provided reliable 
statistical analysis. Using a correlational design demonstrated positive and negative 
correlations among the variables. Employing a priori analyses avoided Type I and Type II 
errors (Booth & Quinn, 2015; Gerrodette & Brandon, 2014). To reduce Type I error rates, 
I reduced the number of correlations reported.  
Aligning enforcement and regulation, and license data and compliance revealed 
unknown phenomenon concerning regulation. Independent variables (blue crab 
regulations) and dependent variables (enforcement data) examined during specific time 
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slots determined associations exist. The time studied represented the years 2010 – 2017. 
This demonstrated post-regulation and activity with no regulation. Tests employed 
nominal ordinal scales to determine the strength of those correlations. 
The Pearson correlation coefficient can range in value from −1 to +1. The larger 
the absolute value of the coefficient, the stronger the relationship between the variables. 
An absolute value of 1 indicates a perfect linear relationship. A correlation close to 0 
indicates no linear relationship between the variables. If variables increased and or 
decreased together, the correlation was positive with an upward slope of the line. A 
downward slope of the line indicated the correlation was negative because as one variable 
was on the rise, the other was on the decrease. However, causality cannot be proven with 
this study. Any extreme values can throw the correlation coefficient; therefore, 
identifying the cause of any extreme value and correcting data or measurement errors was 
essential. Pearson works best when values are removed that are associated with unique 
circumstances and or events. I repeated the analysis after each change in data. 
To examine nonlinear relationships simple regression allowed for table 
representation. To determine the significance of the correlation, I compared the p-value to 
the significance level. I set alpha at 0.10. An α of 0.10 indicates a risk level of 10% as to 
whether a correlation “actually” exists or not. The p-value describes the significance level 
from 0, while a 0 specifies no linear relationship. Thus, if the p-value was less than or 
equal to the significance level, then the correlation was different from 0. Likewise, if the 
p-value was greater than the significance level, then you cannot conclude that the 
correlation was different from 0. 
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Threats to Validity 
One threat to external validity included selection treatment interaction. I derived 
the sample for the study from archival data, and it was specific to the research. 
Nonrandom sampling reduced the ability to generalize the results to the greater world. 
Additionally, the specificity of variables controlled the study through the incorporation of 
specific regulations, and the differences in regulations from state-to-state or region-to-
region would never align. Further, enforcement strategies and gear specifications are 
different from state-to-state or region-to-region. However, the act of the study can be 
duplicated in similar fisheries that may produce similar or drastically different results, 
mainly because of specificity of variables. Data collection systems continue to evolve 
within fisheries development; regardless, human error produces typos and transposed 
numbers challenging the use of secondary and archival data. Sporadic and missing data 
created representative issues. Last, unethical reporting practices on the part of the 
commercial blue crab fisher cause discrepancies in data. 
Historical events do effect outcomes in studies that employ the use of secondary 
data. Because I focused on maritime activity, environmental factors played a role in all 
study outcomes and may have acted as interference. Weather influences all maritime 
participants whether directly or indirectly. One must factor in a measurement to ascertain 
to what degree this may occur. The accuracy or not, of this measure, will effect the 
outcome of the study. Reviewing enforcement against commercial crabbing license 
activity may discover hidden patterns. Weather not only effects the ability to participate 
in a workday for both the commercial blue crab fisher and the natural resource police 
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officer, but it effects the harvest potential and the overall crab catch for the season. Long 
droughts create hypoxia (low oxygen) in the Bay, which leads to mortality. War as a 
historical event can effect outcomes in studies. War temporarily or permanently shrinks 
the population under study. Three wars took place since the development of the blue crab 
commercial fishing industry: WWII, Korean, and Vietnam Wars.  
Using secondary data saved time and reduced threats to internal validity, such as 
ethical bias. As the data collection process matured within MD-DNR, changes in 
measures occurred, which acted as a threat to the coding and grouping of like data for this 
study. Utilizing external data sets lean towards the ability to generalize the results of a 
study. In this study, descriptive statistics using a correlation design do not seek to 
discover cause and effect making internal threats to validity less key. 
Essential to this study was the convergence of data from reliable sources, which 
provided strong support for construct validity. A poorly worded operational definition 
applied to data can cause an inaccurate measure. I quelled threats to data collection by 
providing a clear, concise detailed definition. When data was intended to support or 
negate an issue, it was essential that the data measured that which was intended to be 
measured. For example, data collected from assorted secondary sources may use different 
measurements to measure identical situations or concrete items. If this data was not 
converted accurately, it would produce erroneous results, which become meaningless. 
Ethical Procedures 
Since the use of the secondary, archival data used for this study was public record, 
an ethical agreement was not necessary to gain access to it or protect participants and or 
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data. I categorized data by license type, and the study did not require names, ages, or 
other characteristics to perform its tests. The data included regulatory actions and 
enforcement data. Regulatory actions included public notices, public hearings, 
congressional sessions, emergency regulations, and the like – all of which were heard by 
Committee and enacted into law. The enforcement data is public record. I sourced this 
data from MD-NRP in numerical form. Names or identification numbers were not be 
necessary. In most cases, warnings and citations identified the law that a fisher violated 
and whether it was a commercial citation. IRB approved the proposal on July 31, 2018 - 
07-31-18-0128716. 
Systematic error concerned me as an ethical concern when presenting the findings 
of this research. For instance, if an incident occurred whereby MD-NRP were directed to 
actively seek out noncompliers of anyone specific or group of regulations, this 
information was unavailable to me, and this would place question upon the accuracy of 
measures concerning enforcement and or compliance behavior phenomenon. It must be 
assumed that participants would avoid criminal behavior during a time of heavier than 
usual enforcement. Consequently, normal and heavier enforcement would need to be 
operationally defined, and by whose definition, the commercial blue crab fisher or the 
MD-NRP? However, I chose to include these enforcement incidences within the data as it 
demonstrates actual noncompliance of laws pertaining to commercial blue crab in the 
Chesapeake Bay, the basis of this research.  
 Some people may claim I am biased by my current occupation, chicken farmer on 
the Lower Eastern Shore of Maryland where the population under study resides. 
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Although the State Seal depicts both a farmer and a fisherman, it is common knowledge 
that they are singularly concerned rather than cohort active. I remedied this bias easily by 
the fact that I have been employed in both occupations for at least 10 years each, giving 
me ample time to experience both livelihoods during feasts and famines, with constant 
legislative review controlling my income potential. I chose to study a field that intimately 
impacts my love of the Bay, my state, and its citizens, Maryland. It is a multimillion-
dollar industry and touches most people who reside in Maryland. Secondary data 
provided a means for me to present findings based upon the professional, ethical, and 
critical review of field scientists and fisheries institutions at my disposal on a subject 
constantly regulated and, on a subject, neglected in Maryland’s blue crab research – 
enforcement and noncompliance behavior. 
Summary 
I conducted a quantitative, correlational, time series study that sought to discover 
if any patterns emerged between Maryland Chesapeake Bay blue crab enforcement data 
and regulatory action that directly impacts commercial blue crab harvest in the Bay and 
its tributaries. I reviewed literature dating each year since the inception of the crab pot in 
1939 for a variety of variables. However, MD-DNR provided limited valid data dating 
2010 – 2017. Enforcement data and regulatory action revealed correlations and 
unexpected outcomes of regulation. I housed the model in MS Excel for easy sorting and 
categorizing, and descriptive statistics provided evidence for correlation but not for 
causation. Synchronizing the diverse data into a primary workbook created a friendly 
working environment for converting numbers, as necessary. Microsoft Excel performed a 
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variety of statistical tests. Results of this study provided evidence in support for future 
compliance behavior studies to uncover unexpected phenomenon by the Maryland 
commercial blue crab fisher.  
 In Chapter 3, I provided an explanation and description of the research design and 
its methodology. I used a quantitative, historical time series design to identify correlations 
between blue crab enforcement data and regulatory action in the Maryland Chesapeake 
Bay and its tributaries. The review covered the years 1939 to 2017 with specific tests 
related to 2010 - 2017. Time intervals became necessary to cover the in-depth material. 
Historical and archival data from MD-DNR, MD-NRP, and legislative and judicial 
websites, as well as the leading media in the early decades of the 19th century provided 
data and background knowledge. Threats to validity and ethical bias were presented and 
discussed to support the results.  
 After I received IRB approval, #07-31-18-0128716, I began my research, and I 
collected the data, entered the data into MS Excel, and analyzed the data to record 
measurements that demonstrated correlations between the variables. I discussed the 
results of this research and the tests in Chapter 4. 
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Chapter 4: Results 
Introduction 
The purpose of this quantitative, correlational study was to determine whether 
there was a verifiable relationship between the number of commercial blue crab statutes 
and regulatory actions (laws) and the resultant violations occurring from such laws. 
Although the above objective constituted the main question that drove this research, I 
explored other subsidiary questions related to the commercial blue crab industry if the 
testable data available from MD-DNR provided a sufficient information base to make 
answering these questions possible. 
My primary objective for this research was to share the findings with industry 
stakeholders with the hope of effecting a positive social change and fostering improved 
relationships between policy makers and commercial crabbers in the research area. 
Results of this study may augment efforts in making regulatory actions meaningful and 
coordinated with evolving trends in the commercial blue crab industry. If any unique 
trend not captured in the main research question or subsidiary questions was unearthed in 
the course of examining the baseline data for this research, I made efforts to explain such 
trends and ascertain potential factors or conditions driving such a trend. 
  Apart from the primary objective, I sought to influence how commercial blue crab 
fisheries related regulatory activities are formulated and implemented with more 
emphasis on their practicability, enforcement potential, and potential reactions from 
commercial crabbers (violations). Although this study predominantly was informed by 
the need to ascertain the extent to which various laws governing commercial blue crab 
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fishing correlate with violations of such laws, I projected that the underlying data and 
supportive literature for the study might help answer or shed more light on the following 
subsidiary questions: 
• How many times has fishing illegal gear occurred during the research period? 
•  Based on enforcement data related to illegal gear, what is the skew on harvest 
data because of commercial blue crab fishers exceeding the crab pot limit? 
• Do years with no regulatory activity have less enforcement (crime) compared 
to years with regulatory activity? 
• What percentage is noncompliance behavior of total licenses reporting 
activity? 
Since hypothesis testing is not the goal when conducting correlational studies and 
verifying associations, I developed these subsidiary questions to highlight other important 
issues confronting the commercial blue crab industry and how answers to these questions 
might go a long way to bridge the information gap between state regulators and fishers in 
the commercial blue crab industry. 
Process 
My research method evolved from the main research question. In order to 
ascertain the correlation between the various laws or regulations and the violations of 
such laws, I set out to collect the available data from which I hoped to find empirical 
evidence to answer my main research question. My intial activity involved preparing 
letters to send to appropriate agencies to collect secondary data. I followed-up with a 
“thank you and just checking-in” note. I conducted correspondence and received replys 
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via email. I made telephone calls to MD-DNR, and upon completing the final spreadsheet 
of inclusive data, I sought assistance from a statitician at University of Maryland, Eastern 
Shore. He assisted me in framing my goals, preparing the data for testing, reviewing the 
results, anlayzing the results, and preparing a graph to present the findings. 
 Unexpected hurdles in data collection forced me to revisit how I coded my raw 
data. MD-DNR data collection and storage was inconsistent at best, and this required 
making adjustments in the coding. For instance, an estimated 6% of the remaining 
violations after the first wash came without subtitles or sections that assisted in 
identifying the exact type of violation that occurred. Besides adjustments in coding, I 
added a new variable because it showed itself multiple times in the raw data, making it a 
point of interest. When laws regulating female crabs were separated from those regulating 
male crabs, I had to make a second adjustment to avoid overlap of the results. I made a 
decision to revisit the variables a second time for coding in this specific effect. Further, 
violations specific to life stage became apparent such as violations concerning blue crabs 
in their soft stage and their peeler stage of life. 
Coding culminated into 6 variable sets viewed between 2009 and 2017 for 
correlation tests of  regulatory activity from the previous year with enforcement data for 
the following year. MD-DNR did not provide me secondary data that would provide the 
necessary information to answer each of my questions due to its inconsistent record 
keeping systems. In contrast to 8 points of measurement, the study period, I viewed some 
of the data at individual years and at individual (R) to determine the appropriate steps to 
answer critically the subsidiary questions. I relied on critical statistical assumptions  for 
216 
 
 
answering these additional questions. 
Preview 
Because the study called for the testing of a specific time and set of secondary 
data, I did not use a pilot study; however, adjustments had to be made as the research 
method unfolded. Additional time and money were required to complete the study. 
Specifically, time was dependent on the response from agencies and the unexpected time 
and money that was spent researching law and printing materials for reference. I spent 
additional money on statisticians because the first gentleman was fraudulent in his 
advertising (an expensive lesson), while the second statistician acted as mentor, tutor, and 
editor on my final calculations and tables.  
I made written requests to the agencies that house the data as the predominant 
data collection method. Specifically, MD-DNR’s administrative department provided me 
the necessary data for enforcement of regulations. Initially, the study period had to be 
adjusted because MD-DNR does not house enforcement data in digital format predating 
2009. This limited the study to the years 2010 – 2017. More importantly, although the 
data was housed digitally, it came in multiple formats that later had to be merged and 
screened for accuracy. While MD-DNR provided enforcement data directly, they referred 
me to the General Assembly online source for regulations that were introduced, rejected, 
accepted, rescinded, or amended for the correlation years. Like MD-DNR, the method by 
which the General Assembly house the digital data changed every few years. 
Documenting the information became burdensome, and to maintain organization of the 
data, I printed each law effected for the study years. 
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I followed the fundamental protocols in data collection, data management, coding, 
and key statistical basics in performing its main test. Key strategies that enhanced 
accuracy and consistency were also adhered to in data handling and testing, and I have 
presented the results in two formats. My goal was to find out if significant interaction 
effects existed among the various variables examined in the study and the extent to which 
it might influence the outcome. The first format had three groups reflecting three 
different year structures. The second format showed the entire scope of the period 
captured in the study and was designed to take a holistic overview of the entire data (see 
Table 8). Results from the two formats presented in Tables 5, 6, 7, and 8 clearly indicated 
a divergent correlation outcome. Empirical correlation coefficient evidence associated 
with some periods examined seemed to show that more statutes or laws were associated 
with more violations of the same; however, this could not be said for other years captured 
in this study. Consequently, it would not be factual to suggest that more laws breed more 
violations of such laws, as some may espouse. 
A visual presentation of the data for the main research question and the additional 
subsidiary questions were provided in several tables for ease of analysis and 
interpretation. A written explanation introduces each visual presentation. Table 1 shows 
the coding for the various statutes and laws collected for this study. I defined each 
variable type by R1-R6, described by statute, and defined by explanation. Table 2 
represents the number of laws effected and the resulting violations in the following year. 
Again, because of size, Table 3 consists of 2009-2013, while Table 4 consists of 2014-
2017 and is segmented to highlight the descriptive statistics. Tables 5-7 present the 
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correlation analysis in 3 groupings of years, and Table 8 is a final presentation of the 
correlation analysis. The relationship between the types of statutes and number of 
violations can be viewed in Figure 1.  
To answer the subsidiary questions, Table 9 presents the percent of violations of 
the individual coded variables over the study period. Table 10 is a culmination in 
percentiles of the average violations of the coded variables over the study period. Table 
11 is a reference to the types and number of licenses issued for each year during the study 
period, and Table 12 provides an overview of noncompliance originating from a failure to 
report 100% of one’s harvest, but this noncompliance factor is not reflected in the raw 
data. Table 13 is the culmination in percentiles of licenses failing to report commercial 
harvest 100% of the time. 
This study showed that, all things being equal, existing data does not fully support 
the notion that more laws or statutes in the blue crab fishing industry breed more 
violations of the same laws. A holistic overview of the data sets indicates a divergent 
correlation outcome. Although the study captured both positive and negative correlation, 
it cannot be said that one is more significant than the other; thus, the number of 
regulations introduced each year does not necessarily lead to more violations of the same 
or other statutes or regulations. 
Correlation coefficient estimates presented in the various tables indicate that in 
some periods over the research period, some of the statutes or laws enacted tended to 
correlate positively with violations of such laws a year after its enactment; some other 
periods over the same study period failed to exhibit similar positive correlation. These 
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divergent relational outcomes indicate that the growing number of statutes or laws in the 
blue crab fishing industry does not necessarily fully correlate with resulting or observed 
violations of such statutes or laws. In other words, the notion that an increasing number 
of violations of statutes or laws in the blue crab fishing industry are a result of the 
growing numbers of such statutes cannot be supported fully by existing data. However, 
the data uncovered a specific (R) that towered above the rest in most years of the study 
period. 
Data Collection 
Data collection began in August 2017 after IRB approval, and I finalized a 
spreadsheet on November 25, 2018. The first merge of data presented 10,179 violations 
spanning 2010-2017. The initial wash of data ended with 6,828. This elimination 
included violations concerning recreational crabbing in the Chesapeake Bay. The final 
violation count after a great deal of sorting and eliminating ended with 6,358 commercial 
blue crab violations. This step eliminated further recreational crabbing violations as well 
as other fisheries unrelated to blue crab specifically in Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries. 
This task took much longer than I anticipated because regulations were amended, which 
changed identifiers for specific crimes committed. 
I expected to go to a single location on the website and access each item 
identically. This was not the case, and the collection process of regulations was 
burdensome and expensive. I printed each item point individually by statutue, printed by 
year, printed by type, and so on. It appeared that with the changing of the guard, the style 
of digital bookkeeping changed as well. Once I collected these items, I keyed the 
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information into a spreadsheet for easy sorting and comparing. 
I organized, sorted, and washed the enforcement data 3 times for validity and  
accuracy, while I organized, sorted, and washed the straightforward articles of law and 
COMAR two times. By me doing this repeatedly, reliability increased in that duplicates 
and unwanted data that would skew the results were removed. 
Data collection unfolded as expected except for the lack of detail I assumed to be 
available as a consequence of missing information on the original citation/warning or 
from failing to include the detail of subtitle and section at the point of entry into the 
original database. Sorting required a multitude of headings not limited to date, statute 
number, title, subtitle, section, and the related COMAR to eliminate duplicate and 
missing entries from the raw data. My previous spreadsheet experience and grassroots 
lobbying prepared me well for this unexpected overwhelming task. 
Additionally, to eliminate jumping back and forth from multiple computer 
screens, websites, and hardcopy, I created a single data spreadsheet of the items I sought 
that included the articles and regulations of interest for this project, and I printed it for 
instant reference as I read and sorted each violation in order to code it correctly. Also, 
some of the items I eliminated included violations that I could not assign to any specific 
title or COMAR, so the variable was most likely keyed-in incorrectly at the source. 
Finally, I discovered that a key ingredient in the raw data was inconsistent; at the point of 
data entry into the MD-DNR system, either the clerk failed to enter the subtitle and 
section on many entries or the officer failed to report it on the original citation/warning, 
while other entries included these key elements. As such, I was limited to sorting data by 
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Title and Comar as opposed to specific sections (detail) in the law. 
I conducted this study in Somerset County, Maryland. In the study, each year of 
data encompassed the legal commercial blue crab season for this small-scale fishery. I 
conducted this study to determine if an unexpected relationship existed between blue crab 
enforcement data (2010-2017) and regulation (2009-2017) represented by secondary data 
representing the commercial crabbing industry in Maryland. The commercial crabbing 
community as defined by MD-DNR active license use on a year-by-year basis provided 
the foundation for the above-named content. This community reflected a culmination of 
commercial blue crab harvesters, whether they were Maryland residents or other, but they 
had to work in Maryland’s portion of the Chesapeake Bay or its tributaries. The 
populations I investigated included the commercial blue crab fisher (commercial 
crabber), commercial blue crab citations, and enacted, rejected, and repealed commercial 
crabbing regulations, and the Maryland blue crab. To gain a concise representation of the 
research, I dissected, grouped, and specified the variables into a manageable size. I 
compiled enforcement and legislative activity for this study, which was public record, and 
I viewed the commercial crabbing community as a single unit. 
I did not conduct this study on a living population, but I used secondary numerical 
hard data to review type and number of violations over a specific period; thus, a 
representative sample did not apply to this study. Univariates analysis is often employed 
as pre-estimation tests conducted to examine the nature of the data in one’s research. In 
this instance, because my goal was to verify potential correlations between variables of 
interest, such univariates analysis was not required. 
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Results 
The results emanating from this empirical investigation are presented below in 
various tables and one figure. In Tables 1 through 8 and Figure 1, I provided information 
on the core data I employed in the various tests. Additionally, I reported statistical results 
from which various analysis and research conclusions were derived in Tables 9-13. 
 I explained in Table 1 how the various statutes were coded for the correlation 
analysis. I represented the summation of the individual details for each variable to be 
tested in Table 1. My coded items, R1–R6, represented a variety of laws that could 
potentially be violated. I described by definition the general category for each variable. I 
described the statute and the associated rule title number and COMAR for the individual 
categories. I used this number to sort the data. Finally, I provided an explanation 
describing all the possible violations that could potentially occur within each variable set. 
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Table 1 
Coding for Various Statutes & Laws 
CODE R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 
 
 
DEFINITION 
Single or 
Grouped 
Licenses; 
Times - Crab 
Pot Specific 
Theft of 
Catch 
Crab Pots - 
Specific 
Blue Crab 
Gear - Not 
Specific; 
Times; 
Locations; 
Male 
Crabs; 
Policy 
Peelers; Soft 
Crabs; other 
Blue Crabs 
Mature 
Female 
Blue Crabs 
 
 
STATUTE 
§4-701, 
§4-804, 
§4-1201, 
§4-1210 
(SB635) 
§4-505 §4-803, 
§4-812, 
§4-813 
(HB1561), 
§4-814, 
§4-817 
(SB994) 
§4-803, 
§4-808 
§4-809 §4-810    
 
 
EXPLANATION 
Tidal Fish 
License, 
License for 
Catching 
Crabs for 
Commercial, 
Penalties, 
Natural 
Resources - 
Authorization 
to Catch 
Striped Bass 
and Crabs - 
Revocation 
Removing 
Fish, 
Nets, or 
Gear of 
Another 
Prohibited 
Rules and 
Regulations 
Generally, Use 
of Crab Pots in 
CB, Limitation 
on Number of 
Crab Pots, 
Crabbing - 
Crab Pots - 
Requirements 
Rules and 
Regulations 
Generally, 
Closed 
Season for 
Hard Crabs 
Limitations 
and 
Prohibitions 
on Catching 
and 
Possessing 
Certain 
Kinds and 
Sizes of 
Crabs - 
Purposes 
Rules and 
Regulations 
Pertaining 
to Female 
Crabs 
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In Table 2, I presented the raw data from which various research tests were 
performed. I presented the variables in two charts, splitting the years for easier review. 
R1–R6 represented the NL and VL for each year tested in this study. 
Table 2  
Number of Laws Passed and the Resultant Violation in the Following Year 
 
  
   NL 
(09) 
VL 
(10) 
NL 
(10) 
VL 
(11) 
NL 
(11) 
VL 
(12) 
NL 
(12) 
VL 
(13) 
NL 
(13) 
R1  5 62 9 15 21 13 19 14 7 
R2  1 14 0 12 0 3 0 0 0 
R3  4 86 1 34 1 47 1 31 0 
R4  8 761 0 715 3 704 2 436 0 
R5  1 117 1 76 0 120 0 21 1 
R6  2 109 3 5 4 4 4 5 2 
 
 
         
 
 VL 
(14) 
NL 
(14) 
VL 
(15) 
NL 
(15) 
VL 
(16) 
NL 
(16) 
VL 
(17) 
NL 
(17) 
VL 
R1  13 8 10 6 10 18 21 4 
 
R2  5 1 1 0 6 0 0 1 
 
R3  36 2 73 1 48 1 35 0 
 
R4  532 3 691 3 813 8 409 8 
 
R5  51 1 49 0 53 0 50 0 
 
R6  2 2 1 2 5 2 23 4 
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In Tables 3 and 4, I presented descriptive statistics outlining key features of the 
base data for this research. I examined fundamental characteristics using descriptive 
statistics for the sample data employed in this research, and I presented it in Tables 3 and 
4. I presented key sample data information such as the mean, the standard deviation, 
median, mode, standard deviation, sample variance, kurtosis, skewness, and range.  
I provided the minimum and maximum number by which to make comparisons of 
laws and violations that occurred each year. I presented the sum total for each year. I used 
the mean to calculate the percentage of violations that occurred over the life of the study. 
I had to divide the table into 2 sets because of the sheer quantity of data required; in 
particular,  I reviewed the years 2009-2013 in Table 3, and I reviewed the years 2014-
2017 in Table 4. I captured descriptive statistics for this research in the following tables. 
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics (2009-2013) 
 
  
 
 
NL 
(09) 
VL 
(10) 
NL 
(10) 
VL 
(11) 
NL 
(11) 
VL 
(12) 
NL 
(12) 
VL 
(13) 
NL 
(13) 
Mean 3.5 191.5 2.333 142.833 4.833 148.5 4.333 84.5 1.667 
SE 1.118 114.905 1.406 114.912 3.301 112.562 2.996 70.4456 1.116 
Median 3 97.5 1 24.5 2 30 1.5 17.5 0.5 
Mode 1 #N/A 0 #N/A 0 #N/A 0 #N/A 0 
SD 2.739 281.458 3.445 281.476 8.085 275.719 7.339 172.556 2.733 
S2 7.5 79218.7 11.867 79228.567 65.367 76021.1 53.867 29775.5 7.467 
Kurtosis -0.048 5.648 3.896 5.822 5.157 5.444 5.120 5.913 4.202 
Skewness 0.876 2.352 1.955 2.405 2.235 2.31525 2.233 2.427 2.023 
Range 7 747 9 710 21 701 19 436 7 
Minimum 1 14 0 5 0 3 0 0 0 
Maximum 8 761 9 715 21 704 19 436 7 
Sum 21 1149 14 857 29 891 26 507 10 
Count 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
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Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics (2014-2017) 
 
  
 
VL 
(14) 
NL 
(14) 
VL 
(15) 
NL 
(15) 
VL 
(16) 
NL 
(16) 
VL 
(17) 
NL 
(17) 
Mean 106.5 2.833 137.5 2 155.833 4.833 89.667 2.833 
SE 85.453 1.078 111.337 0.9309 131.724 2.903 64.222 1.276 
Median 24.5 2 29.5 1.5 29 1.5 29 2.5 
Mode #N/A 1 1 0 #N/A 0 #N/A 4 
SD 209.316 2.639 272.7180 2.280 322.657 7.111 157.312 3.125 
S2 43813.1 6.967 74375.1 5.2 104107.767 50.567 24747.07 9.767 
Kurtosis 5.826 4.367 5.758 1.257 5.907 2.381 5.771 0.035 
Skewness 2.405 2.030 2.388 1.214 2.425 1.676 2.389 0.879 
Range 530 7 690 6 808 18 409 8 
Minimum 2 1 1 0 5 0 0 0 
Maximum 532 8 691 6 813 18 409 8 
Sum 639 17 825 12 935 29 538 17 
Count 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
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          Lastly, in Tables 5-8, I presented two formats of correlation analysis examining the 
relationship between the number of statutes or laws on the blue crab fishing industry and 
the number of violations of the laws following that year. In Tables 5 and 6, I presented the 
correlation for the years 2009-2012 and 2012-2015, which shows positive and negative 
trends occurred. Table 7 depicts positive trends and Table 8 is the culmination of all 
years. 
Table 5 
Correlation Analysis (2009-2012) 
 
  
 
NL(09) VL(10) NL(10) VL(11) NL(11) VL(12) 
NL(09) 1 
     
VL(10) 0.79644 1 
    
NL(10) 0.1484 -0.3286 1 
   
VL(11) 0.786012 0.993286 -0.3588 1 
  
NL(11) 0.356795 -0.12713 0.964653 -0.14309 1 
 
VL(12) 0.76746 0.990893 -0.37545 0.997483 -0.1667 1 
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Table 6 
Correlation Analysis (2012-2015) 
 
Table 7 
Correlation Analysis (2015-2017) 
 
  
 
NL(12) VL(13) NL(13) VL(14) NL(14) VL(15) 
NL(12) 1 
     
VL(13) -0.1592 1 
    
NL(13) 0.973986 -0.3037 1 
   
VL(14) -0.18408 0.998573 -0.3214 1 
  
NL(14) 0.973918 0.033593 0.905855 0.007783 1 
 
VL(15) -0.19245 0.998747 -0.33655 0.998573 0.00375 1 
 
NL(15) VL(16) NL(16) VL(17) NL(17) VL 
NL(15) 1 
     
VL(16) 0.18674 1 
    
NL(16) 0.974369 0.19376 1 
   
VL(17) 0.199595 0.998204 0.20215 1 
  
NL(17) 0.617416 0.777667 0.556477 0.782573 1 
 
VL 
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Table 8 
Correlation Analysis – All Variables 
  
NL 
(09) 
NL 
(10) 
NL 
(11) 
NL 
(12) 
NL 
(13) 
NL 
(14) 
NL 
(15) 
NL 
(16) 
NL 
(17) 
NL 
(09) 
1.00000 
        
VL 
(10) 
0.79644 
        
NL 
(10) 
0.14840 1.00000 
       
VL 
(11) 
0.78601 -0.35883 
       
NL 
(11) 
0.35679 0.96465 1.00000 
      
VL 
(12) 
0.76746 -0.37545 -0.16674 
      
NL 
(12) 
0.31841 0.97563 0.99879 1.00000 
     
VL 
(13) 
0.82042 -0.33310 -0.11433 -0.15918 
     
NL 
(13) 
0.13363 0.99154 0.96564 0.97399 1.00000 
    
VL 
(14) 
0.79845 -0.35531 -0.13892 -0.18408 -0.32135 
    
NL 
(14) 
0.51187 0.90919 0.98251 0.97392 0.90586 1.00000 
   
VL 
(15) 
0.81259 -0.36404 -0.14762 -0.19245 -0.33655 0.00375 
   
NL 
(15) 
0.64051 0.84019 0.93293 0.92015 0.83452 0.96364 1.00000 
  
VL 
(16) 
0.80180 -0.35550 -0.13817 -0.18307 -0.32333 0.00818 0.18674 
  
NL 
(16) 
0.62133 0.82734 0.94215 0.92482 0.84058 0.97856 0.97437 1.00000 
 
VL 
(17) 
0.80313 -0.33671 -0.12664 -0.17103 -0.30413 0.01766 0.19959 0.20215 
 
NL 
(17) 
0.78284 0.15481 0.33113 0.29937 0.17956 0.40814 0.61742 0.55648 1.0000
0 
VL 
(18) 
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Figure 1. Types of statutes and number of violations 
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 In Tables 9 and 10, I provided the average violations that occurred over the study 
period.  
Table 9 
Average Violations of (R) Over Study Period 
 
  
Code 
( R ) 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 TOTALS Mean 
VL Yr 
( R ) 
R1 62 15 13 14 13 10 10 21 158 19.75 
R2 14 12 3 0 5 1 6 0 41 5.125 
R3 86 34 47 31 36 73 48 35 390 48.75 
R4 761 715 704 436 532 691 813 409 5061 632.625 
R5 117 76 120 21 51 49 53 50 537 67.125 
R6 109 5 4 5 2 1 5 23 154 19.25 
Per YR 1149 857 891 507 639 825 935 538 6341 
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Table 10 
Average Percent of Violations (VL) Over Study Period 
 
  
Coded Statutes/Laws R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 
 
62 14 86 761 117 109 
15 12 34 715 76 5 
13 3 47 704 120 4 
14 0 31 436 21 5 
13 5 36 532 51 2 
10 1 73 691 49 1 
10 6 48 813 53 5 
21 0 35 409 50 23 
Total VL per Statute 158 41 390 5061 537 154 
Mean of VL per Statute 19.75 5.125 48.75 632.625 67.125 19.25 
       
Grand Mean 
(mean of the means) 
  
132.104 
   
Mean VL of 
Total VL per Statute 
  
1056.83 
   
   
0.125 
   
Mean Percentage Violations over the Study Period 
12.5% 
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In Tables 11 and 12, I presented the number and type of licenses issued and 
noncompliance specific to failure to report one’s harvest for the study years, and this 
culminates in percentages in Table 13.  
Table 11 
Number of Commercial Crab Licenses  
 
  
 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
LCC 3,599 2,362 2,356 2,437 2,434 2,607 2,357 2,580 2,583 
LCM 
 
481 452 448 445 398 392 451 458 
TFL 
NO Add On 1,490 1,496 1,528 1,501 1,529 1,567 1,509 1,24 1,528 
TFL- CB3 232 236 237 233 236 251 232 259 270 
TFL-CB6 195 194 195 192 195 191 187 192 193 
TFL-CB9 371 372 372 362 360 362 357 365 362 
Total Licenses 
 
5,141 5,140 5,173 5,199 5,376 5,034 5,371 5,394 
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Table 12 
Types and Number of Licenses Not Reporting 100% Harvest 
  
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
LCC 66 130 131 217 392 500 426 416 
LCM 20 42 39 49 96 133 111 109 
TFL NO Add On 41 125 123 208 311 428 388 362 
TFL- CB3 14 23 17 27 56 63 52 51 
TFL-CB6 10 22 11 17 29 39 33 30 
TFL-CB9 11 36 34 51 89 115 109 106 
Total Licenses 
 
162 378 355 569 973 1278 1119 1074 
*2009 Data are not available for this request. Record-keeping changed in 2010 that 
allows us to provide this information for 2010 forward. 
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 In Table 13, I present the number of commercial crabbers not reporting. 
Table 13 
Percent of Crabbers Not Reporting 100% of the Time 
 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
LCC 2.79 5.52 5.38 8.92 15.04 21.21 16.51 16.11 
LCM 4.16 9.29 8.71 11.01 24.12 33.93 24.61 23.80 
TFL NO add on 2.74 8.18 8.19 13.60 19.85 28.36 25.46 23.69 
TFL-CB3 5.93 9.70 7.30 11.44 22.31 27.16 20.08 18.89 
TFL-CB6 5.15 11.28 5.73 8.72 15.18 20.86 17.19 15.54 
TFL-CB9 2.96 9.68 9.39 14.17 24.59 32.21 29.86 29.28 
 
 Like most statistical tests, the main assumptions associated with 
correlation analysis adopted in this research were as follows:  
1. Test variables were assumed to have related pairs; this assumption 
is not much of a problem in the data being examined in this study 
because of the focus on absolute numbers of statutes and number of 
violations within the same industry.  
2. Correlation analysis further assumed the absence of outliers in the 
data; this assumption was meant to ensure that there were no 
extremes in the data sets being examined, and often this is captured 
by the standard deviation from the mean. In reported descriptive 
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statistics, the standard deviations and the various means suggest ed 
potential outliers, but this was not projected to significantly skew 
the goal only of verifying a relationship between key research 
variables.  
3. Normality of variables was another assumption in correlation 
analysis, which verifies if the variables were sampled from a fairly 
distributed population. Data collecting procedures adopted in this 
research were designed to ensure that the samples were from a 
normally distributed population.  
Main Research Question 
Question 1: What is the relationship between annual commercial blue crab related 
regulations enacted as measured by individual count and type and noncompliance by 
commercial fishers as measured by the number of tickets written annually?  
To answer the main research question, I presented the results in Tables 5, 6, 7, and 
8. My critical analysis of the results is presented in Table 5, and it suggested that there 
was a positive correlation between the various laws introduced in 2009 and the number of 
violations of the same in the period of the introduction of the law in 2010; this was 
indicated by a correlation coefficient of 0.79644. Correlation results presented in Table 5, 
however, further suggested a negative correlation between the number of laws introduced 
in 2010 and 2011 and the number of violations which occurred a year after those laws 
were introduced. This was indicated by a negative correlation coefficient of -0.3588 and -
0.1667 respectively. 
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I followed a similar format in Table 6 to what I presented in Table 5; in this 
instance, however, the number of laws introduced between the years 2012 and 2015 and 
the number of violations of such laws, which occurred afterwards, were examined. The 
results I presented in Table 6 suggested that there was a negative correlation between the 
number of laws introduced in 2012 and 2013 and the number of violations that occurred a 
year after those laws were introduced: 2013 and 2014, respectively. Correlation 
coefficient results presented in Table 6, in contrast, suggested that the number of statutes 
or laws introduced in 2014, correlated positively with the number of violations of the law 
in 2015. 
    Table 7 followed correlation tests similar to those presented in Tables 5 and 6. 
Coefficient estimates reported in Table 7, however, indicated that the number of statutes 
or laws introduced in 2015 and 2016 respectively correlated positively with the number 
of violations of the law which occurred in the year after its introduction that is in 2016 
and 2017. I tested for associations in this study, which does not require the element of  
hypothesis testing. 
Subsidiary Questions 
Question 2: How many times has fishing illegal gear occurred during the study years? 
 In Table 1, I showed specifically, R4 is defined as Blue Crab Gear – Not Specific; 
Times; Locations, Male Crabs; Policy and Rules and Regulations Generally, Closed 
Season for Hard Crabs. To answer this question, the raw data would have had to record 
this specific violation as an individual incident. In most cases, the raw data did not 
provide the subtitles or sections or any necessary detailed descriptions to identify the 
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specific rule that was violated. The actual statutes and regulations were written as 
groupings of management strategies. Each section and subsection of a title had vernacular 
specific to a crucial element that was not recorded necessarily by the MD-DNR during 
the writing of warnings and citations. Further, R1 and R3 defined Crab Pots, but neither 
was limited to number of crab pots allowed, and each described other requirements not 
pertinent to question 2. Therefore, the data available from MD-DNR did not provide 
enough detailed information to answer this question reliably. However, the data in Table 2 
dis reveal that R4 had a statistically significant number of VL as compared to the 
remaining (R) codes, which supported a claim that the type of regulation enforced may 
have some effect on compliance behavior.  
Question 3: Based on enforcement data related to illegal gear, what is the skew on 
harvest data because of commercial blue crab fishers exceeding the crab pot limit? 
 Data made available by MD-DNR for this study did not specifically provide 
enough information or capture the extent to which the use of illegal gear and commercial 
crabbers exceeding crab pot limits ultimately skews harvest data. In particular, the data 
could not be organized in a manner that provided a number for this skew because 
subtitles and chapters were missing from the keyed data. Without these significant details, 
data had to be grouped by general rules rather than dissected as individual violation 
types, preventing a detailed look at illegal gear use - specifically. However, what we do 
know is that significant literature exists, and Table 2 illuminated how such illegal acts 
could ultimately skew harvest data. According to reviewed literature from the MD-DNR 
on surveys conducted and other related materials on the health of the blue crab population 
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in the Chesapeake Bay, effects of the use of illegal gear and commercial crabbers 
exceeding the crab pot limit skew on harvest data depends on a series of factors. 
Available literature suggested that if illegal gear was used in harvesting mandated crab 
types (male, female, soft, or peeler), the condition would in the short run have a positive 
upward skew on harvest numbers, but such positive increase in harvest on the market 
may not reflect in the data for the season since such illegal acts most likely were not 
reported. Thus, the general output in the marketplace might increase, but official data 
might not capture such increases all things being equal because such catch emanated 
from illegal activity. 
 However, if the illegal catch targets prohibited crab type such as egg bearing 
female crabs or spawning-age female crabs, then although such activity might increase 
the market count during the harvest season, the activity would ultimately negatively 
influence the volume of blue crab harvest in the next crabbing season since the initial 
illegal crabbing activities would have the potential of impacting development of young 
crabs, possibly creating a downward skew. Accordingly, commercial crabbers exceeding 
the crab pot limit has the potential to increase blue crab population in the marketplace in 
the short run; however, such illegal activity can negatively impact commercial crabbing 
harvest in the future if unchecked. 
Question 4: Do years with no regulatory activity have less enforcement (violations) 
compared to years with regulatory activity? 
 I conducted a critical examination of the data made available for this research, and 
it suggested that years with no regulatory activities do not have less crime or violations 
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compared to years with regulatory activities. To appreciate this conclusion, it is important 
for the reader to understand the structure of the data supporting this research. I coded and 
categorized the primary data into years in which statutes or laws had activity and or new 
laws and the number of violations of such statutes that occurred a year after the 
introduction of such laws. 
This coding structure adopted was a reasonable assumption in data management 
and consistent with the lag time between when statutes had activity and when violations 
become enforced. In this study, the lag time was one year. Ordinarily, when such laws 
were enacted, there was a period before such laws take effect; this period was often used 
for sensitization of the intended population before it finally took effect. 
The data I presented in Table 2 provides the necessary information needed to 
answer question 2. Information presented in Table 2 suggested that all things being equal, 
years with no regulatory activities did not necessarily have less crime or violations 
compared to years with regulatory activities. For instance, in Table 2 under NL(10), 
NL(11), NL(12), NL(13), NL(15), and NL(16), which captured the number of laws or 
regulations introduced in 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015 respectively, it was 
evident that although in most instances no laws coded under R2, R3, R4, and R5 were 
enacted in those years, a significant number of violations of similar laws coded under the 
same (R) code from the previous year still occurred even though no similar law or 
statutes under the broad categorization as coded in this study was enacted. For instance in 
2013, that is NL(13), available data suggested that no statutes or laws coded in this study 
under R2, R3, and R5 were enacted; however, under VL(14) where violations of these 
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statutes or laws were captured, it was evident that a significant number of violations of 
these three coded laws or statutes occurred. Consequently, available data did not 
necessarily support the notion that years with no regulatory activities tend to have less 
crime or violations of existing laws or statutes.  
Question 5: What percent is noncompliance behavior of total licenses reporting activity? 
The data collection system utilized by MD-DNR, the data collection process, and 
the coding of variables technique I adopted in this research made it difficult to answer 
this question; in that, the data from which various correlation estimates were derived had 
no systematic category for the number of compliance instances versus the number of 
noncompliance instances for the proportion of noncompliance behavior to be estimated. 
For instance, zero percent noncompliance would suggest zero violations over the period 
of the research. 
Nonetheless, there were several violations of the various statutes over the period 
captured in the research. Therefore, by viewing noncompliance as a sum, several basic 
assumptions could be made. In this study, the percentage of noncompliance was based on 
the coding of the violations produced in Table 1 and repeated in the descriptive statistics 
found in Table 2. In this study I chose to estimate the percent based on the various laws 
coded in R1 – R6. 
I adopted the following calculation to determine percent 
• the sum of violations per (R) code divided by the number of (R) code equal 
mean VL then, 
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• the sum of mean VL per (R) code divided by the number of (R) code equal 
mean of the means then, 
• divide the grand mean by the mean VL of total VL per (R) code by the mean 
of VL per (R) code equal, 
• mean percent VL over the study period. 
The individual sums of VL are recorded in Table 9. A holistic view of this data is 
presented in Table 10. The average is 12.5% and is based on the data captured during the 
study period and is based upon the number of statutes and the number of violations 
occurring thereafter. It is evident from the 6 calculations that the number of 
noncompliance incidences differs significantly between R1–R6 based on the differences 
in the laws themselves over the study period. However, in Table 11 and Table 12, MD-
DNR provided hard numbers for all licenses issued and the number of noncompliant 
licensees failing to report his or her commercial blue crab harvest employing those 
licenses. Percent of noncompliance for not meeting 100% harvest reporting culminates in 
Table 13. 
Summary 
As I indicated in the introduction, I sought to answer the main research question 
of finding any correlation between two variables in one industry. In this study, I 
conducted correlation analysis, which does not require estimation of confidence intervals, 
necessarily. Therefore, the testing did not provide for any confidence interval. I 
conducted only correlation analysis as indicated in the introduction; the correlation 
analysis does not necessarily require conducting hypothesis testing. No initial or 
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additional tests of hypothesis was conducted in this research; as stated in the introduction, 
I focused primarily on correlation analysis between key variables of interest. 
Question 1: What is the relationship between annual commercial blue crab related 
regulations enacted as measured by individual count and type and noncompliance by 
commercial fishers as measured by the number of tickets written annually? 
Correlation coefficient estimates presented in grouped format from Tables 5 
through 7 and the holistic test results reported in Table 8 are all consistent in suggesting 
that a narrative that an increasing number of laws and statutes introduced into the blue 
crab fishing industry might correlate with the growing number of violations of such laws 
and statutes cannot be fully or wholly supported. Reported correlation results from 
various years over the study period diverge significantly. Whereas correlation coefficient 
from some years suggest that the number of statutes and laws introduced in some years 
correlates positively with the number of violations which occurred afterwards; negative 
correlation coefficient results were found also in other years.  
Question 2: How many times has fishing illegal gear occurred during the study years? 
It is not possible for me to answer this question reliably with this study because 
the actual statutes and regulations are written as groupings of management strategies 
rather than each line of vernacular having its own corresponding identifying number or 
letter. Further, R1 and R3 defines some aspect of crab pot use, but neither is limited to 
number of crab pots, locations, time, season, and each (R) describes data beyond the 
scope of this question. In other words, one enforcement officer may have chosen statutes 
listed under R1 which vernacular groups a variety of types of violations pertinent to blue 
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crab commercial harvest, while another officer may have chosen statutes under R3 which 
groups a variety of types of violations pertinent only to crab pots to identify the violation 
on his or her citation – in this case, the study is seeking illegal gear only. Therefore, the 
data available from MD-DNR does not house enough detailed information to answer this 
question reliably. 
Question 3: Based on enforcement data related to illegal gear, what is the skew on 
harvest data because of commercial blue crab fishers exceeding the crab pot limit? 
According to reviewed literature from the MD-DNR on surveys conducted and 
other related materials on the health of the blue crab population in the Chesapeake Bay, 
effects of the use of illegal gear and commercial crabbers exceeding the crab pot limit 
skew on harvest data depends on a series of factors. Available literature suggests that if 
illegal gear is used in harvesting mandated crab types, the condition would in the short 
run have a positive upward skew on the harvest. However, this is short lived because 
what is reported in the market may not reflect on the data for the season because illegal 
acts go unreported. Likewise, if the illegal catch targets prohibited crab type such as egg 
bearing female crabs or spawning-age female crabs, then although such activity might 
increase the market count during the harvest season, the activity would negatively 
influence the volume of blue crab harvest in the next crabbing season. Commercial 
crabbers exceeding gear limits has the potential to increase blue crab population in the 
short run; however, such illegal activity can negatively impact commercial crabbing 
harvest in the future if continued unchecked. 
Question 4: Do years with no regulatory activity have less enforcement (violations) 
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compared to years with regulatory activity? 
Enforcement data available from MD-DNR for this research study suggest that 
years with no regulatory activities do not have less crime or violations compared to years 
with regulatory activities. The coding structure adopted is consistent with statistical data 
management and lag time between the variables analyzed. Information presented in Table 
2 suggests that all things being equal, years with no regulatory activities do not 
necessarily have less crime or violations compared to years with regulatory activities. It is 
evident that although in most instances no laws coded under R2, R3, R4, and R5 were 
enacted in some years, a significant number of violations of similar laws coded under the 
same (R) code from the previous year occurred, nonetheless. Available data does not 
necessarily support the notion that years with no regulatory activities tend to have less 
crime or violations of existing laws or statutes.  
Question 5: What percent is noncompliance behavior of total licenses reporting activity? 
There are several violations of the various statutes over the period captured in the 
research. The individual sums of VL are recorded in Table 9. A holistic view of this data 
is presented in Table 10. The average percent is 12.5 and is based on the data captured 
during the study period and is based upon the number of statutes and the number of 
violations occurring thereafter. Table 11 and Table 12 provide hard numbers for all 
licenses issued and the number of noncompliant licensees failing to report his or her 
commercial blue crab harvest 100% of the time. Percent of noncompliance for not 
meeting this requirement culminates in Table 13. Reporting harvest is an assumed 
responsibility, and its necessity is interpreted and required by agency rule as opposed to 
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statute; thus, it is not reflected in the raw data for noncompliance. 
In this research, I sought to verify the extent to which growing numbers of 
statutes or laws in the commercial blue crab industry correlates with the number of 
violations of such statues. Two forms of correlation analysis were conducted, and the 
results were consistent in both approaches. Correlation coefficient estimates reported in 
both scenarios failed to support fully, a narrative surmising a link between the number of 
statutes or laws introduced in the commercial blue crab fishing industry and the resultant 
violation of such laws. 
Critical analysis of various correlation coefficient estimates reported in Tables 5, 
6, 7, and 8 suggest that it is not accurate, to infer a consistent relationship between the 
number of laws or statutes enacted in the commercial blue crab industry and subsequent 
violations occurring after such enactment. In some of the post statutes or laws period, the 
number of such statutes or laws tend to correlate positively with subsequent violations of 
the statutes; however, in other year periods, similar numbers of statutes tended to 
correlate negatively with the number of violations that occurred thereafter. 
These divergent outcomes over the period of the research, to some extent, suggest 
that available data does not or is inconsistent with a notion that more statutes or laws in 
the commercial blue crab industry tend to coincide with an increasing violation of such 
laws. One of the key features of consistency identified in this research has to do with the 
fact that the number of violations of statutes or laws tend to reflect more on the type or 
nature of a statute or law. Some of the statutes or laws tend to be associated with 
relatively more violations than others regardless of the number of such statutes or laws 
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according to the data. For instance, in Table 2, it is evident that statutes or laws coded as 
R4 is associated with many more violations than the rest of the coded statutes; although 
in some of the year periods, other coded statutes such as R1 in 2011 had more statutes or 
laws introduced. 
It is evident from Table 2 that R4 was violated markedly more than any other 
statute or law presently on the books for the commercial blue crab industry in Maryland’s 
Chesapeake Bay area. This variable is a culmination of gear, time, location, seasons, and 
general blue crab rules and policy – not mature females, peelers, or soft blue crabs. These 
particular blue crab life cycles are found in R5 and R6, respectively. Table 3 demonstrates 
that violations begin 2010 and include up to 2017. Violations for R4 are no less than 409 
violations in 2017 to as many as 813 in 2016. The next largest violations for a data set is 
R3 with as few as 31 violations in 2013 and as many as 86 violations in 2010. 
Finally, grouped correlation estimates to a greater extent suggest that the number 
of statutes or laws introduced does not always correlate positively with the number of 
violations of such laws as has been presumed by some in the industry. Even in instances 
where the number of laws or statutes introduced were found to correlate positively with 
the number of violations of such laws afterwards, it is important to point out that 
presented results only suggest a mere significant association between the variables. The 
results do not infer any causal interactions between the variables since correlation 
analysis only focuses on identifying relationships and not causal association. 
The findings from this research have considerable policy implication for key 
policy makers responsible for managing activities in the commercial blue crab industry 
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which is worth exploring further. Presented results, for instance, could help shape the 
nature and type of policies introduced to management activities in the commercial blue 
crab industry. Apart from the main research question, ensuing empirical analysis found 
evidence suggesting that rather than the number of statutes or laws having meaningful 
relationship with the number of violations of such statutes after its implementation, a 
growing number of violations recorded tend to relate to the type and nature of statutes 
introduced. For instance, from Table 2, it is evident that R4, which is a coded variable for 
some statutes seems to be associated with significantly more violations that other coded 
statutes or laws. Finally, Table 13 demonstrates that commercial crabbers fail to report 
their harvest 100% of the time, and without this core, frontline data, harvests would 
remain a poor estimate of the blue crab population. 
In Chapter 4, I provided the results of the study and answer each of the research 
questions. I provided graphs that depict the identified correlations and percentages of 
noncompliance for reporting harvests. The data uncovered interesting phenomenon for 
future studies. The prescriptive material for further exploration in the next chapter then, is 
to further investigate why specific statues or laws tend to attract significantly more 
violations than others. In Chapter 5, I presented the discussion, summary findings, and 
recommendations for future research. 
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Introduction 
The purpose of this quantitative, correlational study was to determine whether 
there was a statistical or empirically verifiable relationship between the number of 
commercial blue crab statutes (laws) introduced, and the resultant violations of such laws. 
In the study, I systematically compared secondary data, profiling a specific group and 
specific commercial regulations related to blue crab. The data collection process  
provided a volume estimate of enforcement data relative to commercial crabbing in 
Maryland’s Chesapeake Bay. The sample spanned nearly a decade. The selection process 
included those regulations that have a direct enforcement relationship to commercial blue 
crab as defined by the MD-DNR.  
Noncompliance contributes to overregulation that leads to enforcement barriers, 
which negatively effect conservation efforts and economic opportunities. In this study, I 
sought to influence how commercial blue crab fisheries related regulatory activities are 
formulated and implemented with emphasis on equality of harvest, enforcement potential, 
and potential reactions from commercial blue crabbers (violations). I attempted to answer 
the following questions with the available data: What is the relationship between annual 
commercial blue crab related regulations enacted as measured by individual count and 
type and noncompliance by commercial fishers as measured by the number of tickets 
written annually? How many times has fishing illegal gear occurred during the study 
years? Based on enforcement data related to illegal gear, what is the skew on harvest data 
because of commercial blue crab fishers exceeding the crab pot limit? Do years with no 
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regulatory activity have less enforcement (crime) compared to years with regulatory 
activity? What percent is noncompliance behavior of total licenses reporting activity? 
As a facilitator of resource management pro-activity,  I sought to provide clear 
and accurate findings based upon the available data in order to encourage cooperation 
between the vast and diversified stakeholders to solve a problem. Within the Chesapeake 
Bay, the stakes are personal at the community level. For instance, lower shore crabbers 
depend a great deal on the soft and peeler crab market, while the middle Bay crabbers 
depend on peelers, hard, and sook crabs, and the upper Bay crabber’s focus is hard crabs. 
These differences play a vital role in enforcement data, making location equally 
important to coding violation activity. Secondary data provided both variables. The 
independent variable was the presence, type, and number of commercial blue crab 
regulatory actions brought to Maryland’s General Assembly. Blue crab regulations 
included all that which encompassed the words: regulation, act, law, public notice, 
management practice, and or proposal including sunset and repealed laws. The dependent 
variable under investigation was blue crab commercial enforcement data. The 
enforcement data comprised citations, warnings, and public hearing announcements 
reported or recorded by MD-NRP between 2010 and 2017.  
The foremost purpose for this study was to find out if significant interaction 
effects exist among the various variables examined in the study and the extent to which it 
might influence the outcome of enforcement, harvest, and regulatory activity. A large data 
set required that I present the results in multiple formats. The first format I utilized had 
three groups reflecting three different year structures. The second format involved the 
252 
 
 
entire scope of the period captured in the study and was designed to take a holistic 
overview of the entire data sets for this research. The results clearly indicated a divergent 
correlation outcome. Empirical correlation coefficient evidence associated with some 
periods examined seem to support, while other periods examined negated the narrative 
that more statutes or laws were associated with more violations of the same. As such, it 
would be erroneous to suggest that more laws produced more violations of such laws. 
Discussion 
 I based this study on enforcement/compliance theory, which assumes that 
compliance equals zero violations, but free will leads to behavior that suggests humans 
choose to break the law based upon a variety of factors. Researchers have identified a 
multitude of factors that affect compliance behavior such as moral development, income 
potential, perceived legitimacy, expected penalties compared against benefits, reduced 
perceived quality of life, reduced job satisfaction, distrust in government, adopting risk 
behavior, reduced psychological and physical health, and a reduced standard of living 
(Kuperan & Sutinen, 1998; Lord, 2011; Nasser, 2013).  
In commercial fisheries, this might lead to crimes such as illegal, unreported, and 
unregulated harvest, fishing over the line, and other gear violations (Ali & Abdullah, 
2010; Aries et al., 2015; Daw & Gray, 2005; Dresdner, Chavez, & Barriga, 2015; Eliasen, 
Papdopoulou, Vassilopoulou, & Catchpole, 2014; Hentati-Sundberg, Hjelm, & 
Osterblom, 2014; Kuperan & Sutinen, 1998; Mazany et al., 2015; Nielsen & Mathiesen, 
2003). Applying enforcement/compliance theory to my study topic yielded data that 
demonstrated violations as a response to regulatory activity in the commercial blue crab 
253 
 
 
management arena, but the data did not wholly show that cumulative regulations lead to 
additional violations of such regulations. 
However, the data clearly showed that based on the data provided and the time 
captured that R4 had significantly more violations each year as compared to other coded 
variables, regardless of zero regulatory activity in any prior year. R4 captured violations 
regarding blue crab gear – not specific, which consists of crab pots and other harvest 
gear; times and locations to fish commercially; governing rules of male blue crabs; policy 
that included rules and regulations generally; and closed seasons for hard crabs except 
females. The runner up for the most violations each year captured R5, except in the years 
2013 and 2015. R5 violations concerned peelers and soft crabs and sizes of such and 
other crabs, lawful gears, and commercial rules, limitations, and prohibitions generally. 
Finally, R3, crab pots, had the most violations per year regardless of regulatory activity in 
the previous year except in the years 2013 and 2015 when R3 held second place for total 
violations committed.  
Unfortunately, the lack of detail available in the violations’ raw data prevented me 
from coding the variables with the desired statute detail. Statute detail would have 
provided depth to the specific activity violated as opposed to the lumping of statutes and 
relative violations to identify trends. Empirical studies that support or negate rules are 
essential to championing compliance as stressed by the Common Fisheries Policy in 
2013. The results make it clear that MD-DNR and MD-NRP need to work together to 
implement detailed violation data entry to detect other trends present in specific statute 
subtitles, chapters, and paragraphs. Identifying and addressing trends can assist 
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stakeholders in working towards cooperative management and compliant behavior. This 
study showed that fisheries enforcement and management needed empirical studies and 
must consider enforcement and compliance theory as it relates to regulatory activity and 
responses of the end-users – in this case, the Maryland Eastern Shore commercial 
crabber.  
Interpretation of the Findings 
 Credible data that supports specific decision-making regarding management of 
the Maryland Chesapeake Bay blue crab continues to be absent in the study of fisheries. 
Most researchers rely on conservation, eco-systems, economics, and common-
property/rights-based theories to ground their studies. This neglects the most important 
aspects of implementing laws to manage natural resources because it fails to answer 
questions about the who, what, where, how, and when enforcement is occurring. 
Identifying these factors can lead to asking not only the why behind compliance behavior, 
but also offering recommendations on how to work towards a solution of the problem 
using autonomous, qualitative design to reach stakeholders. This study demonstrated that 
patterns emerge between regulatory activity and enforcement data, and those patterns can 
be analyzed further through future research. 
 Quantitative, empirical studies on compliance behavior and enforcement that 
identify patterns are scarce in the literature. This lack of interest spans 300 years, and it 
remains an untackled, obligatory necessity. Current practices in blue crab management in 
Maryland’s Chesapeake Bay is an example of Nielsen and Mathiesen’s (2003) 
observation that “management bodies [employ] restrictive control measures or ignore 
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problems [altogether]” (p. 409). Those researchers who have ventured into this arena 
have discovered compliance behaviors do exist. In 2004, Fogarty and Miller discovered 
substantial impact in the number of blue crabs reported when reporting requirements 
were changed even though the overall population showed minimal fluctuation in 
population. This response to reporting changes is one more example of how regulatory 
activity can influence end-user response, and these types of responses provide evidence 
in support of the need for continued empirical studies grounded in enforcement and 
compliance theory. A second example includes “fishing the line and spill-out” effects, 
which simply means that commercial fishing people drift on the edge of sanctuaries then 
harvest the resources as they swim out of their hideaway (Guenther et al., 2015). What is 
seen in R5 is another form of fishing the line. A fraction of an inch or blatant disregard 
lead to violations of undersize, out-of-season, or illegal catch of peelers, soft crabs, and 
other crabs not sook, and in this study, this violation saw a great deal of enforcement 
activity. 
Conclusions 
My study’s primary research question asked: What is the relationship between 
annual commercial blue crab related regulations enacted as measured by individual count 
and type and noncompliance by commercial fishers as measured by the number of tickets 
written annually? The results clearly showed a divergent correlation outcome. Empirical, 
correlation coefficient evidence associated with some periods examined seems to support 
the narrative that more regulations breed more violations of such; however, this cannot be 
said for other years captured in this study. A critical analysis of results presented in Table 
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5 showed that a positive correlation between the various laws introduced in 2009 and the 
number of violations of the same in the period of the introduction of the law in 2010 
existed; this is indicated by a correlation coefficient of 0.79644. Correlation results 
presented in Table 5, however, further suggest a negative correlation between the number 
of laws introduced in 2010 and 2011 and the number of violations which occurred a year 
after those laws were introduced. This is indicated by a negative correlation coefficient of 
-0.3588 and -0.1667 respectively. 
Through the literature review, I described the strife leading up to the above dates 
of interest. In 2008, MD-DNR identified overreporting of harvest as a response to 
upcoming hard crab laws whereby new individual quotas were to be set to historical 
harvests from each license holder. During the same year, hatchery crabs were being 
released into the wild (Zohar et al., 2008). Those that underreported initially were feeling 
the sting of this new law. Then again in 2010, the female and male hard crab harvest was 
separated by license type. This skewed numbers mirror Lord’s (2011) characterization of 
fishers as willing to break the law based upon their individual perspective if they feel a 
threat to their standard of living. Indeed, in 2012, Emery et al. questioned the practicality 
of quota systems in common property resources. The diverse literature certainly gave the 
commercial fishing community a reason to resist change as they perceive their historical 
practices as no more or less credible than those proposed by the science they resist. 
Certainly, identifying R4 as a prominent area of violation helps fill the gap in the 
literature as to types of laws that are violated more than others. 
Although a correlation design does not identify causes of such a phenomenon, I 
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would argue that changes in hard crab laws that specifically separated male from female 
harvests by ITQs was the source of the positive correlation in 2009 to 2010. This time in 
Maryland’s blue crab industry was wrought with unrest among its participants. Not only 
were license types changed, but also boat harvest limits, individual harvest limits, and 
new formulas for identifying brood stock numbers were under discussion by MD-DNR. 
The current study adds to the enforcement/compliance knowledge base and supports the 
age-old problem that fisheries is lacking empirical studies in enforcement theory. 
Limitations of the Study 
 I limited this study to the Maryland Chesapeake Bay: commercial blue crab 
regulations and violations of such by commercial crabbers. For this study, I sought to 
collect data that included regulatory activity and the following enforcement. However, I 
discovered early on in data sorting that the details of the violation were limited and the 
entry of such was disjointed. I aimed for greater detail such as: specific # of individual 
illegal male or female hard, peeler, or soft crabs caught and # of illegal crab pots 
overused and or confiscated. The results cannot be generalized to other states or to other 
types of commercial fisheries, but the study is worth repeating for other resources in the 
Chesapeake Bay region. I based this study on a correlation design, and I presented 
commercial blue crab regulations and the violations of such by commercial crabbers 
between the years 2009 and 2017. Because the raw data was inconsistent in its original 
entry, it cannot be assumed that the data on which this study was based was inclusive and 
whole. Moreover, although I had access to hard numbers for yearly harvest and the 
number of and license type of commercial crabbers working, I did not perform 
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discrepancy calculations because the raw data did not provide enough detail describing 
the violation. The details required to perform a reliable calculation were not identified in 
the raw data to determine discrepancies between individual harvest reports, pots allowed, 
and type of license demonstrating violations. Regardless, the study discovered several 
trends worth noting. 
Recommendations for Action 
 “Bluewater Crime” as coined by Kuperan and Sutinen (1998) is not “folksy” as 
pointed out by O’Connor Shelley and Crow (2009), and it requires monitoring like any 
other legislative action that leads to enforcement and results in violations. Traffic lights 
are put in place because a specific number of accidents occurred, and the State wants to 
protect its citizens; likewise, protections are required for the commercial blue crab  
industry and its participants. The frontline stakeholders are the primary eyes and 
experience of the state of the fishery, and nothing can replace this baseline data 
(Kerlinger, 1986; Lord, 2011). Eliminate harvest discrepancies and vie for enforceable, 
reasonable, and practical regulations to proliferate the industry not simply stabilize it at 
maximum capacity, such as MSY attempts to do. I recommend the following actions be 
taken: 
1. The federal government should play an active role in advising how to improve 
the water quality of the Chesapeake Bay. The Chesapeake Bay is the largest 
natural estuary in the United States and continues to be a productive resource. 
Water sources begin in New York state and rush through the tributaries until 
they spill into the tidal basin bringing with it, garbage of every kind as well as 
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unimaginable mineral and chemical runoff that contributes to the demise of 
the Bay. Disjointed regulation for a migratory species such as blue crab 
demands oversight that provide checks and balances for individual states’ 
management theories and practices - evening the playing field for commercial 
crabbers in both states - and requires that all states share in the stewardship of 
this natural wonder in America. 
2. Individual states should encourage stewardship of the Bay through media 
avenues of all kinds (social media, billboards, commercials) that visually 
depicts the negative effects on the Bay from everyday practices like: litter 
such as butts, soda cans, and plastics, fertilizer use at home, overuse of 
exterior water sources, illegal harvest of natural resources, gear left unkempt, 
illegal gear, illegal sale of illegal harvest, and the like. 
3. MD-DNR and MD-NRP should rethink how they will record violations from 
point of incident to data base entry that includes specific titles, subtitles, 
chapters, location and the like for future reference and studies. This data is the 
key to future success in compliance behavior. It will uncover unexpected 
trends that can be identified and addressed directly without using the top-
down or control and command approach, which has proven unsuccessful in 
most fisheries throughout the world as the literature represents. Compliance 
behavior can and should be encouraged through communication between 
stakeholders. 
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4. Individual commercial crabbers should take responsibility for themselves at 
an individual and group level. Based on the results of the data, it is evident 
that some commercial crabbers continue to break the law and are unsatisfied 
with regulatory actions. The literature states most violations occur as a direct 
choice. If this is the case, then it is prudent to discuss why they continue to 
break certain laws as opposed to others, or to discuss what it would take to 
gain compliance in that specific regulation. This being the case, they need to 
provide honest, hard-core dialogue in an environment where they feel safe and 
free from reproach or punishment later. 
Recommendations for Further Research 
 This topic is significant because despite having a marine police force in place 
since the late 1800s, noncompliance continues to threaten the fishery resources of the 
Chesapeake Bay. Compliance results in a reduction in citations which means less actual 
direct and indirect costs and proliferation of Maryland’s seafood industry increases with 
legal harvest potential. Therefore, I recommend that further studies be led in the 
following areas: 
1. Supplementary research could include sourcing original, hardcopy data that 
includes the physical ticket that may or may not provide additional violation 
details. Repeating the study steps and making comparisons for an extended 
time series study spanning multiple decades would provide a great deal of 
detail in the types of crimes occurring consistently over time and may reveal 
further trends. 
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2. This study was quantitative, and a qualitative or mixed-methods study could 
provide important perspective on the issue of enforcement and compliance in 
the Chesapeake Bay region as opposed to Maryland’s Bay area only. 
3. This study was based on a single commercial harvest: Maryland blue crab, 
and a similar study could be performed for other natural marine resources 
utilized as a commodity in Maryland’s fishing industry to seek trends in 
compliance behavior. 
Implications for Social Change 
 There is a long contentious history in Maryland concerning regulatory action for 
the Chesapeake Bay blue crab (Callinectes sapidus). Over 300 years, industrial 
revolutions occurred that made it possible to exploit this natural resource and send it to 
the farthest reaches of the world creating a multimillion-dollar blue crab delicacy. In 
1939, the crab pot invention changed the playing field for evermore. Today, crab pots 
continue to catch more than 62% of the total blue crab harvest and are managed by MSY, 
a poor design for a migratory species. As supported by the data, noncompliance continues 
onward and has even demonstrated trends in response to some types of regulations. Now 
is the time for change through communication and empirical evidence that supports or 
negates previous management systems. As restrictions keep increasing, the economic 
impact on local communities is substantial, and compliance monitoring issues escalate 
with the problem. This study has the potential to bring stakeholders together to lead 
discussions in policy making and the unspoken costs of enforcement and compliance 
behavior. 
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 My original argument that more laws breed more violations has been debunked in 
that it may be true some of the time, but it is not wholly true all of the time. The analysis 
further demonstrated that types of laws may breed more violations of such a law. This is a 
starting ground to discuss potential policy changes in record keeping strategies. The 
enforcement variable has often been taken as a constant and not included in the literature. 
In contrast to that perception, the day-to-day officers on the ground are an important key 
ingredient equal to that of the commercial crabbers themselves. The methods by which 
they record activities and violations is the secondary data employed by the use of 
empirical studies in enforcement. 
Additionally, future data collection needs to include the location of violations as it 
pertains to longitude and latitude in an effort to create a complete picture of violation 
occurrences within the Chesapeake Bay. This study helps to fill that continued gap in 
empirical studies in enforcement. In 2004, Fogarty and Miller analyzed the changes in the 
Maryland blue crab harvest reporting system and discovered that substantial changes in 
the blue crab reported individually did not flow into differences in total stock abundance 
of the blue crab population. The study was timely for its necessity to demonstrate 
empirical studies in regulatory requirements of how harvests were reported. Now, MD-
DNR needs to revisit their reporting systems from harvest to violation of regulations in 
detail in order to provide accurate, factual data regarding new phenomena discovered by 
this regulatory enforcement analysis. 
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Contribution of the Study to Social Change 
 Even though the data captured in this study did not demonstrate statistically 
significant results for each research question, the main question demonstrated divergence, 
suggesting responses from commercial crabbers are sometimes effected but not all the 
time for similar regulatory activity in the blue crab industry. This proves that commercial 
crabbers do not always respond negatively towards regulatory activity. Indeed, the 
empirical evidence suggests that certain types of regulations seem to be violated more 
than others, and this is worth further discussion in a workgroup setting. The results of the 
current study confirm the conclusion of earlier research that included types of crimes 
committed (Ali & Abdullah, 2010; Arias et al., 2015; Daw & Gray, 2005;Dresdner, 
Chávez, & Barriga, 2015; Eliasen, Papdopoulou, Vassilopoulou, & Catchpole, 2014; 
Guenther et al., 2015; Hentat-Sundberg, Hjelm, & Ӧsterblom, 2014; Kuperan & Sutinen, 
1998; Mazany et al., 2005; Nielsen & Mathiesen, 2003). 
Seeking dialogue concerning these results with the frontline is prudent for MD-
DNR and MD-NRP. This may lessen the volatile relationship between immediate 
stakeholders (commercial crabbers, NRP, DNR, and legislators), improve on data 
collection and storing practices, create meaningful management practices, and build 
lasting relationships among the players allowing a multimillion-dollar industry to flourish 
without constant duress from groups seeking independent agendas. 
Summary 
The study provided data spanning nearly an entire decade relative to commercial 
crabbing in Maryland’s Chesapeake Bay. The selection process included those regulations 
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that have a direct enforcement relationship to commercial blue crab as defined by the 
MD-DNR. I sought to discover if significant interaction effects existed among the various 
variables examined in the study and the extent to which it might influence the outcome of 
such. Unfortunately, the lack of detail available in the violations’ raw data limited my 
coding of these statutes and the detailed results desired.  
The results make it clear that MD-DNR and MD-NRP need to work together to 
implement detailed violation data entry to detect other possible trends present in specific 
statute subtitles, chapters, and paragraphs. Quantitative studies remain scarce in the 
literature. This lack of action in empirical research has continued for more than 300 years 
and continues to threaten conservation of the Maryland blue crab. Although the results 
cannot be generalized to other states or to other types of commercial fisheries, the study 
is worth repeating for other resources in the Chesapeake Bay region. I based this study on 
a correlation design that presented commercial blue crab regulations and the violations of 
such by commercial crabbers between the years 2009 and 2017. 
Noncompliance contributes to overregulation that leads to enforcement barriers 
that negatively effects conservation efforts and economic opportunities. In this study, I 
sought to influence how commercial blue crab fisheries related regulatory activities are 
formulated and implemented with emphasis on practicability, enforcement potential, and 
potential reactions from commercial blue crabbers (violations). Noncompliance 
represents an ongoing problem in commercial fisheries. Results of this quantitative study 
indicate that certain types of regulations are violated more than others, and in some years, 
regulations triggered violations, while in other years, regulations appeared to have no 
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bearing on the number of violations that occurred following the regulatory activity. 
Results of the study can be used by Maryland agencies, legislators, educators, and a 
variety of stakeholders interested in the success of the Maryland commercial blue crab 
industry, which will serve the entire State of Maryland.   
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Appendix: Request to Conduct the Study 
Dear Maryland Natural Resource Police: 
 My name is Jacquelyn, previously – President of Watermen’s Allegiance for 
Regulatory Fairness - WARF, and I had the fortune to work with the Department of 
Natural Resources after submitting legislation – The Apprenticeship Program, (1998). 
Specifically, I worked with Mr. Pete Jensen who introduced me to your many 
departments. Today, I am working to complete my PhD in Public Administration. My 
strong interest in the blue crab industry in Maryland continues as my title asserts, 
“Measuring Regulatory and Noncompliance Prevalence Among Maryland Commercial 
Blue Crab Fishers.” I am writing this letter to request, officially, the use of departmental 
secondary data in order to complete my research requirements. I humbly request the 
assistance of the Department to acquire such data. I recognize time and budget constraints 
necessitates prioritizing resources, but I believe this research is essential to filling the gap 
that exists between enforcement data and regulatory action. Often, enforcement issues 
and related budgets are barriers to successful conservation. The purpose of this 
quantitative, correlational study is to discover if a relationship between types and number 
of regulatory action and recorded blue crab citations and warnings exists. 
Certainly, should my document be published, credit would be given to the 
Department for its appreciated and valued assistance. Therefore, I am seeking 
commercial citation and warning data related to blue crab that you can offer via your 
public access availability. At the very least, I hope to retrieve enforcement data for a 
minimum of the 10 previous years to create solid validity. I look forward to hearing from 
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you, and I thank you in advance for your valuable time and knowledge. Please feel free to 
reach out to me by any media above provided. I anxiously await your questions, 
concerns, and direction. 
With sincere respect,  
Jacquelyn Lee Rachor-Hornsby 
 
 
 
